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This thesis seeks to investigate the associations among Executive Compensation (EC), 
Sustainable Banking Disclosure (SBD), Financial Performance (FP), competition and Bank 
Risk-Taking (BRT) in English-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa (ESSA) countries. Additionally, 
the thesis explores the mediating role of Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (CGI) on 
these associations in the ESSA banks. The thesis adopts different statistical techniques to 
provide an in-depth analysis. Specifically, and to address endogeneity problems, the study 
employs two stage least squares (2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation 
and lagged structure. Using 220 banks in the ESSA region for the period from 2007 to 2018, 
the thesis finds that internal governance practices and competition are key determinant of BRT 
in the region. Next, the findings of thesis suggest that the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity 
(PSS) is mainly positive, and also enhances in banks with high CGI, implying that the PSS is 
contingent on the internal CGI of banks. Further, the evidence of the thesis show that, the 
sustainability-for-performance sensitivity (SPS) is generally positive, and this association is 
reinforced in banks with high CGI, indicating that the SPS is dependent on banks internal CG 
mechanisms. The results of the thesis are robust to alternative measures, estimation methods, 
potential endogeneity issues and sample selection problems. The findings of the thesis have 
important implications for banking practitioners, regulators, environmental activists and 
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1.1 Introduction and research background  
     More than a decade after the start of the financial crisis, the banking sector continues to face 
key challenges with rebuilding trust and increasing their engagement with clients, customers, 
employees and other stakeholders (UNEP-FI, 2020). Therefore, it has been suggested that, for 
the banking sector to rebuild trust and effectively engage with its stakeholders, the sector needs 
to redefine and affirm its role and responsibilities in shaping and financing a sustainable future 
(UNEP-FI, 2020). Across the globe, countries are working towards greener environment, while 
the millennial generation is changing consumption patterns and business practices (UNEP-FI, 
2020). Accordingly, in order for the banking sector to continue to play a pivotal role in the 21st 
century, the sector has to demonstrate how it is meeting society’s changing needs and demands 
(UN Global compact, 2020; UNEP-FI, 2020). Arguably, one way by which the banking sector 
may achieve this is through sustainable banking or responsible banking initiatives (UN Global 
compact, 2020; UNEP-FI, 2020; Nwagwu, 2020).  
    Sustainable banking can be defined as the integration of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) criteria into traditional banking, and the setting of ESG benefits as a key 
objective (Deloitte, 2017). Alternatively, sustainable banking can be considered as the 
acceptance and incorporation of sustainability concept into the core operations and services of 
banks (Deloitte, 2017). Similarly, responsible banking defines the role of the banking sector in 
building a sustainable future through an inclusive society that uses its natural resources 
sustainably (UNEP-FI, 2020). Thus, responsible banking provides the framework for a 
sustainable banking system and helps the banking sector to demonstrate how it can make a 
positive contribution to society and the planet (UNEP-FI, 2020). Evidently, both sustainable 
banking and responsible banking refer to unique framework for ensuring that the banking 
sectors’ strategies, practices and operations are align with the sustainability vision set out in 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Climate Agreement 
(UNEP-FI, 2020). Therefore, it must be highlighted that, these two terminologies (sustainable 
banking and responsible banking) may be used interchangeably throughout the thesis, however, 
they refer to the same practice in the banking sector as both have become integral part of the 
21st century banking. 
    The integration of sustainability into banking operations is gradually becoming an important 
driver in the global banking system. For instance, sustainability related issues in banking have 
been amplified because of the impact of banks’ activities on the wider society (Fakoya & 
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Nakeng, 2019). In recent times, banks are under intense pressure from various stakeholders to 
incorporate sustainability concerns into their core operations (Kumar & Prakash, 2019). This 
is due to the potential crucial role that banks can play in promoting sustainable development 
through driving inclusive economic growth (UNEP FI, 2016). For example, it has been 
suggested that, the role of banks in contributing towards advancing progress in achieving 
sustainable business environment is priceless (Ntim, 2016). There is therefore a global concern 
for banks to shift from traditional banking and adopt sustainable banking practices (SBPs) into 
their core business strategy (Kumar & Prakash, 2019). 
    However, SBPs seem not to have occupied core position in the operation of banks in English-
speaking Sub-Saharan Africa (ESSA) countries in the past 20 years. This was premised on the 
perception that, unlike manufacturing companies, banks require fewer natural resources. 
Banking activities were largely considered to have less detrimental impact on the environment 
in the region (Nosratabadi et al., 2020). Nevertheless, due to the present socially conscious 
business environment, sustainable banking has become a focal topic across the ESSA region. 
Hence, SBPs trend is fast changing how banks operate in the region. As an illustration, SBPs 
gained attention in ESSA after the adoption of the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (UN SDGs) in 2015- setting 2030 as the deadline for attaining the goals. Primarily, the 
SDGs set criteria for sustainability through key best practices in order to compel corporations 
such as banks to fully integrate SBPs into their core operations. 
    The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates the 
worldwide investment needs for attaining the SDGs to be around US$5 to US$7 trillion yearly 
(UNCTAD, 2019). Concerning developing countries, the estimate is approximately US$3.3 to 
4.5 trillion annually (UNCTAD, 2019). With this huge financial investment gap needed in 
attaining the goals, the critical role that banks can play in directly advancing progress with the 
SDGs turn out to be much stronger (Nwagwu, 2020). This is particularly crucial in ESSA where 
banks dominate the financial sector. Banking assets account for more than 60% of the ESSA 
financial system (Mlachila et al., 2016). Noticeably, banks in ESSA can make an important 
contribution to the transition towards achieving SDGs through the integration of SBPs in their 
operations and services (Citigroup, 2017; David & Laurie, 2012).  
    The concept of SBPs incorporates sustainability principles in three key areas of banking: 
product definition processes, corporate strategy, and funding decisions (Nwagwu, 2020). 
Distinct from traditional banking where investment decisions are primarily based on risk and 
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return, in SBPs context, the social and environmental impact of investments decisions are given 
much greater consideration (Deloitte, 2017). Therefore, this paradigm shift requires banks not 
to only focus on maximizing shareholder value, but to also manage the impact of their 
operations on the broader stakeholders (Nizam et al., 2019). Therefore, the concept of SBPs 
seek to balance shareholder value maximization with sustainability concerns (Nwagwu, 2020). 
    Specifically, and in support of the SDGs, on September 22, 2019, at the United Nations 
General Assembly in New York, the Principles for Responsible Banking (PFRB) was formally 
signed under the framework of the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
(UNEP-FI). The UNEP-FI is a global partnership established between the United Nations 
Environment Program and the financial sector (UNEP-FI, 2020). The Principles seek to 
provide banks with a blueprint on how banks can support with addressing the problems of 
climate disruption and the creation of a sustainable future (UNEP-FI, 2020). The PFRB focus 
on creating the future of global banking through six key sustainable banking principles. The 
six principles are briefly discussed below. More than a third of the global banking sector has 
signed the PFRB (UNEP-FI, 2020). This milestone shows the sector’s pledge to sustainability 
and aligning its business operations and services to the provisions in the 2015 Paris Agreement 
and the SDGs. 
    The first PFRB (alignment) requires signatory banks to align their business strategies and 
decisions in such a manner that it will take into account individuals’ needs societal needs as 
captured in the SDGs and the 2015 Paris Agreement (UNEP-FI, 2020). The second Principle 
(impact and target setting) specifies that, banks should progressively increase their positive 
impacts, but limit the negative impacts as well as manage the risks of their operation to people, 
society, and the environment (UNEP-FI, 2020). It calls for setting and publishing of targets that 
can lead to substantial impacts. Consistent with the SDGs, the third PFRB (clients and 
customers) stipulates that, banks should work with their customers and clients in a responsible 
manner so as to encourage SBPs and enhance economic activities, thereby creating shared 
prosperity for current and future generations (UNEP-FI, 2020). In line with the SDGs, the 
fourth Principle (stakeholders) calls for banks to be responsible by proactively consulting, 
engaging, and partnering with relevant stakeholders so as to attain societal goals. The fifth 
Principle (governance and culture) specifies that, banks should commit and implement the 
PFRB through effective governance and a culture of responsible banking (UNEP-FI, 2020). 
The sixth Principle (transparency and accountability) requires banks to regularly review the 
implementation and achievement of the PFRB. It also calls for signatory banks to be more 
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transparent about and accountable for both their positive and negative impacts as well as their 
contribution to the societal goals and the SDGs (UNEP-FI, 2020).  
    Importantly, it has been suggested that the characteristics of those entrusted with the internal 
governance of banks are crucial with regards to achieving a balance between satisfying 
shareholder value maximisation and addressing SBPs concerns (Fakoya & Nakeng, 2019). This 
is because, the broader spectrum of internal governance fundamentally addresses in whose best 
interest should banks operate (Elkington, 2006). For instance, the contemporary approach of 
internal governance focuses on long-term sustainability of banks (Hussain et al., 2018; 
Elkington, 2006). In particular, Hussain et al. (2018) suggest that internal governance 
mechanisms may influence the entire value chain commonly referred to as the triple bottom 
line (TBL) of banks. The three pillars of TBL are economic, environmental, and social 
performance. Based on this approach, scholars argue that internal governance mechanisms of 
banks should give equal weight to economic, environmental, and social dimensions (e.g., 
Hussain et al., 2018; Elkington, 2006). Similarly, prior research also suggests that internal 
governance structures such as corporate board can play a crucial role in leading banks to focus 
on their performance in respect of TBL initiatives (Tang et al., 2018). Thus, the board can serve 
as “a catalyst” for TBL performance (Walker et al., 2015). 
    The implication is that internal governance structures of banks may play a critical role in 
sustainable banking since TBL forms the three main pillars of SBPs. Notably, the TBL agenda 
is the responsibility of the corporate board (Elkington, 2006). For example, recent stream of 
research emphasizes that the tasks of the board are no longer limited to maximize shareholder 
value, but also to address the increasing concerns over SBPs (e.g., Shakil et al., 2020; Kouaib 
et al., 2020; Kanojia & Bindra, 2018). In particular, evidence from developed countries 
suggests that internal governance structures such as board attributes influence SBPs because of 
the probable impact of corporate governance (CG) on TBL (e.g., Shakil et al., 2020; Kanojia 
& Bindra, 2018; Goel, 2010). For example, Shakil et al. (2020) argue that internal CG 
structures can impact on the economic and social dimensions of TBL. They posit that, the 
financial performance (FP) and social performance of banks are largely driven by corporate 
executives and their pay. Meanwhile, the appointment of executives and the level of executive 
compensation (EC) packages are determined by the board. For this reason, some scholars (e.g., 
Ntim et al., 2019; Ntim et al., 2015; Jensen & Murphy, 1990) contend that, in poor governed 
banks where senior managers are given the power to determine their own pay, powerful senior 
managers may expropriate the resources of banks through excessive compensation. On the 
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contrary, others also propose that in banks with effective CG structures, EC arrangements can 
be structured such that it can limit senior managers from expropriating the resources of banks 
through excessive compensation (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). 
    Similarly, the acceptance and incorporation of SBPs into bank's operations and services are 
largely driven by the executives of banks (Nwagwu, 2020). The implication is that EC 
arrangement can be used as a motivation channel for executives to deliver on strong 
sustainability performance and the FP of banks (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; 
Dittmann et al., 2017). Accordingly, there is an ongoing research drive to find ways to motivate 
executives to be more sustainable responsible (e.g., Haque & Ntim, 2020; Kartadjumena & 
Rodgers, 2019). Prior studies in non-financial sector suggest that banks can achieve this by 
linking EC to SBPs (e.g., Elkhashen, 2019; Haque, 2017).  
    On the contrary, opponents of SBPs contend that sustainability concerns should be solely 
addressed by governments because it lies outside the mandate of banks (e.g., Durrani, et al., 
2020; Simpson & Kohers, 2002; Preston & O’Bannon, 1997). They posit that SBPs investments 
including the adoption of socially responsible initiatives by banks lead to additional costs which 
create competitive disadvantage (e.g., Simpson & Kohers, 2002; Preston & O’Bannon, 1997; 
Aupperle et al., 1985; Friedman, 1970). They suggest that being sustainability active through 
engaging in community projects, supporting employee welfare and minimizing environmental 
damage can be expensive (Barnett & Salomon, 2006). Therefore, SBPs investments can be a 
huge source of administrative burden to banks (Barnett & Salomon, 2006), with negative 
impact on FP of banks.  
    Next, risk-taking represents significant concern for sustainability related issues in the 
banking system (Alguindigue, 2020). This is because excessive risk-taking threatens the 
stability of the banking system.  Conversely, it has been suggested that internal governance 
structures may influence bank risk-taking (BRT) with far reaching implications on the 
sustainability of banks (e.g., Alguindigue, 2020).  
    Against this backdrop, there are calls for studies that seek to find banks’ motivation for 
engaging in sustainable banking in the ESSA context (see Ntim et al., 2015; Ofori et al., 2014). 
The thesis, therefore, includes three empirical chapters investigating the associations among 
CG, EC, sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), FP and BRT. It also seeks to examine the 
possible moderating effects of CG on these associations. Notably, these three chapters are 
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linked together as they are all related with internal CG structures which are all within the 
context of the thesis. Moreover, the three empirical chapters are important within the context 
of CG and SBD in ESSA banks. Specifically, the three chapters seek to jointly identify key 
drivers of SBD in ESSA with particular focus on internal governance structures. Hence, 
carrying out all-inclusive and multi-dimensional investigations that capture direct and indirect 
links will influence SBD policy in the region. Hence, this thesis looks at SBPs from the ESSA 
context, keeping in view the voluntary nature of sustainability initiatives in ESSA countries. 
    The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, the importance, aim and 
the objectives of the thesis will be discussed. The contributions the thesis will be provided in 
Sections 1.3. Finally, Section 1.4 provides the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Importance, aim and objectives of the thesis 
    Executives of banks have come under increasing scrutiny regarding their compensation in 
the ESSA region. Notably, the behaviour of executives of banks has been suggested to be 
accountable for the collapse of banks and banking crisis in the ESSA banking system 
(Anyanzwa, 2019). In particular, the compensation received by executives of banks in the 
countries continue to attract wide academic, media and policy attention (Ntim et al., 2015). 
This is primarily due to the crucial role that EC plays in the banking system. Accordingly, there 
are calls for research to find ways to limit excessive EC in the region. Crucially, one proposed 
approach to achieve this is to improve the internal CG structures of banks in the region 
(Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2015). To illustrate, countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, 
Ghana and Kenya have witnessed several high profile banking crises over the last two decades. 
The collapse of the banks in these countries were occasioned by poor internal governance 
structures, including excessive EC (e.g., Anyanzwa, 2019; Olaniyi, 2019; Bank of Ghana, 
2018, Ntim et al., 2015). 
    It is also worthy to highlight that, a common issue in this stream of debate on EC in the 
region is whether EC has any implications for shareholder value maximization and long term 
sustainability of banks (e.g., Nwagwu, 2020; Anyanzwa, 2019; Ntim et al., 2015).  In view of 
this, scholars in the region call for the design of EC schemes to serve as a powerful mechanism 
which can align the behaviour of bank executives with a wider stakeholder interests (e.g., 
Haque & Ntim, 2020; Smit & Van Zyl, 2016; Ntim et al., 2015), and possibly increase 
sustainable banking and the survival of banks in the region (Haque & Ntim, 2020). They 
contend that sustainable banking will not exist without sustainable responsible executives (e.g., 
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Nwagwu, 2020; Anyanzwa, 2019). For instance, in recent times, policy makers in the region 
are encouraging banks to tie more and more executive compensation to sustainable banking 
targets (e.g., Nigeria CG Code, 2018). Moreover, theoretical evidence suggests that EC can 
serve as an effective tool that can be employed to motivate senior managers to achieve specific 
goals, including sustainable banking targets and FP (e.g., Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Bebchuk 
et al., 2002; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
    Due to the crucial role and the varied reasons underlying EC in the banking system, policy 
makers and Central Banks in particular in ESSA have attempted to explore its determinants 
(e.g., Olaniyi, 2019; Olalekan & Bodunde, 2015). In particular, the ESSA region has 
undertaken several initiatives to reform EC in ESSA banks (Ntim et al., 2015). Briefly, the 
combined executive reforms in the region suggest that, banks should commit to full disclosure 
of EC, offering particulars of fees, salaries, bonuses, pension contributions, share options and 
any other long-term incentive plans in their annual reports (Ntim et al., 2015). In addition, the 
expectation of the EC reforms is that quality internal governance structures might influence the 
level of EC and sustainable banking in the region.  
    However, in spite of the significance of quality internal governance framework and the 
various Corporate Governance Reforms (CGRs) that have been undertaken in ESSA (e.g., 
Ghana, 2018; Nigeria, 2018; South Africa, 2016), prior studies in the region have concentrated 
solely on in what way or whether FP can influence EC (e.g., Ntim et al., 2019; De Wet, 2012; 
Shaw, 2012). Arguably, FP is not the only probable determinant of EC (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). 
Further, these studies focused on only non-financial firms by excluding banks in the region. 
The results of the above investigations have concentrated on the non-financial firms and thus 
offering little or no insight on the effect of CG on EC in the banking system in the region. In 
addition, the broader CGRs in the banking sector in ESSA countries incorporate the expectation 
that EC may be strongly associated with sustainable banking. Meanwhile, existing banking 
studies in ESSA context have not yet explored the direct links between EC and sustainable 
banking, as well as the possible moderating effect of CG on this link. In addition, and distinct 
from other sectors, the ESSA banking system has unique features (e.g., concentrated 
ownership), which can strengthen the interrelationship among CGI, SBD and FP. Again, most 
prior studies in this field are based on US and UK banks. Therefore, the thesis seeks to provide 
empirical evidence on these associations based on ESSA banking context.  
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    Further, from a conceptual view, CG is crucial in decision-making in the banking system 
and hence, CG can be expected to influence corporate outcomes such as sustainable banking 
(Nwagwu, 2020). Thus, based on the key role of CG in the regions’ banking system, CGRs 
implemented in the region over the past decade incorporate the expectation that effective 
governance structures can influence SBD and FP of banks. Noticeably, this assumption is at 
the core of several studies that have examined the effect of varied CG structures on SBD and 
FP of banks in the region (e.g., Agbim, 2018; Ofoegbu et al., 2018; Barako & Brown, 2008). 
However, although CG is a complex ‘notion’ to operationalize, previous researchers have used 
single CG variables, such as independent directors, board size and female directors (e.g., 
Agbim, 2018; Ofoegbu et al., 2018; Barako & Brown, 2008), for the complex CG ‘concept’ in 
the banking system in the region.               
    Notwithstanding the general consensus of their importance, the findings of these prior 
banking CG research (e.g., Agbim, 2018; Ofoegbu et al., 2018; Barako & Brown, 2008) in 
ESSA are mixed in terms of the nature of the variables investigated and findings. This raises 
crucial questions concerning these individual CG variables that have been used in these studies. 
For example, it is possible that these individual CG variables are not ‘valid’ measures 
(individual CG mechanisms) for the complex ‘notion’ (CG) that these researchers attempt to 
estimate (‘proxy validity’) (Liang et al., 2020; Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ahmed, 2017; Black et 
al., 2016). Accordingly, a limited, nonetheless steadily growing number of studies have lately 
initiated broad methods in developing superior and consistent CG indices (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 
2020; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). For instance, Elmagrhi et al. (2020) use content analysis to 
develop a more reliable CG index containing 120 CG provisions for UK firms. Crucially, they 
observe that the index is more reliable and better specified than the single CG variables. This 
thesis therefore responds to recent calls/debates within the CG literature for a broader CG 
‘concept’ in the banking system (e.g., Liang et al., 2020; Tarchouna et al., 2017; Ahmed, 2017; 
Isukul & Chizea, 2017). Consequently, the thesis employs a broad bank level CG disclosure 
approach to develop an alternative internal governance proxy for ESSA banks.  
    In addition, the CGRs pursued in the ESSA region seek to address excessive BRT behaviour 
which is crucial with regards to sustainable development of the banking system. Notably, the 
extensive CGRs place great importance on reforming internal governance in order to protect 
the interest of all stakeholders. In particular, the CGRs aimed at improving the supervisory role 
of the board as a way of curbing excessive BRT. Therefore, the CGRs consider the board of 
directors as an essential internal governance entity that can alleviate the agency problem 
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between shareholders and senior managers. This implies that the board can play a vital role in 
influencing BRT behaviour.  Specifically, and to improve the oversight function of the board, 
the CGRs encourage the appointment of majority independent directors with financial expertise 
to the board. In order to maintain effective control over the bank and monitor BRT, the CGRs 
propose regular board meetings. Also, the CGRs focus on bank ownership as key governance 
mechanism that can influence BRT in the region. Accordingly, the thesis examines whether 
board attributes, ownership structures and competition have effect on BRT, an area that is yet 
to receive research attention in the ESSA banking context. 
    In spite of the extensive CGRs in the region, by contrast ESSA banks face unique governance 
issues in comparison with banks in developed countries (Ntim et al., 2019). Typically, the 
banking system is characterized by concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1999), weak 
investor protection (Ntim, 2009; La Porta et al., 2000) and ineffective external governance 
mechanisms (Ntim et al., 2019). Notably, prior researchers observe that EC, SBD and BRT 
behavior of banks differ considerably across banking sectors because of variations in legal, 
institutional, supervisory and CG practices (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2019; 
Apergis, 2019). However, past research in this area have focused on developed countries such 
as in the UK and US. Arguably, these developed countries present relatively similar 
institutional contexts (Ntim et al., 2019; Zheng, 2010).  
    Thus, the extant literature on this topic in ESSA is currently limited because prior research 
(e.g., Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007) in the region excluded banks 
from their final sample. Meanwhile, countries in ESSA have different institutional settings, 
with particular regard to CGRs, EC incentives, SBD, and BRT. Hence, the moderating effect 
of CG on these relationships can be expected to differ from that identified in developed 
countries. As such, investigating these interrelationships and interdependence in single study 
particularly in ESSA banking context, where empirical evidence is scarce, arguably contributes 
to a deeper understanding of these links. Importantly, in an increasingly globalized world, 
tailoring the empirical evidence being disseminated to fit into the context of ESSA where these 
banks operate is crucial and may be effective in advancing progress towards achieving the 
SDGs (Nwagwu, 2020; Abor et al., 2019). 
    To fill these gaps, this thesis seeks to go deeper, focusing on the ESSA banking system and 
analyzing the interrelationships among CGI, EC, SBD, FP and BRT. The aim of the thesis is 
to investigate the associations among CGI, EC, SBD, FP, competition and BRT in ESSA banks, 
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and ascertains whether CGI can moderate these relationships. The thesis, therefore, has nine 
general integrated objectives that will be contained in chapters 5, 6 and 7. First, it seeks to 
investigate whether CGI can determine the level of EC in ESSA banks. Second, it examines 
the effect of EC on SBD in ESSA banks. Third, it explores whether CGI can moderate the pay-
for-sustainability sensitivity (PSS). Fourth, it assesses the impact of CGI on SBD in ESSA 
banks. Fifth, it investigates the effect of SBD on FP of banks in the region. Sixth, the thesis 
explores the extent to which CGI can moderate the link between SBD and FP in ESSA banks 
(sustainability-for-performance sensitivity). Seventh, the thesis investigates the effect of board 
characteristics on BRT in the ESSA region. Eighth, it assesses the effect of different types of 
bank ownership on BRT in ESSA region. Finally, the thesis examines the effect of competition 
on BRT in ESSA region.    
1.3 Contributions of the thesis 
    Given the importance of internal governance structures in the banking system, the 
contribution of this thesis is to investigate the under research context of corporate governance 
in ESSA banks. In doing so, the thesis first distinctively investigates the effect of internal 
governance disclosure index on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity (PSS) in ESSA banking 
system. This is distinct from prior studies in the regions’ banking system that focused on single 
corporate governance variables such as the size of the board, diversity and independent 
directors (e.g., Agbim, 2018; Ofoegbu et al., 2018; Barako & Brown, 2008), or that explored 
whether financial performance can act as determinant of EC in the region (e.g., Ntim et al., 
2019; De Wet, 2012; Shaw, 2012). More importantly, the study contributes to the banking 
literature by using a comprehensive CGI containing 100 key features of CG provisions in the 
Combined CG Code in the ESSA countries. In particular, the thesis is among the first to 
examine the effect of a broad CGI on individual components of EC (i.e., executive directors 
pay, non-executive directors pay and total executive directors pay) in ESSA banking system. 
Banking studies that provide evidence of the relationship between CGI and EC based on 
individual components of EC is uncommon, particularly in the ESSA region.  
    With insights from optimal contrasting theory and managerial power hypothesis (e.g., 
Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997), the evidence of the thesis suggests that CGI plays a crucial role in the level and nature 
of the ESSA banks' EC and SBD. The thesis provides evidence that show that CGI is negatively 
associated with executive directors pay, non-executive directors pay and total pay for all 
directors in the ESSA banks. Further, the findings of thesis show that, the negative impact of 
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CGI on the individual components of EC is enhanced in better-governed banks (banks with 
high CGI score), but weak in poorly-governed banks (banks with low CGI score). 
    Next, the study contributes to sustainable banking research by shedding light on the level to 
which EC can influence sustainable banking in the ESSA countries. It focuses on post EC and 
sustainable banking reforms in the region which provide a unique opportunity to examine the 
association between EC and SBD in an emerging economy. Precisely, the thesis contributes to 
sustainable banking literature by providing new evidence on the association between individual 
components of EC (i.e., executive directors pay, non-executive directors pay and total 
executive directors pay) and SBD from the ESSA banking context. Specifically, it employs a 
total of 135 disclosures covering six main sustainable banking themes. Banking studies in this 
area from ESSA region are sparse, although a few studies have explored the association 
between CEO pay and financial performance of banks (e.g., Gyapong et al., 2020; Olalekan & 
Bodunde, 2015; Aduda, 2011), without examining the impact of EC on SBD. In a related 
literature, Kartadjumena and Rodgers (2019) investigate whether EC can incentivise bank 
managers to pursue SBD as assessed by Global Reporting Initiative disclosure indicators in in 
a sample of 39 Indonesian banks from 2007 to 2014.  
    Consistent with the expectations of both EC and sustainable banking reforms in the region, 
the findings of the thesis reveal that, linking executive directors pay with SBD initiatives can 
enhance SBD in the region. The thesis also distinctively drills deeper to offer insights on the 
impact of three key individual EC measures (executive directors pay, non-executive directors 
pay and total pay for all directors) on six major individual dimensions of SBD in the ESSA 
region. The six dimensions of SBD are environmental, social, health and safety, ethics and 
human rights, community involvement and employee disclosures.  
    More importantly, this study departs from prior evidence (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019; Ofori et 
al., 2014), and contributes to sustainable banking literature by examining whether CGI 
moderates the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity in the ESSA region. Crucially, studies on the 
probably moderating effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms of banks on the pay-
for-sustainability remain uncommon globally. This delivers a fertile ground to contribute to the 
extant international banking literature in the area.  Accordingly, this is the first study from the 
ESSA banking sector to investigate the unique moderating effect of CGI on the pay-for-
sustainability sensitivity as prior banking studies in the region have not yet investigated this 
key interdependence. Considering that executives’ incentives and CGI can act as complements 
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and/or substitutes (Nguyen & Soobaroyen, 2020; Shahab et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2019), the 
thesis distinctively contributes to the increasing sustainable banking studies by exploring 
whether CGI can influence the EC-SBD nexus.  
    Similarly, the thesis provides insight of the impact of CGI on the PSS based on three 
individual components of EC (executive directors pay, non-executive directors pay and total 
pay for all directors). The thesis therefore attempts to make a methodological contribution by 
seeking to address the probable endogeneity issues that might arise from the probable 
concurrent use of monitoring (CGI) and incentives (EC) mechanisms in the regions’ banking 
system. The insight from the thesis shows that, CGI positively moderates the PSS in the 
regions’ banking system, and this positive moderation effect is reinforced in banks with high 
CGI score. The thesis employs traditional OLS regressions in addition to lagged structure and 
two stage least squares (2SLS) methods in assessing the robustness of these contributions.    
    Second, this thesis contributes to banking literature by examining the impact of CGI on the 
sustainability-for-performance sensitivity (SPS) in ESSA banks. In particular, the thesis 
contributes to literature by using a CG disclosure index containing 100 key components and 
135 SBD covering all the six integrated sustainability pillars from the Combined Code in the 
region. In conducting the CGI and SBD analysis, this research constructed disclosures 
reflecting CG and SBD-related expectations as well as the provisions of the Combined Code 
in the ESSA countries. This is different from prior evidence in the region. Previous studies in 
the region focused on either single CG variables (e.g., Barako & Brown, 2008), or focused on 
few SBD (e.g., Boachie, 2020). Moreover, other evidence is also based on a single country 
analysis (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019; Ofori et al., 2014).  
    Precisely, the thesis offers new insight by investigating how CGI influences SBD, and 
distinctively ascertain whether CGI moderates the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity in 
the region. In particular, this thesis is among the first to capture the direct relationship between 
broad bank level CGI and SBD in the ESSA region. Unlike past studies that used individual 
CG variables (e.g., Barako & Brown, 2008), or single country analysis (e.g., Siueia et al., 
2019), the thesis examined the influence of CGI on the aggregate SBD, as well as the impact 
on six key dimensions of SBD (environmental, social, ethics and human rights, health and 
safety, community involvement and employee disclosures) in the ESSA context. The findings 
of the thesis reveal that banks with high CGI scores are associated with an increased 
engagement in SBD initiatives in the region. In addition, the evidence reveals that banks that 
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have better-governance structures engage in more SBD than their poorly-governed 
counterparts. 
    Furthermore, the thesis contributes to banking literature with particular focus on the direct 
impact of SBD on the FP of banks. Different from past studies (Boachie, 2020; Siueia et al., 
2019; Ofori et al., 2014), the thesis provides evidence on how SBD and six individual 
dimensions of SBD are associated with two key measures of FP (ROA and ROE) in the ESSA 
banking system. Specifically, insights from the study shows that, engagement in SBD activities 
can potentially increase the FP of banks.  
    In addition, given that CGI and SBD structures may work either as complements and/or 
substitutes, the study distinctively seeks to contribute to the extant banking literature by 
exploring whether CGI can moderate the sustainability for-performance sensitivity (SPS). This 
inference is grounded on evolving theoretical literature and the observation of prior research 
that suggest that whereas the stock market prices both CG and SBD, CG disclosures may be 
valued higher in comparison to SBD (e.g., Ntim, 2016; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Jo & 
Harjoto, 2012, 2011). The thesis documents first time evidence on the moderating effect of 
CGI on the SPS in ESSA banking context. With this, the thesis attempts to bring together the 
different strands of the banking literature concerning CGI, SBD and FP in a combined 
empirical framework in the region.  
    Third, the thesis also contributes to the existing banking CG literature by offering new 
observations on the determinant of bank risk-taking in ESSA. Distinct from prior studies (e.g., 
Bokpin, 2016; Brick & Chidambaran et al., 2010), the thesis provides new insight following 
CG and financial sector reforms that have focused primarily on reforming governance in order 
to limit BRT. In particular, it contributes to banking research by exploring whether banks’ 
internal CG variables can influence risk-taking in ESSA region. This is distinct from prior 
evidence (e.g., Ozili, 2018; Bokpin, 2016), as the thesis offers insight on the impact of internal 
governance structures which have not been explored in the ESSA banking system. 
Accordingly, the thesis examines the impact of some new attributes of board of directors on 
risk-taking in ESSA banks. More specifically, the thesis uses independent directors who are 
financial experts and the number of board meetings as key determinants in the study. Drawing 
from the theoretical insights of agency, stakeholder and resource dependence theories (Pearce 
& Zahra, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rhenman & Stymne, 1965) framework, the evidence 
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shows that these attributes of the board play a vital role in the determination of ESSA banks' 
risk-taking behaviour. 
    Next, the thesis is the first major study from the ESSA banking system to examine the unique 
relationship between distinct ownership attributes and risk-taking. Previous banking studies 
(e.g., Ozili, 2018; Bokpin, 2016) in the region have not investigated these relationships in a 
single study across the ESSA banking system. Overall, the findings reveal that all the three key 
attributes of bank ownership (institutional, foreign and government) are significantly (either 
negatively or positively) associated with risk-taking in the region. This suggests that, 
ownership attributes can partly explain the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the ESSA region.  
    Finally, the thesis contributes to the existing banking literature by investigating whether 
competition influences the risk-taking behaviour of banks in the region. The study focuses on 
post FSR in ESSA which provides a unique opportunity to test the link between intense 
competition and BRT. Prior evidence in the region (e.g., Akande et al., 2018) focused on a 
single measure of bank risk-taking. For example, Akande et al. (2018) evidence is based on 
only off-balance sheet risk. This thesis extends the work of Akande et al. (2018) by examining 
this association in a new sample and, with new and additional measures of competition and 
BRT. The thesis employs both Lerner and Panzar-Rose H-statistics (PRH) as measure of bank 
competition. Studies in ESSA have mainly applied Lerner index as measure of competition. 
However, the PRH method has been applied extensively as competition proxy in most banking 
studies (Leon, 2015). Notwithstanding its strength, PRH method has seen limited application 
in ESSA studies (Fosu, 2013). Further, the study employs four different and common risk faced 
by the banks in the region. Distinct from prior studies (e.g., Akande et al., 2018), and by 
focusing on various risks, the research provides the nature of the relationship between 
competition and specific risks of banks in the ESSA region. Based on insights from 
competition-fragility “view” perspective, the thesis reports that competition positively 
influences risk-taking behaviour in the ESSA countries.  
    With regards to contribution to methodology, the thesis makes a comparison of findings 
based on estimating direct model and indirect complex relationships (moderating effect) 
concerning the associations among CGI, EC, SBD and FP in the ESSA banking system. 
Specifically, the thesis makes a methodological contribution by attempting to address the 
potential endogeneity issues that may arise from the possible simultaneous use of CGI and EC 
and, CGI and SBD mechanisms in the ESSA banks. Prior studies have mainly examined the 
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direct relationship between individual CG variables and EC, whilst others focused on the 
association between individual CG and SBD (e.g., Boachie, 2020; Siueia et al., 2019; Ofori et 
al., 2014 Barako & Brown, 2008), without investigating the potential indirect or moderating 
effect on these associations. Accordingly, the thesis addresses these methodological gaps in 
literature in a combined empirical framework. Generally, the thesis shows that methodological 
choice can potentially impact on research findings with crucial implications for future studies. 
Finally, the issues that the potential presence of endogeneity may cause in these 
interrelationships have been addressed in a comprehensive manner. These include estimating: 
a lagged structure; a two-stage least squares; and a dynamic panel generalized method of 
moments. Arguably, these robust statistical investigations have improved the reliability of the 
findings. It is noteworthy to state that, these contributions are linked with chapters 5, 6 and 7 
of the thesis. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
    The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, the thesis discusses the 
background of the ESSA countries including corporate governance reforms and sustainable 
banking reforms. The chapter also provides overview of financial and banking sector reforms 
in the ESSA countries. Then, chapter 3 the thesis provides literature review to include 
theoretical framework and empirical evidence. Additionally, the chapter highlights the gaps in 
literature and suggests how the gaps in literature are addressed by the thesis. Next, chapter 4 
presents the methodology and data. It also provides the descriptive statistics and correlation 
diagnostics. This is followed by the empirical results of the association among CGI, EC and 
SBD in chapter 5. In chapter 6, the empirical results CGI, SBD and FP investigation is 
provided. Chapter 7 also presents the empirical results of CG, competition and BRT analysis. 
Finally, chapter 8 provides the conclusion and future research which includes conclusion, 







2 Background of ESSA countries and corporate governance reform 
    This chapter focuses on the ESSA countries in terms of three key reforms undertaken in the 
region. They reforms include corporate governance reforms, sustainable banking reforms, and 
financial sector and banking reforms in the ESSA countries. Specifically, Section 2.1 provides 
an overview of the internal CG framework and the CG reforms undertaken in the ESSA region 
with particular focus on implications for EC, SBD and BRT. In section 2.2, the thesis discusses 
sustainable banking framework in the ESSA countries and its implication on FP. Finally, 
Section 2.3 provides a summary of the financial and banking reforms undertaken in the ESSA 
countries. Additionally, the section offers the implications of these reforms on competition and 
BRT in the region.  
2.1 The ESSA corporate governance framework and reforms 
    Since 1994, countries in the ESSA region have been pursuing internal governance reforms 
concerning how banks are governed (Ntim et al., 2015). It must be pointed out that, the reforms 
were implemented following failures of banks in the region, such as Nedbank companies in 
South Africa (Ntim, 2009). Some of the countries have issued their own CG codes. Others are 
yet to issue their codes and have adopted that of neighbouring countries (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Corporate governance codes in the ESSA region 
Year of first issue of code 1994 2002 2003 2010 
Country South Africa Kenya Nigeria Ghana 
 (2010** and 2016**) (2014**) (2011** and 2018**) (2012**) 
 Botswana* Uganda*   
 Zimbabwe* Tanzania*   
 Mauritius*    
 Zambia*    
* are countries that are yet to issue any CG but adopt the CG code of other countries, ** denote year of revision of the code. Source: Compiled 
from the CG codes of Ghana (2012); Nigeria (2018), Kenya (2002 and 2014) and South Africa (1994-I, 2002-II and 2010-III and 2016-IV, 
King Reports). 
 
    One crucial expectation of CG reforms in the ESSA region is the expectation that effective 
internal governance mechanisms might limit excessive executive compensation packages in 
the region.  Also, the Combined CG code considers corporate board as an indispensable internal 
governance body that can alleviate the conflict of interest between shareholders and senior 
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managers. This implies that the board can play a vital role in influencing BRT behaviour. 
Specifically, and to enhance the monitoring function of the board, the codes encourage the 
appointment of majority independent directors with financial expertise. To promote and 
maintain effective control over the bank and monitor BRT, the codes propose regular board 
meetings. For instance, at least six annual meetings in Ghana, three times in Nigeria and at 
least once every quarter in Kenya and South Africa, respectively. Notwithstanding, the CG 
structures in ESSA region have been characterized as less effective when compared to 
developed countries in key areas such as monitoring and supervising senior manager (Ntim, 
2009). Based on the vital role that the board can play in the operation of banks, analyzing the 
link between board mechanisms and BRT is crucial issue in the region which is the focus of 
the study. In addition, the regional codes consider bank ownership as key governance 
mechanism that can impact on BRT behaviour. The ESSA region thus provides a good setting 
to explore the link between ownership and BRT particularly after the privatization of state-
owned banks. Hence, the study examines whether various forms of ownership structure 
influence BRT in the region. 
    Again, the countries have implemented voluntary (‘conform or explain’) CG disclosure 
policy reforms (e.g., Ntim, 2016; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). To improve the quality 
of governance in the ESSA region, the Combined Codes focus on four main internal CG 
disclosures namely: (i) director and board, (ii) audit, accounting and transparency, (iii) risk 
management and internal control and (iv) compliance and shareholder enforcement (see Table 
2.2). 





Ghana (2018) Kenya (2014) Nigeria (2018) South Africa (2016) 
Board and Directors     





A balance of non-
executive directors 
Majority of board 
members 



































Board meetings Regularly/at least 
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At least once every 
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At least three times 
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At least once every 
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Recommended to be 
disclosed 
Policy on risk 
management 
Covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Covered Covered 
Audit committee Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Related party 
transactions 
Covered Not covered Covered Not covered 




External auditor Recommended 





Recommended to be 
disclosed 
Risk management, 
internal audit and 
control 
    
Risk management 
committee 
Covered Not covered Covered Covered 
Risk management 
committee meetings 
Covered Not covered Not covered Covered 




limited in scope 
Covered, but 
limited in scope 
  
Narrative on the firm 
as a going concern 




    
Shareholder activism 
(proxy vote) 
Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Shareholder right to 
vote 
Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Shareholder right to 
have views on pay 
Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Timely information 
on AGM 
Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Sources: Compiled from the CG codes of Ghana (SEC, 2010, 2012, 2018), Nigeria (SEC, 2011, 2018), Kenya (CMA, 2014) 




2.2 The ESSA sustainable banking framework 
      Sustainability is concerned with ensuring long term business success, while contributing 
towards economic and social development, a healthy environment and a stable society (UNEP- 
FI, 2020). The acceptance and incorporation of sustainability concept into the core operations 
and services of banks is known as sustainable banking (Deloitte, 2017). Sustainable banking 
activities are commonly referred to as SBPs. Distinct from conventional banking where 
investment decisions are based on a two factors, risk and return, in SBPs, they are based on 
three dimensions: risk, return and impacts (Deloitte, 2017). This implies that, the probable 
detrimental impact of the investment decisions is of key importance in SBPs setting. Therefore, 
SBPs integrate profit maximization with environmental and social concerns (Nwagwu, 2020).  
    According to UNEP-FI (2020), countries in ESSA region will be among the hardest hit by 
sustainability issues such as climate change. Take for example, the region already faces 
daunting challenges around job creation, poverty and inequality (UNEP-FI, 2020; Muriithi & 
Louw, 2017). Notwithstanding the pivotal role that banks can play in sustainability, the concept 
of SBPs was not considered as an integral part of banking in the last 20 years in ESSA 
(Nwagwu, 2020). Indeed, SBPs is an emerging concept for the banking sector in ESSA 
countries (UNEP-FI, 2020). This was mainly due to the claim that the banking sector does not 
have a direct substantial environmental and social ‘footprint’ in comparison with 
manufacturing or extractive industry sectors in the region (Ganda & Ngwakwe, 2014).  
    However, as the global banking sector steadily shifts toward responsible banking, banks 
operating in ESSA are gradually coming under increased pressure to meet such best practice 
trends (UNEP-FI, 2020). Accordingly, countries in the region have implemented regulatory 
framework that makes banks and investors accountable for their environmental and social 
impacts. This is becoming a key source of financial incentive for banks to incorporate 
sustainability issues into their core operations and services. Another key driver of sustainable 
banking reforms in ESSA stems from pressure from various stakeholders for greater 
transparency and disclosure by banks, regarding their community involvement, equality, and 
more importantly the fear of negative publicity related with these, is prompting banks to 
become more committed to responsible banking (UNEP-FI, 2020). 
    Next, social pressures such as the need for job creation, black economic empowerment 
(BEE), poverty alleviation, HIV/AIDS, Ebola and COVID-19 are having negative impact on 
the financial viability of projects particularly in the ESSA region. Therefore, there is an 
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increasingly recognition within the banking sector as a matter of necessity to address these 
challenges. Consequently, banks are becoming aware of the need to take into account these 
challenges in their financial modelling phase, to evaluate not only the effect on the projects, 
but also the implications they have on loan repayments and associated communities (UNEP-
FI, 2020).  Additionally, the expansion of international standards, guidelines and CG codes are 
compelling banks in the region to accept that, they no longer act independently from the 
societies and the environment in which they operate. Accordingly, banks in the region have 
begun to embrace sustainable banking, thereby shifting from a single bottom line (profit 
maximization) to a triple bottom line (economic, environment and social) managerial approach 
(UNEP-FI, 2020). 
    In response, policy makers have implemented sustainable banking reforms over the past 
decade (e.g., Ghana SEC code, 2010, 2012; Nigeria SEC code, 2011, 2018; The Kings Report, 
2016; Kenya CG code, 2016). It is worthy to note that, the responsible banking reforms in the 
ESSA countries expect executive pay to be strongly associated with SBPs. Hence, the reforms 
require banks to fully disclose their EC and SBD activities in their annual reports. Briefly, the 
combined sustainable banking reforms in ESSA region highlight six integrated responsible 
banking themes namely: (i) environmental disclosures (ii) social investment and service quality 
disclosures (iii) health and safety disclosures (iv) ethics and human right disclosures (v) 
community involvement disclosures and (vi) employee disclosures (see Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3: A Comparison of Integrated Sustainable Banking Reporting of Ghana, Kenya, 




Ghana (2018) Kenya (2014) Nigeria (2018) South Africa (2016) 
Environmental 
disclosures 




limited in scope 
Covered Covered Covered 
Policy on climate 
change 
Not specified Not specified Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Covered 






Not covered Covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 





limited in scope 
Covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Covered 
Recycling and raw 
material 
conservation policy 





limited in scope 
Covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 




Energy savings Not covered Covered, but 
limited in scope 





limited in scope 
Covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Covered 
Product innovation Not covered Covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Covered 
Social disclosures     
Social policy Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Education policy Not covered Covered, but 
limited in scope 
Not covered Covered 
Road construction 
policy 
Not covered Not covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Not covered 
Sports and donations Not covered  Not specified Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Not specified 
Natural disaster Not covered Not specified Covered Covered 
Feedback systems Covered, but 
limited in scope 
Covered Covered Covered 
Health and Safety 
disclosures 
    
Health policy Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Health education Covered Not specified Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Covered 
Health of employees 
and family 
Covered  Covered, but 




Safety in the 
workplace 
Covered, but 
limited in scope 
Not specified Covered Covered 
Product and 
customer safety 
Covered Not specified Covered Covered 




Ebola Not covered Not covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Not specified 
Health assistance to 
disabled 
Covered, but 
limited in scope 
Covered Covered Covered 
Community 
involvement 
    
Community 
involvement policy 
Covered Covered Covered Covered 




Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Support for refugees Not covered Covered Covered Covered 
Support for arts and 
culture 
Not specified Covered, but 
limited in scope 
Not specified Not specified 
Support to local 
farmers 
Not covered Not covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Not covered 
Ethics and human 
rights 
    




limited in scope 
Covered Covered Not specified 
Support for political 
parties 
Covered Not covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Covered 
Labour rights Covered Covered, but 





limited in scope 
Not covered Covered Covered 
Code of ethics Covered Covered Covered Covered 
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Gender and minority Covered, but 
limited in scope 
Covered Not specified Covered 
Whistle blowing 
policy 
Covered Not covered Covered Covered 
Employee 
disclosures 
    
Staff training and 
development 
Covered Covered Covered Covered 
Staff compensation Covered Covered Covered, but limited 
in scope 
Not specified 





Covered Covered Covered Not specified 
Sources: Compiled from the CG codes of Ghana (SEC, 2018), Nigeria (SEC 2018), Kenya (CMA, 2014) and South Africa 
(2016, King Report)  
 
    Given that the banking sector is at the heart of financial sector and the society in the region, 
it is expected to be more sustainability accountable as stipulated in the Combined Code (Siueia 
et al., 2019; Chambers & Day, 2009). Although countries in the region have pursued inclusive 
CG reforms (combined CG and SBD reforms), it must be pointed out that, complying with the 
sustainable banking reforms contained in the Combined Code in the ESSA region is voluntary. 
In addition, the ESSA banking context is typically characterized by concentrated ownership 
structures (e.g., Ntim, 2016; Bokpin, 2016). In addition, activism by shareholders is noticeably 
weak in the countries (Ntim, 2016). Moreover, none of the corporate laws and regulatory 
guidelines in these countries required mandatory disclosure of sustainable banking activities in 
annual reports of ESSA banks. Thus, banks disclose information on SBD on voluntary basis 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
    Discernably, this raises concern as to whether the voluntary compliance CG reforms 
implemented in ESSA may be efficient with regards to advancing good CG and enhancing 
SBD initiatives. Accordingly, the region constitutes an ideal banking system for the 
investigation. Additionally, the Combined Code stipulates that, banks can leverage on SBD as 
valuable asset which can enhance their reputation and FP. In this regard, the study expects that 
good CG in the form of improved SBD may enhance the legitimacy of banks’ operation and 
reputation in the region. This can enhance efficiency and FP of banks through the acquisition 
of key resources. Hence, in line with the Combined Code, the study examines whether internal 
CGI can moderate the association between SBD and FP in ESSA banks. 
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2.3 The ESSA financial sector reforms in the region 
    The financial sector reforms (FSR) in ESSA has progressed from the pre-colonial native 
system that resembles barter trade arrangements (Gakunu, 2007). During colonial era, financial 
systems in the region were largely underdeveloped (Mlachila et al., 2013). The colonial leaders 
principally introduced money for the purpose of tax payments to the colonial governments in 
the region. A limited number of banks were introduced to facilitate trade mainly in the export 
of minerals business across the countries in the region. These banks were mainly expatriate 
banks. Accordingly, the few banks that were established in the countries during the colonial 
era solely provided for the needs of expatriate merchants. 
    After independence in the 1970s, most governments commenced plans to nationalize their 
banking sectors as a way of making credit more accessible to the local people. This led to the 
establishment of state banks which were wholly funded by the state. However, these state-
owned banks failed to comply with the strict regulations and procedures instituted by the 
respective national regulators in the countries in the region. Consequently, post-independence 
banking systems in most of the countries remained shallow with state-owned banks as the 
dominant institutions (Mlachila et al., 2013). Confronted with huge developmental gap, most 
governments put severe pressure on their banking systems. In the absence of strict regulation, 
the banks fixed interest rates at extremely low level beyond the deposit rates (Elix, 2019). This 
practice allowed several governments to cheaply borrow from the banks. This led to the 
crowding of the regions’ banking system (Elix, 2019), leading to systemic banking crises in 
most of the countries in the late 1980s in the region (Bokpin, 2016).  
    To revamp the banking system, post-1980s governments in the region implemented different 
FSR. The prime objective of the FSR was to restructure and privatize state-controlled banks in 
the ESSA region.  The FSR were instituted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 
addition, World Bank also put in place several programs and policies aimed at revamping the 
financial sector in the ESSA region at different times in the region. Notable among these polices 
is the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP). Some of the notable programmes implemented by 
The IMF and World Bank and included Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 
Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP) and Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP). These programmes focused on stabilising and reforming the financial sector particularly 
the banking system through: (i) liberalisation of interest rate regimes; (ii) removal of credit 
ceilings and (iii) structuring of more desirable interest rates to essential sectors of the economy. 
This was done to guarantee the flow of financial services to the most productive sectors of the 
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economy; (iv) privatization of state-owned banks to private investors and institutions and (v) 
improved supervision by national regulators such as Central Banks to safeguard stability in the 
financial sector especially the banking system (Mlachila et al., 2013; Elix, 2014; Gakunu, 
2007).  
    The implementation of the reforms led to other supplementary policies in the region. For 
instance, the reforms resulted in the easing of entry and exit restrictions in the financial sector 
(Nyantakyi et al., 2015). This allowed entry of several foreign banks into the ESSA region 
(Nyantakyi et al., 2015). Although the total financial gains of the FSR remain largely debatable 
among scholars, the consensus is that it has led to intense competition in the region (e.g., Motsi 
et al., 2018; Gulde et al., 2015; Nyantakyi et al., 2015). The implication is that, the FSR has 
presented key challenges to policymakers with regards to BRT in the region. Therefore, the 
thesis seeks to empirically examine whether the increased competition resulting from the 

















 3 Literature Review    
    This chapter provides literature review of the thesis. The chapter is organized as follows. In 
section 3.1 the thesis provides the theoretical framework of the study. Section 3.2 provides the 
empirical evidence and hypotheses development. Additionally, the section highlights the gaps 
in literature and suggests how the gaps in literature are addressed by the thesis. 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
 
    This section briefly discusses the main theoretical foundations of the study. The thesis adopts 
the integrative conceptual framework proposed by Mellahi et al. (2016), and as applied in 
recent banking studies (e.g., Gupta & Bala, 2020; Orazalin, 2019; Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 
2019; Platonova et al., 2018). This framework provides a new classification of governance 
theories into internal and external drivers (Frynas et al., 2016). Internal governance driver’s 
theories are concerned with the analysis of internal motivators. Specifically, the thesis relies 
on four internal CG theories namely managerial power hypothesis (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; 
Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), optimal contrasting 
theory (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen & Murphy, 1990), agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and resource-based view (Rugman & Verbeke, 2002) as primary 
motivator theories of the study (Frynas et al., 2016).  
    Theories of external drivers of CG incorporate motivators concerned with relational, political 
or integrative drivers (Mellahi et al., 2016; Frynas et al., 2016). The thesis includes three 
external CG theories as secondary motivators or complementary theories. They are stakeholder 
theory (Huse, 2009; Rhenman & Stymne, 1965), resource dependence theory (Pearce & Zahra, 
1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1972), and neo-intuitional theory (Scott, 2001; North, 
1991; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
    The thesis applies the above multi-dimensional framework due to the following reasons. 
Together, these theories are multi-dimensional and all-inclusive that can directly and/ indirectly 
capture internal (Frynas et al., 2016) and external theoretical predictions simultaneously 
(Suchman, 1995). Further, the thesis seeks to explore complex interrelationships among CGI, 
EC, SBD, FP and BRT in ESSA banks, which intrinsically involve various organizations and 
stakeholders with diverse interests. Hence, the study contends that a multi-dimensional 
approach is the most appropriate theoretical framework. In addition, there has been increasing 
calls (e.g., Haque & Ntim, 2020; Mellahi et al., 2016; Frynas et al., 2016) for multi-dimensional 
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theoretical approach in CG studies to provide new insights that can lead to theoretical 
improvements. Hence, the thesis attempts to respond to such calls by scholars.   
    Firstly, and in line with Kartadjumena and Rodgers (2019), the thesis applies insight 
Managerial Power Hypothesis (MPH) and Optimal Contrasting Theory (OCT) to explain the 
pay-for-sustainability sensitivity in the ESSA banks. Banks are subjected to agency conflict: 
the divergence between the individuals who manage the banks (the executives who are the 
agents) and the owners of the banks who are the shareholders (Emerton & Jones, 2019). 
Typically, ownership of banks are likely to be diverse in nature, with few senior executives 
largely in control of the running of the banks (Emerton & Jones, 2019; Ntim et al., 2015; 
Berrone et al., 2008). This presents a classic agency conflict in the banking system, as there is 
the likelihood for opportunistic senior managers to seek their self-centered interest at the 
expense of shareholders (e.g., Abdullahi & Tanko, 2020; Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). To 
resolve this agency conflict, different approaches have been proposed within the banking 
system. Two of such key mechanisms in the banking system that can resolve the agency conflict 
are effective internal governance through monitoring and incentive alignment (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Compensation incentive schemes can motivate executives to work in the best 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). Hence, from 
theoretical perspective, an important approach for bringing into line the interests of 
shareholders, stakeholders and senior managers is to structure suitable executive pay packages 
(e.g., Abdullahi & Tanko, 2020; Pepper et al., 2013).  
    Noticeably, this is the dominant motivation underlying the various sustainable banking 
reforms in ESSA countries over the past decade (e.g., King, 2016, Ghana SEC, 2010; Nigeria 
SEC, 2011). Discernably, the fundamental question, as to whether such EC arrangements are 
also effective in enhancing SBD initiatives has comparably generated extensive theoretical 
debate and research interests (e.g., D’apolito et al., 2019; Kartadjumena, 2019). In particular, 
agency theory (AT) contends that incentive alignment through executive pay and internal 
governance can play crucial role in resolving agency problems in banks due to the separation 
of ownership from control (Ntim et al., 2019; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Notwithstanding, 
while the general objective for designing EC schemes is to align the interests of shareholders 
and senior managers, such incentive contract might themselves lead to an increased agency 
conflicts in banks (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Kartadjumena, 2019; Ntim et al., 
2019; Ntim et al., 2015). 
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    Not surprisingly, the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity banking studies are reinforced by two 
sharply opposing incentive alignment theories namely optimal contracting theory (OCT) (e.g., 
Kartadjumena, 2019; Shaw, 2012; Waweru et al., 2009), and managerial power hypothesis 
(MPH) (e.g., Kartadjumena, 2019). The two theories differ because, while OCT focuses on the 
use of monitoring and incentive alignment as powerful tools to reduce agency conflicts in 
banks, MPH suggest an increase in agency conflicts due to ineffective governance and 
incentive schemes (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Kartadjumena, 2019).  
    Accordingly, prior banking studies on CG, EC and SBD have employed either OCT 
perspective (e.g., Shaw, 2012; Waweru et al., 2009), or MPH (e.g., Kartadjumena, 2019).  
However, individually these theories give one-dimensional perspective of governance and 
hence, a deeper understanding can be obtained by taking a multi-paradigm perspective 
(Cornforth, 2002). Consequently, some previous studies have used a combination of the two 
theories (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). In particular, the thesis adopts the PSS 
theoretical framework developed by Kartadjumena & Rodgers (2019) in the banking system as 
illustrated in Fig 3.1 below. 
    Managerial power hypothesis posits that in banks with poor CG mechanisms, opportunistic 
influential senior managers can expropriate bank resources when they have control to set their 
own remuneration (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Ntim et al., 2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Thus, it can be expected that MPH framework will be more effective in a banking 
environment where the CG structures are weak (e.g., Kartadjumena, 2019; Shahab et al., 2020). 
Proponents of this view consider EC arrangements as a product of close interpersonal 
relationships and negotiations between powerful senior managers, such as the CEOs, and weak 
board of directors (e.g., Scherer, 2020; Kartadjumena, 2019; Ntim et al., 2015; Sapp, 2008). 
This can lead to the creation of inefficient managerial contracts (e.g., Scherer, 2020; 
Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). The outcome of such contracts is the exacerbation of agency 
conflicts by increasing the disparity of interests between senior managers and stakeholders 
(Bebchuk &Weisbach, 2010). Because senior managers are presumed to determine their own 
compensation (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Kartadjumena, 2019; Van Essen et al., 2015), 
managerial power hypothesis view expects EC not to be tied necessarily to SBPs; thus, 
expecting the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity to be relatively small or weak. 
    Alternatively, optimal contrasting theory views the interaction between independent board 
and senior managers as efficient and should not be interrupted since it improves the value of 
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banks by creating efficient managerial contracts (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Ntim et al., 
2015; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Consequently, the theory proposes that agency conflict should 
lessen owing to proper alignment of the interest of senior managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, OCT perspective is more applicable when CG 
structures are effective (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; 
Kartadjumena, 2019). 
    Because the theory proposes that EC stems from arms-length negotiations between a bank 
with independent board and executives, it can potentially be used to optimize managerial 
performance (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Conyon, 2014; Conyon & He, 2012; 
Edmans & Gabaix, 2009), especially in areas such as achieving SBPs (e.g., Kartadjumena & 
Rodgers, 2019; Kartadjumena, 2019). Within this framework, banks can achieve long-term 
value creation by linking EC to sustainability performance. This is mainly due to the 
assumption that executive directors have limited influence in determining their own pay 
(Elmagrhi et al., 2020). Because executive directors often do not have full control over their 
remuneration, the theory predicts that executive pay can influence SBD. Accordingly, OCT 
expects a strong positive PSS, due to the suggestion that senior bank managers have less control 
in determining their own compensation packages (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Ntim et al., 
2015). Therefore, this theoretical framework expects a strong PSS in the banking system in 
ESSA.       
    Overall, given the complex nature of the association among CGI, EC and SBD, the thesis 
relies on two opposing theories in developing the hypotheses, as well as in the discussion of 
the results in chapter 5. On one hand, MPH suggests that, in banking system where the CG 
structures are weak, bank executives can have greater control over their compensation 
packages, which leads to a weak PSS (see Fig 3.1). On the other hand, OCT suggests that in 
banks with good CG mechanisms, senior managers pay incentives can be structured in such a 
manner that it can contribute to properly align the interest of senior managers and owners of 
banks. In this case, EC arrangements can be expected to improve the PSS (see Fig 3.1). 
    Notably, and as discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the CG, EC and sustainable banking 
reforms implemented across the ESSA countries have focused on two important areas. 
Consistent with MPH view, the reforms seek to encourage banks to put in place strong internal 
CG structures to prevent opportunistic senior managers from expropriating bank resources by 
possessing the power to structure their own compensation. Potentially, this can minimise 
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agency conflicts in banks including curbing excessive EC (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). This is 
particularly crucial given the weak institutional framework in the region. Prominently, the 
Combined Code focuses on four key CG disclosures: (i) director and board; (ii) accounting, 
auditing and transparency; (iii) risk management, internal audit and control; and (iv) 
compliance, shareholder rights and enforcement. 
    Further and consistent with optimal contrasting theory, the Combined sustainable banking 
reforms in the region recommend that a greater amount of the total executive compensation 
package should be linked to progress towards attaining SDGs. This is expected to align 
executive interests with those of broader stakeholders. Accordingly, the reforms encourage 
banks to consider SBPs and integrate them into their operations and services, especially with 
regards to compensation packages for executives. Based on the importance of the two theories 
in CG related studies, the study applies insight from these theories to develop the hypotheses 
and interpret the results in ESSA banking context. This is because these theories are multi-
dimensional and all-inclusive that together can directly and/ indirectly capture internal 
governance theoretical predictions simultaneously (Suchman, 1995). In addition, the study 
seeks to explore complex interrelationships among CGI, EC and SBD, which intrinsically 
involve various stakeholders with diverse interests. Hence, the study contends that the above 




Fig 3.1: An integrative model of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the Pay-for-Sustainability Sensitivity Framework 
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    Second, the thesis draws insight from agency, resource-based view, stakeholder, resource 
dependence and neo-institutional theories to investigates the sustainability-for-performance 
sensitivity (SPS) in the ESSA banks (Fig 3.2). In doing so, the thesis adopts the integrative 
conceptual framework proposed by Mellahi et al. (2016), and as applied by prior studies that 
investigate the SPS in the banking sector (e.g., Orazalin, 2019; Platonova et al., 2018). 
    Agency theory (AT) is one of the pivotal theories in the framework of governance in the 
banking system (Albassam, 2014). The theory addresses agency problem that arises due to the 
conflict of interest between owners and senior managers. The agency problem is heightened by 
the inability of shareholders to effectively monitor senior managers. Take for example, senior 
managers may employ charity approach as a way of receiving endorsement and admiration 
from local corporate leaders (Galaskiewicz, 1985), which may not serve in the interest of 
shareholders. Thus, AT set out to check misappropriation of shareholders’ wealth (Ntim, 2009).  
    Internally and more importantly, AT concentrates on designing resourceful contracts and 
employing efficient monitoring systems to protect shareholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The implication is that, banks that put in place efficient internal governance mechanisms may 
ensure that senior managers commit to long-term sustainability of banks. For example, banks 
with effective CG will curb the likelihood for senior managers to engage in self-serving 
charitable investments, which may hurt shareholders by generating lower FP (Frynas et al., 
2016). Consequently, within this framework, better-governed banks may engage in SBD more 
than their poorly governed counterparts (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).   
    Crucially, AT depends on well-organized market features such as bank control and 
managerial labour to oversee or discipline managerial misbehavior (Fama, 1980). In particular, 
within the banking sector, the present and future wage opportunities of senior managers may 
be influenced by the future successes or long-term sustainability of the banks. (Fama, 1980). 
This means that in better-governed banks, senior managers may have key interests in the FP of 
banks. This can limit senior managers from expropriating shareholders wealth in the banking 
system. Hence, AT predicts that, the quality of governance in banks may influence its 
sustainable banking and financial performance. 
    In practice and to enhance board independence, the theory suggests the establishment of 
boards with minority executive members, and the roles of chairperson and MD/CEO should be 
held by different persons (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). It also calls for the formation of board 
sub-committees, risk management and internal control systems to monitor managerial 
behaviour (Albassam, 2014; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In brief, AT postulates that a net 
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decline in agency costs (monitoring) stemming from the establishment of quality CG 
mechanisms should help increase sustainable banking investments and improve financial 
performance of banks (Ntim, 2009). This is the dominant theory fundamental to the provisions 
of several CG codes in various regions and countries (see OECD Principles, 1999; Cadbury, 
1992). 
    Similarly, the theory has also been the foremost stimulus driving the implementation of the 
Combined Code in the ESSA region. The Combined Code seek out to decrease agency conflicts 
between senior managers and owners of banks by enhancing transparency, accountability and 
the supervisory role of the board of the bank (Munisi et al., 2014). For this reason, to a greater 
extent the use of AT perspective becomes even more crucial internal driver of sustainable 
banking disclosure and financial performance in the context of the ESSA region. 
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Fig 3.2: An integrative model of the moderating effect of governance on Sustainability-for-Performance Sensitivity (SPS) framework 
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    Next, resource-based view (RBV) addresses the heterogeneity of banks regarding their 
strategic and resource endowments (Rugman & Verbeke, 2002). RBV focuses on the strategic 
ability of banks to exploit internal resources in the quest for sustainable competitive advantage 
(Frynas et al., 2016). Hence, the fundamental principle is that bank-specific resources may 
offer sustainable competitive advantage (Haque & Ntim, 2020).  
    Internal CG disclosure and SBD-related implications of RBV suggest that unique skills and 
competences linked to CG and SBD can lead to bank-specific financial benefits (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2011), which can enhance FP. For instance, based on RBV perspective, SBD can be 
seen as important investment in abilities that may permit a bank to distinguish itself from its 
competitors, thereby enhancing FP (Frynas et al., 2016). Such capabilities may include 
reputation for sustainability management (Lourenco et al. 2014), green novelties (Chen et al., 
2006), key proactivity (Torugsa et al., 2012), social and environmental capabilities (Frynas et 
al., 2016). Others include technological resources and abilities (Huang et al., 2015), and 
marketable rewards for banks (for example by improving product diversity or establishing 
barriers to entry for competitors) which can improve FP (Frynas et al., 2016). 
    Based on RBV, banks in ESSA can gain sustainable competitive advantage through 
investments in sustainable operations such renewable energy, reduced pollution and energy 
consumption. This is because, such investments can potentially reduce the operational costs of 
banks with regards to utility bills (e.g., electricity and water bills). This is particularly important 
given the high cost of electricity in the region (Suberu et al., 2013). 
    Similarly, by focusing on employee responsible agenda, banks can attract and retain highly 
skilled staff which can lead to customer satisfaction. In addition, employee responsive banks 
benefit in terms of staff commitment which can offer such banks competitive advantage as 
human capital is one of the key resources in the banking system. Given the important role that 
CG structures play in the choice and nature of internal SBD investments, the study relies on 
RBV as a theory that can complement AT in explaining the internal drivers of SBD and FP of 
banks in the region. 
    Also, stakeholder theory (SHT) focuses on the need for banks to manage the complex and 
conflicting relationships with their stakeholders. Based on SHT, the success of banks largely 
depends on the enduring relationship with stakeholders. Hence, managing these stakeholders 
is a key tool for value creation. The stakeholders include customers, employees, creditors, 
competitors, public interest groups, environment, and governmental bodies (Tamimi & 
Sebastianelli, 2017). Thus, identifying stakeholders can help managers of banks to respond to 
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their concerns inclusive of stakeholders who might not even have legitimate demand but who 
may affect or are being affected by the operation of the bank (Freeman, 1984). 
    Therefore, SHT provides a framework that links CG to SBD (Huse, 2003). From the 
perspective of this theory, banks disclose CG information in order to mitigate information 
asymmetry with shareholders and to improve stakeholder confidence (Grassa et al., 2019). For 
example, government, regulatory bodies and other stakeholders are considered as external 
“influencers” of SBD activities as banks rely on SBD as a key strategy to resolve the claims of 
their external stakeholders (Roberts, 1992). Hence, the theory suggests that, better-governed 
banks are expected to adopt SBD activities as a credible means of showing their good internal 
CG to their stakeholders (Beekes & Brown, 2006).  
    The theory asserts that, banks may engage in SBD as a form of establishing trusting, 
cooperative and goodwill relationships with stakeholders, which can serve as key competitive 
advantage (e.g., Jizi et al., 2014; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010). By way of illustration, high SBD can 
produce invaluable goodwill, which can safeguard the banks from unforeseen concerns and 
contribute to attracting new businesses (Platonova et al., 2018). This can improve the FP of the 
banks. Within this framework, it can be argued that SBD promotes banks’ image and enhances 
their reputation. For instance, socially responsible banks have a tendency to be associated with 
greater brand loyalty (Jizi et al., 2014), customer satisfaction, whereas employee responsive 
banks benefit in terms of employee commitment. Additionally, SBD engagement can enhance 
FP of banks by reducing labour disputes and work stoppages because of disputes between the 
bank and employees such as strikes and lockouts (Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
    In sum, SHT advances that the board should protect the shareholders’ interests by taking full 
and appropriate account of the interests of other stakeholders and the community. This is the 
dominant foundation emphasized in the recommendations of the all the CG codes and 
sustainability reforms in the ESSA countries. Based on the above discussion, the study relies 
heavily on SHT as external driver theory that provides the foundation of arguments in literature 
and the hypothesis development on the relationship among CGI, SBD and FP in the region. 
    Further, resource dependence theory (RDT) is the next corroborating theory that this 
research depends on. RDT argues that banks rely on their environment to ensure the flow of 
essential resources for their sustainability (Pfeffer &Salancik, 1978). Therefore, managers of 
banks must pay key consideration to the claims of the factors in the environment that offer 
these resources for their continuous existence (Frynas et al., 2016). According to Oliver (1991), 
these various actors may put contradictory social demands on banks. Thus, it may be difficult 
for a bank to satisfy all these conflicting demands. Therefore, banks should focus on social 
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players who are in control of these crucial resources (Pfeffer &Salancik, 1978). This may 
explain, for instance, why banks tend to pay considerable attention to employee related issues 
as a way of attracting and highly maintaining skilled employees. 
    Considered as the most critical resource, RDT calls for the establishment of strong 
independent corporate board. This will ensure that senior managers are efficiently supervised. 
It can also serve as a crucial connection between the banks and their external essential resources 
that the banks need to optimize their FP. For instance, the board of every bank serves as a 
pivotal connection to the bank’s external actors and other key stakeholders including creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and competitors (Surroca et al., 2010).  
    Within broader framework of RDT, banks in developing economies can consider SBD in 
general as intangible assets that can result in a more effective utilization of resources, which in 
turn enhances the FP of banks (Surroca et al., 2010). Banks that engage in wide-ranging local 
developmental programmes (such as health and education) can attract and win businesses 
within their locality.  
    Consistent with the Combined Code, RDT encourages banks to engage in SBD as a way of 
influencing the flow of vital resources to the banks (e.g., knowledge, deposit and contracts). 
This theory therefore may provide an insight for the probable association between SBD and 
FP. Based on the usefulness of RDT in banks as discussed above, the study relies on it as a 
complementary external driver theory. 
    Additionally, neo-institutional theory (NIT) is the final complementary theory that this 
research depends on. It defines the concept of ‘institution’ as economic and social activities, 
rules and principles concerning diverse aspects of society (religion/politics/law) that are 
generally accepted (North, 1991; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Noticeably, ‘economic 
institution’ concept has two forms:  formal (statutes/rules) and informal (norms/conventions). 
The focus of economic institutions should be about maximising economic growth (North, 1991; 
Scott, 2001). Hence, economic institution-based NIT is mainly concerned with the concept of 
‘economic-efficiency (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013)/ ‘substantiveness’ (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990)/ ‘instrumentality’ (Aguilera et al., 2007). Following NIT tradition, economic institutions 
(nations/firms/groups) suggests that banks should prioritize the maximization of their own 
interests at the expense of the community members in which they operate (Aguilera et al., 
2007). The implication is that, banks should strive to out-compete all other actors in the 
environment for scarce societal resources (Haque & Ntim, 2020). 
    Alternatively, sociologists provide a wider perspective of institutions. They contend that, 
institutions should not only focus on efficiently producing goods and services, but they should 
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also represent organizations of high social, environmental, ethical and moral values (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). Therefore, the sociologists’ conceptualization of NIT contends that institutions 
will not only compete for the limited societal resources (‘economic/substantive/instrumental’) 
(Ntim & Haque, 2020), but may also try to gain the endorsement and support of the greater 
community for their existence rights (‘social/symbolic legitimacy/moral’) (Ashfort & Gibbs, 
1990). Societal legitimacy entails exhibiting responsiveness of how the actions and inactions 
of institutions influence members in the society (Suchman, 1990). 
    Similarly, the study applies insights from NIT framework, with focus on SBPs that have 
been introduced in the region. This framework argues that banks may gain social legitimacy 
by voluntarily adopting and/or complying with recognized institutional standards, rules and 
norms (Scott, 2001). Accordingly, ESSA banks as economic institutions should comply with 
SBPs policies that are set by their national regulators (coercive/regulative pressures) (Clarkson 
et al., 2015). This can also serve as means of learning from best practice from peers 
(cognitive/educative/mimetic pressures) and/or as part of international standards (e.g., SDGs, 
Global Reporting Initiatives) (Haque & Ntim, 2020).  
    For instance, complying with SDGs may not only improve bank legitimacy by enhancing 
the banks’ image, but also promote economic efficiency through having access to key 
resources. Examples of key resources in the banking system include easy access to finance or 
deposit by establishing links and securing the support of diverse powerful stakeholders. In this 
regard, banks may achieve this through the implementation of SBPs-based initiatives (Haque 
& Ntim, 2020). Arguably, such SBPs initiatives can improve the banks’ image and legitimacy 
in the eyes of their influential stakeholders (legitimation’). In addition, this may decrease the 
operating costs of banks by improving efficiency and thereby enhancing the FP of banks 
(Haque & Ntim, 2020). The study therefore relies on NIT as an important external driver theory 
to investigate the impact of SBD on FP and the moderating effect of CG on the SBD-FP nexus. 
    Overall, following prior studies and suggestions (e.g., Haque & Ntim, 2020; Kartadjumena 
& Rodgers, 2019), and based on the importance of the five theories in CG related studies, this 
study applies insights from these theories to investigate the association among CGI, SBD and 
FP in ESSA context. These theories are appropriate and closely interrelated. As will be 
explained in section 3.2, collectively, they will contribute to throwing light on the often-
complex agency relationships among shareholders, board, senior managers and other 
stakeholders. Accordingly, the study is positioned to contribute to this existing theoretical 




The extant banking literature has used several theories to shed light on the link between CG 
mechanisms and BRT in the region. Prior studies used agency theory alone (e.g., Akande, 2016; 
Bokpin, 2016), or in combination with other theories (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2013) to investigate 
this link. In line with recent calls (e.g., Haque & Ntim, 2020) for the adoption of multi-
dimensional theoretical framework, the study adopts agency theory as the primary motivator, 
with stakeholder and resource dependence theories as secondary motivators for the study. 
    Third, and similarly the thesis interprets the results of the association among board attributes 
and ownership structures in the ESSA banks with AT, SHT and RDT as applied by  Bokpin 
(2016) (see Fig 3.3). The cornerstone of AT centers on the assumption that the interests of the 
shareholders and senior managers may vary (Dawar, 2014). The separation of control of banks 
from their shareholders presents a typical agency conflict between senior managers and owners 
(Berle & Means, 1932). In terms of BRT, agency problem exists because the interest and risk-
taking preferences of senior managers may not be aligned with shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Thus, there is a call for effective governance structures that can properly 
align the conflicting interest of the managers and shareholders (Bokpin, 2016). Without this 
alignment, the preferences of senior managers and shareholders may be in convex concerning 
BRT behaviour (Bokpin, 2016).  
    On one hand, AT posits that, because of the ‘convex pay-off’ behaviour of profits in the 
banking system, shareholders tend to have a high penchant for excessive BRT in the absence 
of strict regulatory checks (John et al., 1991). Shareholders basically hold a ‘call option’ on 
bank’s value (Bokpin, 2016; Galai & Masulis, 1976). The exercise price of this ‘call option’ is 
the total outstanding debt of the bank (Galai & Masulis, 1976). In weak external regulatory 
framework such as ESSA region (see Fig 3.3), shareholders of banks may be more motivated 
to increase their profit from this ‘call option’ by encouraging excessive risk-taking (Bokpin, 
2016). When this excessive risk-taking pays-off, shareholders pay back debtholders 
(depositors) and benefit from the abnormal returns (Bokpin, 2016). However, when the high 
risk does not succeed, shareholders risk losing the capital they initially invested in the bank 
(Bokpin, 2016). This is due to the fact that banks are limited liability companies. 
    On the other hand, AT suggests that, senior managers tend to be risk averse (Andries et al., 
2020). The is based on the suggestion that, managers of banks are conservative in their decision 
because of their inability to diversify their portfolio unlike shareholders (Andries et al., 2020). 
Therefore, senior bank managers have reasons to prefer less BRT.  
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Fig 3.3: An integrative framework of board attributes and ownership structures on bank risk-taking  
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    Managers have their wealth mainly dependent on the banks that they manage (Pathan, 2009). 
In order to protect their interest in banks, senior managers will either opt for excessively safe 
assets or diversification. For example, they might reduce investments in high risky projects 
although such projects may have a positive net present value (Andries et al., 2020). Again, 
unlike bank owners who can possibly rely on diversification of their portfolio risk in the capital 
market, senior managers can only reduce their portfolio risk at the bank level (Bokpin, 2016). 
They therefore have more motivation to ensure diversification on bank level because they are 
incapable of reducing their portfolio risk in the capital market (Bokpin, 2016). Further, 
shareholders may also be rewarded by the number shares they hold in a bank, whereas bank 
managers are rewarded through wages and salary packages (Bokpin, 2016). The implication is 
that, because managers are compensated through wages and salary agreements which are 
mainly fixed especially in ESSA region, they have a tendency to be more conservative (Bokpin, 
2016). Hence, managers of banks do not have much to gain from abnormal profit resulting 
from excessive BRT but may lose the whole lot in an event that the bank fails including their 
reputation (Cornett et al., 2006). 
    Accordingly, AT makes the following crucial contributions with regards to BRT. First, it 
suggests that, EXPERT have a superior monitoring ability which can reduce management 
opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, the theory predicts that the appointment of 
majority EXPERT to the board may limit senior managers from engaging in excessive BRT. 
Second, and consistent with the CG codes in the region, AT calls for regular board meetings 
(Conger et al., 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It argues that, regular board meetings will lead 
to better monitoring which can limit managers’ discretion, thereby reducing excessive BRT 
(see Fig 3.3). 
    Finally, AT advocates for the participation of more institutional investors by suggesting that, 
when institutional investors have substantial investments in several banks operating in the same 
region, then they will be interested in maximizing the return on all the shares in the region. In 
this case, excessive BRT among the invested banks may be undesirable to such institutional 
investors as it could potentially reduce the profit margins within the portfolio (OECD, 2017). 
    To sum up, the CG codes in the region seek to lessen agency issues between senior managers 
and owners of banks through effective monitoring by board. This is particularly important in 
ESSA due to the presence of highly concentrated ownership in the banking system (e.g., 
Bokpin, 2016). Such ownership concentration can undesirably influence the rights of minority 
52 
 
owners and other stakeholders. This creates divergence of interest between small and large 
owners of banks. In particular, large shareholders may possibly use their influence to appoint 
their relatives or friends to key managerial positions. The appointment of such managers will 
imply that these senior managers may be seek the interest of large owners who influenced their 
appointment at the expense of minority owners in the bank (Albassam, 2014). Additionally, it 
is possible that politically linked persons can be selected as senior managers short of due 
diligence such as their capacity to perform such roles (Albassam, 2014). Such appointments 
may have detrimental effect on BRT. Hence, the application of an AT perspective is crucial in 
ESSA banking system. The study therefore depends on AT as the theory that offers the 
foundation of opinions in literature and the hypothesis development. 
    Again, SHT provides much wider viewpoint of internal CG framework. The notion of the 
stakeholder is seen as give-and-take relationship in which a stakeholder is a party that relies on 
the bank to attain its own goals and on which the bank relies on for its survival (Rhenman & 
Stymne, 1965). Banks typically have several stakeholders including depositors, borrowers, 
debtholders, employees, regulators and the community (Bonnafous-Boucher & Rendtorff, 
2016). SHT suggests that, the legitimate interests of the broader stakeholders of banks should 
be considered by bank managers (Frynas & Yamahaki et al., 2016). This may explain why 
senior managers may opt for safe investments and avoid excessive BRT in order to protect the 
interest of all stakeholders.  
    SHT has several implications on BRT within ESSA context. The theory posits that, 
shareholders of banks are entitled to most of the benefits of excessive BRT by managers 
(Bonnafous-Boucher & Rendtorff, 2016). However, with regards to losses, owners of banks 
are only held liable to a total amount of the capital they initially invested in the bank 
(Bonnafous-Boucher & Rendtorff, 2016). The implication is that, banks shareholders may 
adopt a strategy which can compel managers to undertake high risky projects. They will pay 
no attention even when the associated risk of such projects is greater than what other 
stakeholders of the bank may consider as tolerable BRT. By contrast, SHT argues that non-
shareholding interest groups of banks tend not to be interested in encouraging managers to 
engage in excessive risk-taking (Bonnafous-Boucher & Rendtorff, 2016).  Such interest groups 
of the bank are rather much interested in the long-term sustainability of the banks (Bonnafous-
Boucher & Rendtorff, 2016). They are typically considered as stakeholders with predetermined 
claim. They will receive allotted or predetermined streams of income no matter the profit 
recorded by the bank (Bonnafous-Boucher & Rendtorff, 2016). Therefore, the theory calls for 
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strict discipline of managers by EXPERT since they can provide better monitoring (Laeven, 
2013). Additionally, the theory recommends regular board meetings to ensure more discussions 
about BRT decisions. 
    In conclusion, in an environment where the institutional framework is strong, the interests 
of all stakeholders are protected by powerful state institutions. However, countries in ESSA 
have been identified to have weak institutional environment. This calls for strong internal 
governance mechanisms. One key internal CG mechanism that can strengthen governance in 
the banking sector is the board. For example, consistent with SHT, the Combined Code 
mandates the board to strictly monitor managers to ensure risk-taking is consistent with the risk 
preference of all the major stakeholders. This study relies on SHT as a complementary theory 
to AT which can potentially enhance the investigation of the link between board mechanisms 
and BRT in the countries in the ESSA region. 
    Crucially, RDT is related to the pioneering scholarly study of Pfeffer & Salancik (1978). 
Their proposition was based on the argument that banks heavily depend on active players in 
the environment. These active actors are essential because they are the channels through which 
essential resources may flow to the bank and thereby ensuring the sustainability of the bank. 
Because of this crucial link, banks are encouraged to prioritize the demand of actors in the 
communities that they operate so as to have access to these resources which will guarantee 
their own survival and long-term sustainability. Within this framework, board and ownership 
structures are viewed as key governance mechanisms that can influence BRT behaviour.  
    The theory proposes that the board should be considered as a useful connection between the 
bank and players in the environment who control vital resources needed for the banks’ survival 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Pfeffer, 1972). This suggests that, the growth and continued existence 
of banks largely depend on the actions of the board. From this perspective, the board may 
influence BRT behaviour in two main ways. The board is to offer advice and counsel to 
managers concerning investments decisions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, quality 
advice and counsel by the board may curb the tendency for managerial opportunism and 
excessive BRT. Crucially, the board should provide legitimacy to the transactions of the bank 
to ensure the flow of critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, the general 
practice in the banking system is that, loans above a certain threshold should be recommended 
by management for approval by the board. Thus, the board has the power to decline loans that 
are inconsistent with the risk preference of the bank. 
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    Furthermore, RDT highlights the role ownership structures play in ensuring the flow of 
critical resources to banks. It posits that the agency conflict may be reduced by putting in place 
owners with better capacity to monitor managers (Jafarinejad et al., 2015). For example, large 
equity holdings by institutional investors can empower them to better monitor BRT behaviour 
by managers. Hence, banks can leverage on such investors as critical resources to curtail 
excessive BRT. 
    Given the valuable nature of cooperation and reciprocal action of the different interest groups 
and banks which ensures the drive of essential resources to banks, the theory has key 
implications for BRT in the region. In terms of composition of the board, RDT suggests that 
banks can appoint more EXPERT to the board. This may signal to stakeholders that the bank 
has the needed expertise to run the affairs of the bank, and hence attract the needed critical 
resources such as deposit. The bank can also benefit from their expertise in terms of early 
spotting of risk and preferring of risk-mitigation solutions (Apergis, 2019). Besides appreciable 
knowledge of banking can lead to effective monitoring and oversight of BRT in the region 
(Wang & Zhu, 2015). 
    The theory specifies that different forms of ownership structure can influence BRT. For 
example, public pension fund investors have substantial stakes in the countries across the 
region. The benefit of such shareholders is in twofold. Typically, pension fund investors have 
low risk preference due to the long-term nature of their commitment to their clients 
(pensioners). In this regard, such dominant institutional investors with substantial voting power 
can reduce BRT by imposing their low risk preference on senior managers. Moreover, there is 
the tendency for such institutional investors to join forces to effectively monitor managers and 
limit excessive BRT in the ESSA region (see Fig 3.3). 
    Similarly, government ownership in banks may imply receiving the necessary funding from 
government. Arguably, this may guarantee huge financial resources with little costs, however, 
this may also influence BRT in ESSA context. As discussed earlier, substantial state-ownership 
in banks in the region has been transferred to foreign banks. This facilitates the flow of non-
financial resources such as import of skills and expertise from foreign owners in developed 
countries. Importantly, it can potentially lead to local banks receiving financial resources such 
as having access to external financing in the international market as well as foreign financing 
from the foreign investors or banks. Nevertheless, this can influence BRT in the region. The 
study therefore applies RDT as a second complementary theory to AT to explain the 
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relationship between CG and BRT in the region. Overall, based on the importance of the three 
theories, the study applies insights from them to examine the connection between CG and BRT 
in the ESSA region. Accordingly, this thesis is positioned to contribute to current theoretical 
framework by relying on the provided multiple theoretical framework. 
3.2 Empirical evidence and hypotheses development 
    This section provides the empirical evidence and hypotheses development. Additionally, the 
section highlights the gaps in literature and suggests how the gaps in literature are addressed 
by the thesis. The section is divided into three main parts. In Section 3.2.1, the thesis provides 
empirical evidence and develops hypotheses on the association among CGI, EC and SBD in 
the ESSA banks. Section 3.2.2 discusses the empirical evidence and sets hypotheses on the 
association among CGI, SBD and FP of banks in the ESSA countries. Finally, section 3.2.3 
focuses on the empirical evidence and the development of hypotheses on the relationship 
among board attributes, ownership structures, competition and BRT in the ESSA banks. The 
review will be structured as follows:  
    Throughout the thesis, the review of literature will be structured as follows. To start with, 
for every variable, the appropriate theoretical perspective will be explained. Next, the related 
international empirical literature concerning that particular variable will be provided. The main 
differences between the current study and previous literature will be addressed. Also, where 
applicable, related banking studies in the ESSA region will be provided, with particular 
emphasis on explaining the major differences between prior evidence and this study. To 
conclude, a suitable hypothesis within the ESSA banking system concerning the variable and 
the conceptual framework of the study where appropriate will be provided.  
 
3.2.1 Empirical evidence on the association among CGI, EC and SBD 
    This section reviews banking literature on CG, EC and SBD. In reviewing the empirical 
literature, the theoretical perspectives considered in section 3.1 will be totally integrated into 
the fundamental arguments. Subsection 3.2.1.1 focuses on CG disclosures and EC. Subsection 
3.2.1.2 reviews empirical literature on the association between EC and SBD. Subsection 3.2.1.3 
focuses on empirical studies on the moderating effect of CG disclosures on the association 






3.2.1.1 A broad CG disclosure index and executive compensation  
    Agency theoretical literature has proposed various monitoring mechanisms (e.g., quality CG 
structures) and incentive arrangement (e.g., EC incentives) approaches to minimise agency 
issues in banks (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). Accordingly, prior literature on CG and EC has 
primarily employed two contrasting views of agency theory namely: MPH and OCT (e.g., 
Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2019; Ntim et al., 2015; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).              
    First, managerial power hypothesis view posits that in banks with poor internal governance 
mechanisms, opportunistic senior managers may expropriate the resources of the bank. For 
example, given the power to determine their own pay, powerful senior managers of banks may 
expropriate the resources of banks through excessive compensation (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). 
Therefore, managerial power hypothesis perspective functions better in banks with poor 
internal CG setting. The poor CG structure is characterized by banks with weak corporate 
boards but influential senior managers including CEOs (Ntim et al., 2015). The outcome of this 
is the creation of ineffective managerial contract which ultimately increases agency problems 
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). This is due to the divergence of interests between bank senior 
managers and stakeholders particularly shareholders (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Sapp, 2008). 
Managerial power hypothesis states that, under weak governance settings, senior managers can 
manipulate the board and award themselves with excessively generous compensation plan 
(Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2015). Consequently, such weak managerial contracts tend 
to pay executives of banks higher than banks with strong CG structures (better-governed 
banks).                  
    On the contrary, OCT suggests that in banks with effective CG structures, EC arrangements 
can be structured such that it may align senior managers and stakeholders’ interests (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The implication is that, this theory is expected to be more applicable in banks 
with good CG structures (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). Unlike MPH, the theory views the interaction 
between independent corporate boards and senior bank managers as effective (e.g., Elmagrhi 
et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2015). Therefore, the proponents of the theory suggest that such 
arrangements should not be interrupted because it enhances the value of the bank by creating 
efficient managerial contracts (Ntim et al., 2015; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  
    Accordingly, OCT predicts that agency conflict should lessen due to proper alignment of the 
interest of senior managers and shareholders in such banking environment (Ntim et al., 2015; 
Tang, 2012). Essentially, because executives often do not have full control over their 
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remuneration, the theory predicts that CG structures can be used to align the interest of senior 
managers and stakeholders. In a good CG setting, executives of banks have less power in terms 
of their compensation packages (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009. This arrangement allows the board 
to structure EC packages in such a manner that it may influence the performance of the 
executives (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). The implication is that, such effective managerial contracts 
are more likely to pay lower compensation packages to executives than in a banking setting 
where there are poor governance mechanisms.  
    In practice, this expectation is reflected in the sustainability and CG reforms implemented 
across the banking system in ESSA countries. For example, consistent with OCT, the CG codes 
issued in the region suggest that good CG structures including board disclosures, accounting 
and transparency, risk management, shareholder rights and activism can limit excessive 
executive compensation in the banks. The CG reforms therefore incorporate the expectation 
that effective internal governance mechanisms can determine the level of executive 
compensation in the regions’ banking system.  
    Studies exploring the influence of broad CGI on executive compensation are scarce (Ntim 
et al., 2015), especially in the banking system in ESSA. As a result, this provides prospects to 
make original contribution to the banking literature. Nevertheless, prior evidence in the non-
financial sector suggests that CG disclosure indices have negative impact on executive pay of 
firms (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2012). Essentially, because 
well-governed banks tend to have superior financial performance than poorly-governed banks, 
the study expects that banks with high CGI may be in a better position to limit excessive 
executive compensation. Indeed, Elmagrhi et al. (2020) and Ntim et al. (2015) provide rare 
findings that lend support to this suggestion in the non-financial sector. Elmagrhi et al. (2020), 
for example, investigate the effect of CG disclosures on executive pay in a sample of 100 non-
financial firms in UK from 2008 to 2013. Their evidence suggests that, well-governed firms in 
UK pay their CEOs and executives far lower than poorly-governed firms.  
    More importantly, their results indicate that good CG disclosures impact on both the level 
and the structure of executive pay in UK. Notwithstanding the importance of their evidence, 
the study focused on non-financial sector in a developed economy. Also, Ntim et al. (2015) 
evidence focused on executive compensation and corporate governance in South Africa. 
Although the findings of their findings is very crucial, the study was based on a sample of 169 
non-financial firms in South Africa from 2002 to 2007. Besides focusing the non-financial 
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sector, they used single CG measures such as board size, independence, institutional ownership 
and block ownership as the measure of complex CG. 
    Noticeably, these prior studies (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 
2012) have focused on either the non-financial sector in a developed economy and/or have 
employed individual CG variables in their investigations. This limits the generalization of their 
findings. Therefore, the likely impact of corporate governance disclosures on executive 
compensation within the banking sector in emerging economies such as ESSA is limited. The 
current thesis attempts to fill this gap by focusing on the banking sector in ESSA countries as 
well as employing a broad CG disclosure index and three measures of EC (executive directors 
pay, non-executive directors pay and the total pay for all directors) over a relatively longer 
period which will offer new insight from an emerging economy context. 
    Accordingly, and consistent with the objectives of the considerable CG and executive pay 
reforms (e.g., Ghana SEC code, 2018, 2012, 2010; Nigeria SEC code, 2018, 2011; Kings 
Report, 2016; Kenya CG code, 2016) that have been implemented in the ESSA region over the 
past two decade, the study assumes that in banks with good CG mechanisms, senior managers 
will have less power in terms of determining their own remuneration packages. This may limit 
excessive EC in the region’s banking system as shown in Fig 3.4 (H1). Therefore, the first 
hypotheses of the study to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 1a. There is a negative association between internal corporate governance 
disclosure index and compensation of executive directors of banks in ESSA region.  
Hypothesis 1b. There is a negative association between internal corporate governance 
disclosure index and compensation of non-executive directors of banks in ESSA region. 
Hypothesis 1c. There is a negative association between internal corporate governance 
disclosure index and compensation of all directors of banks in ESSA region.  
 
3.2.1.2 The effect of executive compensation on sustainable banking disclosures 
    Corporate executive compensation in the banking system is a subject of public interest 
(Conyon, 2011), as it generates press coverage and comment (Emerton & Jones, 2019). One 
key approach of addressing agency conflict in the banking system is to align the interests of 
shareholders and senior managers. Primarily, incentive compensation in theory remunerates 
senior managers of banks for good performance which profits shareholders (Emerton & Jones, 
2019; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Thus, executive compensation can be used to align or attempt 
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to align the interests of shareholders and senior managers in the banking system (Emerton & 
Jones, 2019; Arora & Alam, 2005). The implication is that EC can be used to incentivise senior 
bank executives to deliver higher sustainable banking performance (Dittmann et al., 2017). For 
example, within the banking system, targets setting and monitoring of incentives within EC 
can serve as motivational strategy (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Thus, the role of corporate 
executives in catalysing progress with SDGs in any banking system cannot be overemphasized 
(Nwagwu, 2020). For example, the adoption and integration of the SBPs into bank's operations 
are largely driven by corporate executives. Theoretically, there are two major opposing views 
on the likely impact of executive compensation on sustainable banking; optimal contrasting 
theory (OCT)  and managerial power hypothesis (MPH) (e.g., Ntim et al., 2019; Kartadjumena 
& Rodgers, 2019; Ntim et al., 2015).  
    On the one hand, managerial power hypothesis views EC arrangements as a product of close 
negotiations between powerful senior managers and weak boards leading to the creation of 
inefficient managerial contracts and the exacerbation of agency conflict (e.g., Ntim et al., 2019; 
Bebchuk et al., 2002). Accordingly, during the design of executive compensation packages, the 
board cannot be expected to handle and bargain at arm’s length with managers (Kartadjumena 
& Rodgers, 2019). This is largely due to the excessive managerial power. It has been suggested 
that two main agency conflicts originate from excessive managerial power (Ntim et al., 2019). 
A first-tier agency conflict looks at the tendency of influential CEOs to manipulate director 
appointment in order to gain control in board decisions (Ntim et al., 2019), thereby facilitating 
excessive executive compensation in the banking system (Gomez-Mejia eta al., 1987).  
    A second-tier agency conflict arises because non-executive directors may reward powerful 
CEOs and senior managers with a disproportionately high remuneration in return for a 
comparable and reciprocal backing from them (Ntim et al., 2019; Morse et al., 2011; Core et 
al., 2003). Under such arrangement, linking executive compensation with sustainable banking 
practices may not necessarily lead to improved sustainable banking performance. This is 
because executives and non-executives are assumed to structure their own compensation in a 
reciprocal (give-and-take) arrangement. Thus, the theory claims that executive compensation 
may not be linked necessarily to SBD, hence may not incentivize managers to work towards 
achieving SDGs. Compensation arrangements that are excessively influenced by senior 
managers due to weak CG can lead to a decrease in long-term value of the bank (Pepper & 
Gore 2015; Bebchuk & Fried, 2005), and a decoupling of pay-for-sustainability sensitivity 
(Emerton & Jones, 2019). Therefore, whether executive compensation is linked with 
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sustainable banking or not (Elmagrhi et al. 2020; Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019), managerial 
power hypothesis expects a negative pay-for sustainability sensitivity (PSS).       
    On the other hand, optimal contrasting theory suggests that executive pay results from close 
arrangement between strong corporate board and senior managers (Conyon, 2014; Edmans & 
Gabaix, 2009). This creates efficient managerial incentive contracts (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
The implication is that, in banks with good CG mechanisms, executive compensation schemes 
can be structured in such a manner that it aligns managers and stakeholders’ interests (e.g., He 
et al., 2014; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
    The theory relies on the expectation that senior managers have less influence in determining 
their own remuneration (e.g., Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014; Dong et al., 2010). Because executives 
do not have full control over their remuneration, optimal contrasting theory framework 
suggests that executive compoensation can be an effective tool in advancing progress towards 
attaining the SDGs. This is premised on the notion that because executives have minimal 
influence on their compensation schemes, EC can be linked to sustainable banking 
performance. This can direct senior managers attention towards long‐term value creation such 
as sustainable banking. Accordingly, the theory suggests that one useful link in the chain of 
improving sustainable banking is to tie improvements to EC. This leads to EC packages that 
are able to drive and optimize managerial performance in key areas such as SBPs targets. 
Therefore, optimal contrasting theory predicts a strong positive relationship between EC and 
SBD (e.g., Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014; Dong et al., 2010), implying a strong pay-for-
sustainability sensitivity. 
    The consensus is that, the market tends to encourage SBPs by awarding banks with superior 
sustainability performance with high appraisal and vice-versa (e.g., Haque & Ntim, 2020; 
Haque, 2017). Hence, well-meaning bank boards may use motivation-based approach, such as 
executive compensation to incentivise senior managers to engage in sustainability investments, 
which can improve the organizational legitimacy (Campbell et al., 2007). This may in turn 
enhance the economic benefits and financial performance of banks.  
    Incentive based compensation for executives in the banking system is key due to a number 
of reasons. First, it has been suggested that, influential executives may be unwilling towards 
pursuing SBPs since such investments may necessitate considerable capital investments amidst 
unpredictable financial payback in the short-term (Haque, 2017). Second, SBPs initiatives 
especially environmental activities necessitate labour intensive and highly skilled workforce to 
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design and implement (Haque & Ntim, 2020). Examples of such initiatives include advancing 
non-polluting products, green finance or minimizing the danger of environmental disasters 
(Haque & Ntim, 2020; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). Thus, banks may have to rely on 
appropriate incentives in order to attract and motivate such experts (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 
2009). In addition, it has been suggested that, banks with generously remunerated executives 
may be exposed to public and media scrutiny (Haque & Ntim, 2020). Consequently, banks 
offering attractive compensation packages may be subjected to public scrutiny to continue 
engaging in SBD linked initiatives as a way of minimizing possible undesirable media attention 
(Haque & Ntim, 2020). This can improve the banks’ legitimacy. 
    Banking studies examining the relationship between EC and SBD are largely uncommon 
and hence, this offers a fertile field for further investigation (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). 
However, the limited findings of prior studies are mainly in line with OCT that EC can be 
designed to motivate senior managers to pursue higher SBD in such a manner that it links up 
executives’ interest with that of the wider stakeholders (e.g., Haque & Ntim, 2020; 
Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). For example, Kartadjumena and Rodgers (2019) investigate 
whether EC can motivate managers to pursue corporate sustainability concerns as measured by 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) disclosure indicators in a sample of 39 Indonesian banks 
over the period 2007-2014. Their results suggest that higher EC motivates managers to engage 
in more climate and environmental concerns which also enhances FP of the banks. Similarly, 
D’apolito et al. (2019) provide evidence from 42 European banks over the period 2013-2017 
that shows that, the implementation of sustainable criteria in the banks’ remuneration contracts 
is positively associated with sustainability performance. The difference between these prior 
banking studies and this thesis is that, Kartadjumena and Rodgers (2019) is based on only one 
dimension of SBD (environmental performance), whilst D’apolito et al. (2019) focused on 
developed banking sector (European banks). This thesis focuses on seven dimensions of SBD 
in 16 ESSA countries. 
    With reference to ESSA banking sector, studies examining the influence of EC on SBD are 
sparse, and consequently this study serves as a timely contribution to the existing sustainable 
banking literature. Waweru et al. (2009) examine the level and structure of EC schemes in the 
banking industry in Canada (8 banks) and South Africa (4 banks) in 2005. They report a 
positive association between CEOs compensation and the FP of banks. In line with the positive 
prediction of OCT and consistent with the expectation of the recent SBD and EC reforms that 
have been pursued in the region, the study predicts that EC incentives can influence SBD. The 
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study expects the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity to be positive based on the traditional 
economic view that considers cash compensation as an indicator of success and satisfaction 
(Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). Hence, executive compensation incentive scheme can be an 
effective tool to align senior managers’ self-interest in maximizing its wealth with the “bank 
common good” results by engaging in more sustainability responsible actions (Kartadjumena 
& Rodgers, 2019). Therefore, as depicted in Fig 3.4 (H2), the study proposes that executive 
compensation may serve as an effective governance structure that can increase sustainable 
banking. Accordingly, the study sets the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive association between executive compensation and the 
composite sustainable banking disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a positive association between non-executive compensation and the 
composite sustainable banking disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2c: There is a positive association between the total compensation for all directors 
and the composite sustainable banking disclosures. 
    In addition, it is crucial to point out that the multi-dimensional nature of SBD and the need 
to disaggregate it into individual dimensions to advance a deeper insight of the link. Thus, the 
study anticipates that the three key components of executive compensation variables will 
positively influence the individual dimensions of SBD as captured in Fig 3.4 (H2). As a result, 
the study develops the next hypotheses focusing on the probable impact of the individual 
components of executive compensation on the individual dimensions of SBD as follows: 
Hypothesis 2d: Executive compensation has a positive association with the individual 
dimensions of sustainable banking disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2e: Non-executive compensation has a positive association with the individual 
dimensions of sustainable banking disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2f: Total compensation for all directors has a positive association with the 
individual dimensions of sustainable banking disclosures. 
 
3.2.1.3 The moderating effect of CGI on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity 
    From optimal contrasting theory perspective, in banks where CG structures are effective, EC 
incentive can be structured in such a manner that it supports the proper orientation of 
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executives, shareholders and other stakeholders’ interests (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 
2019; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, it has been suggested that compensation-based 
approach of CG can be influential tool that may shift corporate accountability towards SBD 
(Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015). In addition, good CG can enhance the boards’ monitoring 
mechanisms of management behaviour such as the opportunistic behaviour of senior managers 
in the banking sector (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). This can improve the pay-for-
sustainability sensitivity (Ntim et al., 2015). In this case, OCT predicts that, effective internal 
governance mechanisms tend to have a strong positive impact on the pay-for-sustainability 
sensitivity in the banking system. In other words, the more banks adopt quality internal 
governance disclosures, the better the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity. 
    On the other hand, managerial power hypothesis maintains that senior managers of banks 
have much influence in structuring their own compensation, and that they tend to rely on this 
influence to expropriate shareholders wealth (Ntim et al., 2015; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). In 
this vein, Elmagrhi et al. (2020) suggest a weak association between the interaction of CGI and 
EC (i.e., CGI*EC) and the SBD. The implication is that, within MPH framework, the 
moderating role of CGI on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity may be relatively weak in the 
banking system (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019).  
    However, prior banking studies (e.g., D’apolito et al., 2019; Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; 
Waweru et al., 2009) that have examined the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity have not yet 
explored the potential moderating impact of CG disclosure index on the pay-for-sustainability 
sensitivity. Meanwhile, it has been argued that, because monitoring (CG) and incentive 
alignment (EC) approaches are usually applied collectively by banks to address agency 
conflict, they can be interconnected or interdependent before they may be effective in the 
banking system (Grewatsch et al., 2017; Ntim et al., 2015). A unique means of factoring such 
probable interdependencies into consideration and enhance the pay-for-sustainability 
sensitivity is to carry out an investigation involving an interaction terms among the SBD 
incentive (EC) and monitoring (CG disclosure) structures (Elmagrhi et al., 2020).  
    For instance, as shown in Fig 3.4 (H3), it is possible good CG disclosures can increase 
monitoring of opportunistic behaviour of bank senior managers and thereby limiting the 
tendency for excessive EC. Besides limiting excessive EC, such good governance structures 
may play a pivotal role in aligning the interest of the executives of banks with the long-term 
sustainability and growth of banks. Therefore, if better internal governance structures are 
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generally associated with lower executive compensation and greater engagement in sustainable 
banking, then linking executive compensation with sustainable banking targets due better 
governance system should represent an enhancement tool for SBD (D’apolito et al., 2019; Ntim 
et al., 2015). Arguably, this can improve the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity in the banking 
system.  
    Therefore, effective CG mechanisms arising from corporate board structures, such as board 
and director, accounting, audit and transparency, effective monitoring by shareholders and 
executive pay disclosures can influence executive compensation and to an extent SBD (Nigeria 
CG Code, 2018). For example, effective managerial monitoring associated with sustainability 
progress linked to executive compensation by independent board may incentivise bank senior 
managers to increase their SBD activities (Elmagrhi et al., 2020; D’apolito et al., 2019). 
Further, compliance, shareholder rights and enforcement structures can mitigate agency 
conflicts (Ntim et al., 2015). For instance, effective internal CG such as higher activism by 
institutional investors can moderate the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity (Ntim et al., 2015). 
    Prior banking research has examined the direct impact of executive compensation on SBD 
without taking in to account the probable moderating influence of CGI on the link (e.g., 
D’apolito et al., 2019; Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). As a result, the objective of this study 
is to contribute to the existing international sustainable banking literature by exploring the pay-
for-sustainability sensitivity and ascertains whether broad CG disclosure mechanisms can 
positively moderate the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity. Accordingly, the thesis proposes that 
effective internal corporate governance mechanisms as measured by compliance with the 
regional Combined corporate governance Code (e.g., Nigeria SEC 2011; 2018; Ghana SEC 
2010; Kenya, 2016) can influence the relationship between executive compensation and 
sustainable banking disclosure in the banking system in the ESSA countries.             
    Additionally, the thesis expects that, the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity will be stronger in 
banks with high internal corporate governance disclosure score (better-governed banks), but 
weaker in banks with low corporate governance disclosure score (poorly-governed banks). 
Hence, the next set of hypotheses to be examined are: 
Hypothesis 3a: Corporate governance disclosure index moderates the relationship between 
executive directors pay and sustainable banking disclosures, with the executive directors pay-




Hypothesis 3b: Corporate governance disclosure index moderates the relationship between 
non-executive directors pay and sustainable banking disclosures, with the non-executive 
directors pay-for-sustainability (PSS) being stronger in banks with high internal corporate 
governance disclosure index. 
Hypothesis 3c: Corporate governance disclosure index moderates the relationship between 
total executive directors pay and sustainable banking disclosures, with the total executive 
directors pay-for-sustainability (PSS) being stronger in banks with high internal corporate 
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3.2.2 Empirical evidence on the association among CGI, SBD and FP 
    This section reviews banking literature on CG, EC and SBD. In reviewing the empirical 
literature, the theoretical perspectives considered in section 3.1 will be totally integrated into 
the fundamental arguments. Subsection 3.2.2.1 focuses on CG disclosures and SBD. 
Subsection 3.2.2.2 reviews empirical literature on the association between SBD and FP. 
Subsection 3.2.2.3 focuses on empirical studies on the moderating effect of CG disclosures on 
the association between SBD and FP. 
  
3.2.2.1 A broad corporate governance disclosure index and sustainable banking   
    Internal governance mechanisms and SBPs have been subjects of evolutionary tendencies, 
and research exploring in their possible association has been growing steadily (Gangi et al., 
2019). As has been discussed in section 3 above, the theoretical recognition is that good internal 
CG mechanisms help in aligning managerial interests with the broader stakeholders of banks 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). AT framework describes internal corporate governance as a set of 
well-established bank structures that can align the interests of two key groups. These are the 
executives of the bank and the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory posits that 
a net decline in agency costs (monitoring) emanating from the establishment of good CG 
mechanisms may lead to an increase in SBD (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Within this 
perspective, better-governed banks may engage in SBD more than their poorly-governed 
counterparts (Frynas et al., 2016). 
    Next, RBV considers good CG mechanisms as bank specific capabilities that can enhance 
SBD (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011). It argues that a bank with quality CG can differentiate 
itself from competitors by engaging in key SBD investments. Such banks can gain reputation 
for sustainability management (Lourenco et al. 2014), social care and green novelties (Chen et 
al., 2006), thereby becoming attractive to investors and other stakeholders who are more 
concern about sustainability. 
    In support of above theories, NIT suggests that, conforming with good CG guidelines either 
through coercive or supervisory pressures in the form of improved SBD investments can 
enhance the legitimacy of banks’ operation and services (Haque & Ntim, 2020). This can 
ultimately enhance the reputation of the bank (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy motivates banks 
to engage and report SBD activities (Gangi et al., 2019).  Therefore, NIT suggests that there is 
an implied social contract between banks and the society (Cormier & Gordon, 2001). To fulfil 
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contractual requirements of this relationship, banks can legitimize, maintain and enhance their 
legitimacy by disclosing their sustainability information (e.g., Mousa & Hassan, 2015; Branco 
& Rodrigues, 2008). Thus, banks with good CG tend to fortify their existence and earn social 
acceptance by engaging in SBD such as contributing to the well-being and prosperity of the 
society (Khan, 2010).  
    Also, SHT considers CG as a set of structures that ensure banks are accountable to a broader 
stakeholder groups (Gangi et al., 2019). This group consist of shareholders, customers and 
financial investors (Gangi et al., 2019). Accordingly, good governance is projected to sustain 
good dealings with various stakeholders who relate with the bank regardless of the existence 
of recognized agreements or not (Gangi et al., 2019). From SHT, good CG practices can be 
considered as a pillar that complements SBD (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). It argues that CG is 
inextricably linked to SBD (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), hence banks with quality internal CG 
structures may be motivated to engage in SBD initiatives as a reliable means of exhibiting their 
good governance to their stakeholders (Beekes & Brown, 2006). SHT therefore suggests that 
good CG should encompass broader CG disclosures which require not only uprightness, 
transparency and accountability to shareholders, but should also show great concern to all other 
stakeholders (Jamali et al., 2008). Thus, this framework suggests that the sustainable growth 
of banks depends on the support they receive from all their stakeholders (Orazalin, 2019).  
    Accordingly, the core principle of this theory is that banks can achieve their goals by 
balancing the conflicting interests and demands of various stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984). 
The stakeholder groups of banks include employees, customers, suppliers, auditors, regulators, 
government, shareholders and the general public (Freeman, 1984). For example, stakeholders 
have specific needs and expectations of bank’s SBD in areas such as environmental 
management, social, health and safety, community involvement, elimination of discrimination 
and employment of minority groups (Orazalin, 2019; Freeman, 1984). In this regard, banks 
with good CG will act in accordance with stakeholders’ needs and expectations to gain their 
support by improving their corporate disclosures including SBD (Barako & Brown, 2008). 
Hence, the theory suggests that good CG will lead to improvements in SBD in the banking 
systems. 
    From RDT perspective, good CG mechanisms can bring valuable economic resources, 
information, skills, knowledge and recommendations for organizational success (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). In this case, CG mechanisms such as board disclosures serve as crucial link 
between banks and their external resources (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003), which can mitigate 
uncertainty through transparent and extensive SBD (Gangi et al.,2019). 
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    Prior literature also suggests that CG mechanisms can impact on the outlook towards banks’ 
compliance with sustainability initiatives, as well as all the components captured under the 
broad umbrella of SBD (e.g., Gangi et al., 2019; Jamali et al., 2008; Jo & Harjoto, 2012). 
Arguably, because quality internal corporate governance is connected with effective 
supervision and monitoring, it can be argued that, CG can serve as a stimulus for SBD 
initiatives (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011). Accordingly, it has been 
suggested that banks with good internal governance structures tend to operate in such a way 
that, it sustains good dealings with various stakeholders who interact with the bank even in the 
absence of recognized agreements (Gangi et al.,2019; Kendall, 1999). A few of such dealings 
in the banking industry are illustrated below.           
    It has been suggested that, shareholders of banks are increasingly demonstrating their 
sustainability concerns by exerting their right to influence the way banks operate (Dimson et 
al., 2015). Unlike traditional shareholder activism, such sustainability conscious shareholders 
continue to rely on effective CG that is receptive to SBD‐oriented initiatives by focusing on 
the well-being of a wider perspective of stakeholders (Ntim, 2009). This may suggest that good 
CG mechanisms can positively influence SBD in the banking system. 
    Additionally, besides shareholders and from a wider approach of CG, protecting 
stakeholders of banks who do not possess formal power over senior managers is crucial in the 
banking system (Gangi et al., 2019). In this case, effective CG mechanism can be considered 
as a pivotal lever that impacts on a bank to work responsibly towards the various stakeholder 
groups who interact with the bank. Considerate about the wider necessities of bank's policy 
relative to focusing on only the interest of shareholder is in line with the idea of CG mechanism 
as a pillar of SBD (Gangi et al., 2019; Elkington, 2006). This is because the effectiveness of 
CG structures is a necessary requirement that guarantees responsible behaviour of senior 
managers towards all stakeholders (Huse, 2009). Hence, effective CG mechanisms are can be 
beneficial in implementing and maintaining SBD (Jamali et al., 2008). This view therefore 
highlights the probable beneficial effect that CG may have on SBD (Gangi et al., 2019).  
    Arguably, the objective of reducing probable conflicts of interest in the banking system far 
exceed the conventional conflict of interest between executives and shareholders (Gangi et al., 
2019; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). From the conflict resolution approach, effective CG 
mechanisms improve the status of social engagement as a pillar of SBD (Gangi et al., 2019). 
The implication is that, good CG mechanism is critical condition that can resolve potential 
conflict between senior managers of banks and their various stakeholders (Gangi et al., 2019; 
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Huse, 2009). Thus, this perspective also suggests that CG mechanisms can increase 
investments in SBD in the banking system (Gangi et al., 2019).  
    Moreover, good CG mechanisms are valuable in sustaining effective SBD (Jamali et al., 
2008). For example, investors are increasingly becoming sensitive to how banks respond to 
social, natural conservation and environmental issues (Gangi et al., 2019; Ntim, 2009). In 
responds to that, banks with good CG structures tend to rely on SBD as way of signalling to 
these investors their CG quality (Beekes & Brown, 2006). In that regard, there is a call for 
strong CG mechanisms to support bank's involvement in SBD (Gangi et al., 2019; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Importantly, Walls et al. (2012, p.885) suggest that “since the turn of the 
21st century, CG discussions have shifted progressively toward contemporary social issues 
(e.g., climate change, labour rights, and corruption) that matter to lawmakers, consumers, 
shareholders, and corporate managers in the marketplace.” Accordingly, effective CG 
mechanisms represent an additional tool to address SBD pressures originating from diverse 
stakeholders (Gangi et al., 2019). 
    The empirical evidence linking broad CG disclosure index on SBD is largely uncommon 
and therefore, this offers a fertile ground for further studies. Indeed, prior studies mainly 
examine the impact of individual board structures on SBD (see Table 3.1). For example, Gupta 
and Bala (2020) investigate the effect of board committee disclosures in a sample of 24 banks 
in India over the period 2015-2016. They establish that, board committee disclosures relate 
positively with SBD. Orazalin (2019) explore the effects of board characteristics on SBD in a 
sample of 38 banks in Kazakhstan over the period 2010-2016. The results of the study reveal 
that board gender diversity has a positive influence on SBD, while board size and board 
independence have no impact on the level of SBD. Similarly, based on an international sample 
of 142 banks in 35 countries over the period 2011-2015, Gangi et al. (2019) document a positive 
effect of CG variables measured by board size, independence, gender and CEO duality on 
banks' environmental disclosures.  
    Likewise, Jizi et al. (2014) examine the same link in the US banking system with a sample 
of 193 banks from 2009-2011. They report a positive relationship between board independence, 
board size and SBD. They also document a negative link between CEO duality and SBD. 
Further, Das et al. (2015) examine 29 banks in Bangladesh from 2007 to 2011. Their results 
indicate a significant positive link between board size, ownership structure, and board 
independence and SBD. Additionally, Bukair & Rahman (2015) explore the same link in a 
sample of 53 Islamic banks in GCC countries for the year 2008. They establish that board size 
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has no significant impact on SBD. Their result shows no significant relationship between CEO 
duality and SBD, and a negative relationship between board independence and SBD.  
    As discussed above, prior banking studies on CG-SBD link have largely focused on the 
effect of individual board structures (e.g., Bukair & Rahman, 2015; Jizi et al., 2014). Banking 
CG studies that employ comprehensive CG disclosure in ESSA remain uncommon (Gangi et 
al., 2019). For example, Barako and Brown (2008) investigates the effect of CG attributes on 
social disclosures in 40 banks in Kenya from 2006-2007. They find that board gender diversity 
has a positive effect on social information disclosure. The study reports no significant 
relationship between foreign national and voluntary social disclosure. They report that board 
independence is positively associated with social disclosure. The study focused on a single 
country, analyzed only social factors with only 22 disclosure items.  
    As indicated earlier, the Combined Code in ESSA focuses on four main CG mechanisms as 
hallmark of quality CG mechanisms namely: (i) board and director, (ii) accounting, auditing 
and transparency, (iii) risk management, internal audit and control and (iv) compliance, 
shareholder rights and enforcement. The codes also specify six core SBD themes: (i) 
environmental, (ii) social, (iii) health and safety, (iv) ethics and human rights, (v) community 
involvement and (vi) employee disclosures. The theoretical perspective recognizes internal 
governance structures such as CG disclosures as pillar of SBD in the region (Gangi et al., 2019). 
Therefore, it is argued that quality CG may serve as a key motivator of higher sensitivity to 
SBD initiatives of banks in the region. In line with the recommendations of the Combined Code 
in ESSA, and given that good CG mechanisms can influence SBD, the study expects the CG 
disclosure index to increase the extent of SBD as captured in Fig 3.5 (H4). The study sets the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H4a: There is a positive association between bank-level corporate governance disclosure 
index and SBD in ESSA, with the positive relationship being stronger in banks with high CG 
disclosure index. 
    Additionally, and delving deeper, several scholars (e.g., Platonova et al., 2018; Makni et al. 
2009; Mahoney & Roberts, 2007; Mahoney &Thorne, 2005) have pointed out that the need to 
focus on the individual dimensions of SBD score when analyzing the influence of CGI on SBD, 
contending that the explanatory information is ‘lost’ when only the composite measure of SBD 
is employed (Johnson & Greening, 1999, p. 574).  Subsequently, this study develops individual 
hypotheses as follows: 
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H4b: There is a positive association between bank-level corporate governance disclosure 
index and environmental dimension of SBD in ESSA banks.  
H4c: There is a positive association between bank-level corporate governance disclosure 
index and social dimension of SBD in ESSA banks.  
H4d: There is a positive association between bank-level corporate governance disclosure 
index and, health and safety dimension of SBD in ESSA banks.  
H4e: There is a positive association between bank-level corporate governance disclosure 
index and, ethics and human rights dimension of SBD in ESSA banks.  
H4f: There is a positive association between bank-level corporate governance disclosure 
index and community involvement dimension of SBD in ESSA banks.  
H4g: There is a positive association between bank-level corporate governance disclosure 
index and employee dimension of SBD in ESSA banks.  
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3.2.2.2 Sustainable banking and performance (sustainability-for-performance sensitivity)       
    Internal governance structures and sustainability have been subjected to evolutionary debate 
over the past 20 years. In particular, several theoretical perspectives have been adopted by 
previous researchers to examine the relationship between sustainable banking and financial 
performance of banks. Agency theory (AT) argues that managers may employ charity approach 
to gain endorsement from local business leaders (Galaskiewicz, 1985), which may not serve in 
the interest of shareholders and the society. Such activities may generate lower profits.  
    Resource-based view (RBV) posits that specialized skills and capabilities linked to SBD can 
lead to bank-specific economic benefits (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011), which can enhance FP. 
RBV perspective asserts that, SBD can be justified as key investment in capabilities that 
differentiate a bank from its competitors (Frynas et al., 2016). Such capabilities may include 
reputation for sustainability champion (Lourenco et al. 2014), green innovations (Chen et al., 
2006), reduction in environmental risks and capitalization of environmental opportunities that 
generate long term shareholder value (Gangi et al., 2019). For example, consistent with the 
RBV (e.g., Gangi et al., 2019), the adoption of green strategies helps banks to address 
restrictions prescribed by the natural environment. It also contributes to the generation of 
sustainable, non-replicable, or unparalleled competitive edge (Elijido‐Ten & Clarkson, 2017). 
Such activities may enhance FP of banks. 
    Stakeholder theory (SHT) is the underlying foundation, which states that SBD enhances FP 
(Freeman, 1984). It posits that, for banks to achieve the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth, 
managers should be mindful and pay attention to the diverse interests and well-being of all the 
stakeholders who can assist or hinder the achievement of this goal (Philips et al., 2003).  It 
suggests that, the FP of banks largely depends on the enduring relationship with stakeholders. 
Hence, managing the stakeholders is a key tool for FP (Hammann et al., 2009). Accordingly, 
banks engage in SBD as a form of establishing trusting, cooperative and goodwill relationships 
with stakeholders (Jizi et al., 2014; Kolk & Pinkse, 2010). 
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    Banks with good SBD can generate valuable goodwill, which can protect banks from 
unexpected issues and open doors to new businesses (Platonova et al., 2018), thereby 
enhancing FP. It further contends that SBD promote banks’ image and enhances their 
reputation. Socially responsible banks therefore experience greater brand loyalty (Jizi et al., 
2014), and customer satisfaction. This explanation is well grounded in SHT. Within this same 
framework, employee responsive banks benefit in terms of employee commitment. This can 
enhance FP because in such banks the tendency for labour related challenges such as labour 
disputes and work stoppages (strikes and lockouts) is reduced (Waddock & Graves, 1997).      
    Resource dependence theory (RDT) framework considers SBD as key investments that can 
influence the flow of critical resources to the banks (e.g., knowledge, deposit, contracts). Banks 
that invest in local developmental initiatives such as health may attract and win businesses 
within the locality. Thus, it suggests that banks in developing economies such as ESSA can 
consider SBPs as intangible assets that can result in a more efficient utilization of resources, 
which can enhance the FP of banks (Surroca et al., 2010).  
    Neo-institutional theory (NIT) suggests that engaging in SBD can help to improve bank 
legitimacy by enhancing the banks’ image. It requires banks to be responsive to the ethical or 
moral environment where they operate (Andania & Yadnya, 2020). This can lead to economic 
efficiency in the form of gaining access to key resources, such as finance by securing the 
support of different powerful stakeholders which can enhance FP (Haque & Ntim, 2020).  
    Traditionally, scholars are of the view that the one and only SBD of a business is to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase shareholder value (Henderson, 2007; 
Lantos, 2001; Friedman 1970). The implication is that banks are established to maximise the 
profit of shareholders and as such SBD investments undermine this objective (Friedman, 1970).  
    Accordingly, opponents of SBD investments explain that the adoption of socially 
responsible initiatives by banks lead to additional costs which create competitive disadvantage 
(e.g., Simpson & Kohers, 2002; Preston & O’Bannon, 1997; Aupperle et al., 1985; Friedman 
1970). They suggest that being socially and sustainability active through engaging in 
community projects, supporting employee welfare and minimizing environmental damage can 
be expensive (Barnett & Salomon, 2006). Therefore, SBD investments can be a huge source of 
administrative burden to banks (Barnett & Salomon 2006), with negative impact on FP. Indeed, 
Preston and O’Bannon (1997) argue that the higher the performance of banks’ SBD 
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investments, the lower their FP. Accordingly, sustainable responsible banks tend to have less 
advantage compared to average banks (Platonova et al., 2018). 
    Likewise, other researchers advocate that resources dedicated to SBD or actions should be 
diverted or either spent on banks’ efficiency or returned to shareholders’ (e.g., Perrini et al., 
2011; Lantos 2001). The basis of their argument is that it is not the responsibility of banks to 
address SBD issues (Perrini et al. 2011). To that effect, they rationalize that SBD investment 
is associated with lower economic efficiency and profit because it imposes unequal cost among 
banks and places responsibility on banks rather than government (e.g., Jensen, 2001; Lantos 
2001; Friedman 1970). In this regard, they suggest that SBD issues should be matters of 
concern to the government and hence should be addressed by the government or a third sector 
(Platonova et al., 2018).  
    In addition, others assert that SBD investments should not be factored into banks’ core 
operations (e.g., Jensen, 2001; Friedman, 1970). They justify their claim by underscoring the 
potential adverse effect of excessive role diversification in banking. For instance, they classify 
SBD policies as external interference, over-regulation and legislation (Friedman, 1970). Thus, 
SBD investments denote corporate irresponsibility, misguided virtues, unethical and 
misappropriation or unjustified appropriation of shareholders’ funds, which amount to theft 
and violation of shareholders’ rights (e.g., Lantos, 2001; Friedman, 1970). In particular, Jensen 
(2001) argues that SBD issues can lead to a situation where senior managers will be confronted 
with multiple goals with no clear objectives. These can negatively impact on FP. Therefore, 
integrating SBD policies in business can create an obstacle to banks’ competition for survival 
(Platonova et al., 2018). Accordingly, banks are advised to focus on ‘making profit’ which is 
the overriding goal and responsibility of bank senior managers (Ofori et al., 2014). 
    However, in line with the theoretical arguments, recent fast-developing banking literature 
and global institutions have rejected the notion that banks should channel all their efforts and 
resources to maximization of shareholder value (e.g., Platonova et al., 2018; Ofori et al., 2014). 
In particular, the interdependence of banks and society has been recognized as a key 
relationship (Platonova et al., 2018). For example, the UN Global Compact (2020) suggests 
that banks need to adopt and articulate a clear purpose beyond profit maximization to attract 
investors, highly skilled employees and loyal customers (UN Global Compact, 2020). Indeed, 
the days of shareholder return as the sole business objective are over (UN Global Compact, 
2020). Therefore, managers of banks have an obligation to take action to protect and improve 
both the welfare of society and the interest of their banks (Ofori et al., 2014). For example, the 
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risk that climate change will have a substantial and long-term detrimental impact on the growth 
and prosperity is a factor that banks need to acknowledge.  
    Conversely, banks should also be committed to respecting human rights which applies 
equally to employees, customers, suppliers and business partners. Besides, ensuring a safe and 
productive banking environment is one of the fundamental responsibilities of banks. For 
example, concerning health and safety disclosures, the ongoing spread of the new coronavirus 
has become one of the biggest threats to the global economy and financial markets including 
banks (Olimov & Khotamov, 2020). Nicola et al. (2020) stress the need for banks to pay equal 
attention to global health and safety issues by indicating that COVID-19 has affected 
communities, firms and organizations globally, inadvertently affecting the banking system. 
    Seemingly, this suggests that banks have other equally important SBD aside from 
shareholder value maximization. These additional activities are contained in several SBD 
models propounded by researchers that seek to capture the various responsibilities of banks 
(Ofori et al., 2014). Perrini et al. (2011) suggest that in responding to the paradigm shift, there 
are attempts to include different SBD practices on the agendas of an increasing number of 
banks in various parts of the world and the adoption of value-based governance in meeting the 
interests of primary and secondary stakeholders. For example, banks have in recent years begun 
to incorporate SBD within their organizational and operational strategies (Platonova et al., 
2018). 
    The empirical evidence has produced mixed findings (see Table 3.2). From the developed 
market, Cornett et al. (2014) examine the effect of SBD on FP of 190 banks in US. They find 
that, SBD does not appear to affect FP (ROA and ROE) for all the smallest size banks. 
However, they find that for the largest banks, SBD positively relate to FP. In an international 
sample of 22 countries, Wu et al. (2013) explore the same link in a sample of 162 banks from 
2003 to 2009. They report that SBD has positive effect on all the two FP measures (ROA and 
ROE). 
    From developing economies, Mukhibad et al. (2020) examine the influence of SBD on FP 
of banks in a sample of 12 Islamic banks in Indonesia over the period 2012-2018. They show 
that SBD has no impact on ROA, ROE and net profit margin. Buallay et al. (2020) investigate 
the same link in 18 MENA countries based on a sample of 59 banks. The findings of the 
empirical results demonstrate that SBD has positive impact on Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. 
However, they find evidence that suggests that social SBD has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q, 
ROA and ROE. Szegedi et al.  (2020) also in a sample of 20 banks in Pakistan from 2008 to 
2018 report that SBD has positive effect on FP (ROA and ROE). Similarly, Maqbool and 
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Zameer (2018) examine the same link in a sample of 28 banks in India from 2007-2016. The 
results show SBD positively impacts on FP (ROA, ROE and stock returns). Platonova et al. 
(2018) sample 24 banks in 5 Gulf Cooperation Council countries and report a positive 
relationship between the SBD and ROA. The results of the study show no statistically 
significant relationship between all the individual dimensions of SBD and ROA. 
    In ESSA context, Bolanle et al. (2012) in a sample of 1 bank (First Bank Plc) in Nigeria 
provide evidence of a positive relationship between SBD expenditure and FP measured by 
profit after tax from 2001-2010. They suggest since SBD investments is tax deductible, banks 
can reduce their tax burden by engaging in SBD investments which impact positively on FP. 
Similarly, in another single country analysis, Ofori et al. (2014) employed a survey SBD 
measure. The authors document a positive link between SBD and FP measures (ROA and ROE) 
in the Ghanaian banking system in 2009. Finally, Siueia et al. (2019) analyze the same 
relationship in a sample of 10 banks in two countries in Africa, South Africa and Mozambique 
over the period 2012-2016. They establish a positive relationship between SBD and ROA. 
    Based on the arguments of the multi-dimensional framework, which suggest a positive SBD-
FP nexus and prior studies that also document positive link between SBD and FP, it is expected 
that SBD will positively affect FP of banks in the region. Therefore, the study proposes the 
following hypothesis as illustrated in Fig 3.5 (H5): 
 
H5a: There is a positive association between sustainable banking as measured by SBD and 
financial performance (FP) in ESSA banks. 
 
    Taking into consideration the outcomes of previous studies, it is important to highlight the 
multi-dimensional nature of SBD and the need to disaggregate it into sub-dimensions to gain 
an improved understanding of the relationship. Therefore, it is expected that the individual 
dimension variables of SBD, namely ENV, SOC, HAS, EHR, CIV and EMP will positively 
affect the FP of banks in the region as discussed above. As a result, the following sub-
hypotheses are developed: 
H5b: There is a positive association between environmental dimension of SBD and the FP of 
banks in ESSA. 
H5c: The social dimension of SBD has a positively associated with FP of banks in ESSA. 
H5d: Health and safety dimension of SBD is positively associated with FP of banks in ESSA. 




H5f: There is a positive association between community involvement dimension of SBD and 
the FP of banks in ESSA. 
H5g: The employee dimension of SBD is positively associated with FP of banks in ESSA. 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of prior banking studies on SBD-FP nexus 
Publications Employed data Period of 
study 
CSRD measure FP measures Findings and conclusions 









ROA, ROE and 
Net profit 
margin 
They find that SBD has 
insignificant relationship with 
ROA, ROE and Net profit 
margin 







EIRIS ESG ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q 
The report positive effect of 
SBD on ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q. However, social 
factors were negatively linked 
with all the FP measures. 








Content SBD ROA and ROE They find positive link 











ROA The study finds no significant 
relationship between SBD 
and ROA. However, social 
disclosure has positive impact 
on ROA. 











ROA and ROE The study finds positive 
relationship between SBD 
and the two FP measures; 
ROA and ROE 










ROA and ROE The study documents a 
positive link between SBD 
ROA. The results find no 
significant link between the 
individual dimensions of 













The study documents a 
positive link SBD and the FP 
measures (ROA, ROE and 
stock market returns) 







MSCI ESG Stats ROA and ROE They document insignificant 
relationship between SBD 
and FP (ROA and ROE) in 
small banks but report 
positive link 
 between SBD and FP (ROA 
and ROE) in large banks. 








ROA and ROE Document a positive impact 
SBD on the two FP measures 
(ROA and ROE) 







NII, ROA and 
ROE  
They report that SBD has 
positive effect on all the three 
FP measures (NII, ROA and 
ROE)   







SBD expenditure Profit after tax They establish a positive 
relationship between SBD 
and FP 




3.2.2.3 The moderating effect of CGI on the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity          
    It has been suggested that banks that engage in greater SBD can perform better financially 
than their counterparts that engage in less SBD projects in several ways. In theory (AT, SHT 
and RDT), it has been claimed that engaging in SBD can improve FP (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This is mainly achieved through a reduction in managerial opportunism as a results of 
quality flow of information between managers and shareholders (Suchman, 1995; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Crucially, others suggest that engaging in increased 
SBD may not only help enhance FP by legitimising the activities and operations of banks, but 
also provide opportunities to obtain key corporate assets (UN Global Compact, 2020; Ntim, 
2016; Suchman, 1995). For example, SBD builds brand loyalty (UN Global Compact, 2020), 
enhances banks’ image, goodwill and reputation (Suchman, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Additionally, banks that disclose authentic narrative on creating societal values especially how 
that link to employees’ values can attract and retain highly skilled staff (UN Global Compact, 
2020).  
    Moreover, other scholars propose that addressing the needs of powerful stakeholders (e.g., 
trade unions, customers, politicians, and local communities) through increased commitment to 
SBD can improve corporate legitimacy and FP (Ntim, 2016; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995). They argue that such disclosures minimise potential costs related 
to politics (e.g., nationalisation threats, legislation, labour frictions, uprisings by local 
communities and customer boycotts) (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984).  
    In practice, there is significant evidence that shows that quality CG structures can positively 
impact on the FP of banks (e.g., Musa, 2020; Otieno, 2012; Uwuigbe, 2011). Considering that 
the choice for banks to engage in increased SBD originates from the board of banks, the study 
proposes that internal governance structures may have a moderating effect on sustainability-
for-performance sensitivity (SPS). Also, evolving theoretical and empirical insights suggest 
even though both effective CG and SBD are valued by the stock markets, but CG disclosures 
are valued much greater than SBD (e.g., Ntim, 2016; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). The 
implication is that, the potential positive impact of SBD on FP may be as the results of the 
positive effect of CG mechanisms on FP, and hence the increase in FP is mainly driven by CG 
disclosures rather than SBD. 
    More importantly, prior literature offers one important channel by which CG disclosure may 
heighten the SPS. Meanwhile, some scholars argue that, internal governance structures can be 
assumed as strong pillar, dimension and/or complement to SBD (e.g., Ntim, 2016; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013; Jamali et al., 2008). The implication is that, SBD can be theorized as an 
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extension of quality of internal corporate governance structures. This infers that in well-
governed banks (i.e., banks with high levels of CG disclosures), senior managers may seek to 
increase their SBD investments as a critical means of minimizing conflicts with stakeholders 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Jo & Harjoto, 2012). In this case, SBD will have a beneficial 
impact on FP due to the decline in conflicts of interests with the diverse stakeholders through 
effective internal governance structures (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
    Alternatively, in banks that are poorly governed (i.e., banks exhibiting low degree of 
accountability, transparency, corruption, fraud, and managerial violation), less SBD 
investments are likely to be implemented, which can aggravate conflicts among the bank’s 
broader stakeholders (Ntim, 2016; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Harjoto & Jo, 2012, 2011). This 
can lead to frequent labour strikes, customer boycotts, and increased regulator or government 
intervention (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Hence, not engaging in SBD can have a negative 
impact on FP of banks through increased conflict of interests, emanating from ineffective or 
weak CG mechanism (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
    Nevertheless, prior banking studies have investigated the direct impact of sustainable 
banking on financial performance (e.g., Mukhibad et al., 2020; Buallay et al., 2020; Siueia et 
al., 2019), without exploring the probable moderating impact of CG disclosures on the 
sustainability-for-performance sensitivity. Consequently, the objective is to contribute to the 
international corporate governance, sustainable banking and financial performance banking 
literature by exploring the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity and ascertains whether 
CGI can positively moderate the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity as highlighted in 
Fig 3.5 (H6). Therefore, the next hypothesis to be investigated is: 
 
H6: Corporate governance disclosure index positively moderates the sustainability-for-
performance sensitivity (SPS) of the ESSA banks, with the sustainability-for-performance 
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3.2.3 Empirical evidence on the association among board attributes, ownership 
structures, competition and BRT 
    This section reviews banking literature on board attributes, ownership structures, 
competition and BRT. In reviewing the empirical literature, the theoretical framework 
discussed in section 3.1 will be totally integrated into the fundamental arguments. First, the 
study will focus on the association between board attributes and BRT. Next, it will discuss the 
association between ownership structures and BRT. Finally, the section will focus on empirical 
studies on the impact of competition on BRT. 
 
3.2.3.1 Board independent financial expert and bank risk-taking 
    Board member financial acumen is crucial in highly regulated financial sectors, such as 
banking (Apergis, 2019). Theoretically, AT suggests that independent directors who have 
financial expertise (EXPERT) have higher monitoring capacity to limit managerial 
opportunism and BRT (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This argument is based on the notion that, 
EXPERT possess superior oversight leading them to help reduce agency conflicts, thereby 
protecting shareholders (Minton et al., 2014). From SHT perspective, EXPERT on the board 
of banks might increase the monitoring role of the board by offering a superior presentation of 
stakeholders’ interests (Solomon, 2010; Ozkan, 2007). Similarly, RDT considers EXPERT as 
key internal governance mechanism that can help attract critical resources to the bank as 
appreciable knowledge of banking can lead to effective monitoring and oversight of BRT 
(Wang & Zhu, 2015). For that purpose, RDT specifies that independent directors should be 
composed of enough EXPERT with specialized skills and expertise commensurate with the 
risk profile of banks (Apergis, 2019). 
    In practice, prior studies suggest that EXPERT tend to adopt a more conservative approach 
in making essential corporate decisions such as BRT (e.g., Apergis, 2019; Harris & Raviv, 
2006). In particular, Harris and Raviv (2006) argue that EXPERT have lesser outlays in 
obtaining information about the details and the inherent risks associated with banking 
transactions. In this regard, they can mitigate any inefficiencies in monitoring managers’ BRT 
behaviour. Arguably, an appreciable knowledge of banking can lead to better oversight and 
more efficient BRT behaviour because substantial proportion of BRT is driven by operations 
and economic conditions unique to the sector (Wang & Zhu, 2015; Minton et al., 2014). 
Moreover, scholars posit that, banks with more EXPERT can benefit from their expertise in 
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terms of early spotting of risk and preferring of risk mitigating solutions (e.g., Apergis, 2019; 
Minton et al., 2014). 
    Empirically, studies analyzing the influence of EXPERT on BRT are generally uncommon. 
This provides avenue to make contribution to the growing body of banking literature exploring 
this link. For instance, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2017) document that EXPERT on the board is 
associated with less BRT. Their evidence was based on an international sample of 159 banks 
from 2004 to 2010. Crucially, the effect of EXPERT on BRT has not been explored in the 
ESSA banking context. However, based on the above arguments, EXPERT in the region may 
be beneficial in terms of curbing excessive BRT. Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested is 
that:  
H7: Board independent directors who are financial experts will curb bank risk-taking 
behaviour in the ESSA region.  
3.2.3.2 Board meetings and bank risk-taking 
    Board meeting is considered to be a key attribute that may influence the effectiveness of 
corporate board (Vafeas, 1999). Within the theoretical framework, AT predicts that without 
effective monitoring by the board, managers will behave in ways inconsistent with the interests 
of the shareholders. In this case, the board is expected to monitor BRT to ensure is consistent 
with shareholders’ risk preferences. Discernably, one key dimension of board oversight is the 
intensity of board activity, which encompasses number of meetings by the board (Brick & 
Chidambaran, 2010). Accordingly, AT recommends that the board of banks should meet 
regularly in order to align the interest of shareholders and managers. Within SHT framework, 
regular board meetings will lead to alignment of the risk preferences of stakeholders and 
managers which can influence BRT. 
    Moreover, evidence of prior research suggests that, regular board meetings offer directors 
the platform to deliberate on key BRT decisions (see Younas et al., 2019; Dong et al., 2017). 
This has the potential of resolving agency conflicts because of a greater information flow 
within the board resulting in apparently fewer extreme decisions (Younas et al., 2019). For 
example, overconfident managers may pursue bank policies that can be excessively risky or 
value destroying (e.g., Jiang et al., 2015). Such unhealthy BRT may not serve the interest of 
shareholders; however, this can be limited by effectively monitoring managers through 
frequent board meetings (Younas et al., 2019). Similarly, past evidence observes that a board 
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that meets more often can respond and address key banking issues such as investment 
decisions, thereby influencing BRT. 
    The empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical framework of AT that NBMs can 
increase board effectiveness, which can help the board to curb excessive BRT (see Battaglia & 
Gallo, 2017; Dong et al., 2017; Liang et al., 2013; Ayadi & Boujèlbène, 2012). For instance, 
Liang et al. (2013) in a sample 50 Chines banks from 2003 to 2010 document that the NBMs 
improve the quality of loan portfolio. They conclude that, banks with increased monitoring 
through frequent board meetings exhibit lower loan default and less BRT. Likewise, Dong et 
al. (2017) find that NBMs reduce BRT in the Chinese banking system. Their sample contained 
105 commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2011. Battaglia and Gallo (2017) also examine 
the link between NBMs and BRT in Europe from 2006 to 2010. Based on a sample of 40 banks 
in Europe, they establish a negative relationship between NBMs and BRT. Ayadi, and 
Boujèlbène (2012) document a negative link between the NBMs and BRT in 30 European 
banks over the period of 2004-2009. 
    With reference to ESSA banks, studies examining the influence of NBMs on BRT are sparse, 
and hence, this research establishes a timely contribution to the existing banking studies. 
Notably, the Combined CG Code issued in the ESSA countries recommend that the board of 
the banks should meet regularly to deliberate on key corporate decisions including BRT. Again, 
the expectation of the Combined CG Code is that when the board of banks have regular 
meetings, the monitoring role of the board will increase which in turn can limit excessive BRT. 
Given the weak institutional framework in the region, it is expected that frequent board 
meetings can limit managers from engaging in excessive BRT. Hence, the second hypothesis 
to be tested is: 
H8: An increase in the number of board meetings will curb risk-taking behaviour in the ESSA 
regions’ banking system. 
3.2.3.3 Institutional ownership and bank risk-taking 
    Agency theory (AT) suggests that institutional shareholders are influential stakeholders who 
tend to have additional motivation in terms of monitoring of opportunistic behaviour of senior 
managers (Ntim et al., 2019). In ESSA region, institutional investors have large equity stakes 
in the banking system (Andrianova et al., 2008). Prominently, these institutional owners have 
some advantages over individual or less informed shareholders (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). Such 
advantages include easy access to information, knowledge, skills and greater external networks 
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(Ntim et al., 2015). These resources empower them to exert greater effect on key decisions of 
the board including BRT (Elmagrhi et al., 2020).  
    AT argues that institutional shareholders have a much greater motivation to monitor senior 
managers to safeguard their investment (Albassam, 2014). This is particularly important in 
banking industry where exit may be costly to institutional investors (Albassam, 2014). In this 
case, institutional owners can limit agency problems by imposing their risk preferences on 
managers. This can help in aligning managers and shareholders’ risk preferences, thereby 
preventing excessive BRT. In addition, SHT contends that institutional shareholders may 
monitor banks to ensure BRT is aligned with the various stakeholders and not only 
shareholders. Due to their considerable investment in banks, institutional stockholders tend to 
be actively involved in the internal governance structures of banks in which they hold 
significant stake (Diez-Esteban et al., 2016). For example, Boubakri et al. (2013), and Wang 
and Xiao (2011) maintain that, when institutional investor’s stakes increase, there is the 
tendency for them to join forces with management to safeguard their investments and this may 
curtail excessive BRT.        
    By contrast, other scholars argue that institutional investors, may have detrimental effect on 
BRT. They maintain that because institutional investors are assumed to be diversified investors, 
they are largely driven by profitability of their investments regardless of the level of control 
and as such, a lot of institutional investors tend to have high risk attitude (Diez-Esteban et al., 
2016). Therefore, it has been suggested that, when banks are controlled by institutional 
investors, BRT can usually reach higher levels (Diez-Esteban et al., 2016).  
    In line with the above opinion, other scholars classify institutional investors as a group of 
investors who are driven by short-term returns and will not support long-term value creation 
(e.g., Hutchinson et al., 2015; Almazan et al., 2005). Particularly, in banking, transient 
institutional investors are often myopic investors who tend to focus on short-term, hence lack 
incentives to incur monitoring costs (Chou & Lin, 2011).  For instance, Almazan et al. (2005) 
suggest that, such short-term investments are mostly risk-prone, and this attitude of institutional 
investors can encourage managers to undertake riskier investments to increase shareholder 
returns. Moreover, Pound (1988) asserts that institutional shareholders can be considered as 
controlling owners who are able to exploit the resources of banks to finance their own projects. 
For instance, Diez-Esteban et al. (2016) suggest that, by encouraging excessive BRT, 
institutional shareholders can largely be blamed for the collapse of many banks in Southern 
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European countries. These arguments tend to suggest that, powerful institutional shareholders 
may be associated with high BRT. 
    Concerning institutional ownership, the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, 
Garcia’Marco and Robles’Fernandez (2008) investigate the effect of ownership structures on 
BRT in Spanish banking sector for the period 1993-2000 in a sample of 258 banks. They 
observe that institutional bank owners decrease the risk-taking of banks in Spain. Similarly, 
Knopf and Teall (1996) document that institutional ownership is beneficial as they find an 
inverse link between institutional ownership and BRT in a sample of 2082 banks in the US 
from 1986 to 1992. Similarly, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) investigation in the US reveal that, 
banks in the US with substantial institutional investors tend to be cautious in their risk-taking. 
Their evidence is based on a sample of 100 US banks from 1995 to 2010. 
    Alternatively, other prior literature also finds a linear link between institutional ownership 
and BRT. Barry et al. (2011) establish that institutional ownership increases BRT in 17 
countries in Europe. They sampled 1791 banks from 1998 to 2011. Similarly, Ehsan and Javid 
(2018) find that institutional ownership increases BRT in the banking system in Pakistan. Their 
analysis was based on sample of 26 banks from 2000 to 2014. Further, Chou and Lin (2011) 
provide support of a positive link in Taiwan. They document a positive connection between 
institutional ownership and BRT in a sample made up of 37 banks in the country. The analysis 
covered the period from 2001 to 2006.  
    The regional governance reforms in ESSA are reinforced with prospect that institutional 
stockholders could possibly play a vital role in augmenting CG mechanisms, including limiting 
excessive BRT. However, studies on the link between institutional ownership and BRT in 
ESSA region are generally rare. This provides a fertile area for further studies. Notably, 
institutional stockholders such as public pension funds, mutual funds and insurance 
corporations are the major players in the ESSA banking system accounting for about 75% 
stakes in banks (Andrianova et al., 2008). It can be argued that, such institutional investors with 
significant voting power can influence BRT through their voting rights by imposing their low 
risk preference on managers which might reduce BRT. The study therefore expects institutional 
ownership to be related with less BRT in the region, hence the study investigates the hypothesis 
below: 




3.2.3.4 Government ownership and bank risk-taking 
    AT argues that agency conflicts may intensify with influential owners such as government 
(Albassam, 2014). From SHT perspective, government ownership may be a key factor 
influencing BRT, especially in developing countries (Dinc, 2005). Based on RDT perspective, 
government ownership may offer banks with financial and non-financial resources (Boubakri 
et al., 2019). Financial resources that banks with government as shareholder may receive 
include access to government related contracts, tax credit, cheap deposits from governmental 
agencies and financing (Albassam, 2014). Examples of non-financial resources from the 
government may be in the form of implicit bailout guarantees when the bank is in distress as 
witnessed during the recent global financial crisis (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2019; Albassam, 2014).  
    Crucially, the influence of government ownership in the banking system can be discussed in 
two main ways: development and political views. Pioneered by Gerschenkron (1962), the 
development view suggests that government ownership in banks has two key motives. These 
are financial development and economic motives. The researcher contends that, these motives 
totally differ from that of commercial banks operating in the country. In this case, government 
ownership is costly as it delivers the opportunity for the government to use its influence to 
compel the bank to finance projects of the government (Boubakri et al., 2019). Evidently, such 
projects may be finance regardless of the associated risk and return (Boubakri et al., 2019). 
This view suggests that, in banks where governments have substantial ownership, senior 
managers may work as agents of government and may have the incentive of engaging in 
excessive BRT (Eshan & Javid, 2018). 
    The political view which was developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) posits that 
government holding in banks provides the platform for governments to allocate resources for 
their political gains. Political motives related challenges with government holding vary from 
one country to the other. However, notable among these challenges from developing countries 
perspective are offering of employment and financing (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Others 
include granting of incentives to favour politically connected interest groups for the purpose of 
votes and funding of political parties especially the ruling party (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In 
particular, Ismiyanti et al. (2018) suggest that government ownership is generally employed 
for political purposes. Examples include granting of low-interest loans to businesses that are 
pro-government. Such firms are rewarded by politicians for offering them support to stay in 
power or in return for supporting their political strategy. For example, government owned 
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banks in the ESSA region have the tendency to grant credit facility for projects that may have 
high social returns but with very low profit returns.  
    Additionally, when state owned bank or in a bank where government has substantial stakes 
fails, the government will bail out the bank to avoid embarrassment. Such government 
protection becomes a form of insurance, which creates moral hazard problems through 
decreased market discipline (Ismiyanti et al., 2018). In this regard, there is an implied 
endorsement and shield of the bank’s risky projects by government (Al-Khouri, 2012). The 
moral hazard view indicates that as government holdings increases in the banking system, risk-
taking also increases (Boubakri et al., 2019). 
    Previous studies confirm that government ownership in banks is associated with excessive 
BRT. For example, Iannottaa et al. (2007) observe that government holdings in banks reduces 
the quality of loan portfolio and high BRT in 15 European countries. Their evidence is based 
on a sample of 181 banks from 1999 to 2004. Further, Iannotta et al. (2013) report that 
government ownership induces high BRT in a sample of 210 banks in 16 European countries. 
They sampled the banks from 2000 to 2009. In developing countries, Micco et al. (2007) 
establish that government ownership in banks is linked with high BRT. They document this 
finding based on an international sample of 6677 banks in 179 countries. The sample period 
starts in 1995 and ends in 2002. Of direct relevance to this study, Lassoued et al. (2016) in a 
sample of 171 banks from MENA (Middle East and North Africa) area during the 2006-2012 
period find that government ownership incentivizes banks to engage in excessive BRT. 
Similarly, Cornett et al. (2010) also examine banks from 16 Asian countries. Their sample 
period starts in 1989 and ends in 2004. They observe that government holdings in banks 
exposed the banks to much higher credit risk than banks that are privately-owned in the 
countries. 
    Alternatively, others maintain that if governments attach much importance to social and 
political objectives with the aim of achieving political stability and employment, then banks 
with government ownership should pursue less risky investments to reduce the uncertainty of 
earnings (Boubakri et al., 2013; Al-Khouri 2012). They contend that; directors appointed by 
the government may pressure the banks to desist from engaging in risky investments. Under 
such circumstance, government ownership may lead to less BRT. Likewise, Denis & 
McConnell (2003) and John et al. (2008) claim that, government holding is usually linked with 
lower bank value which is as the results of less risky investment policies. 
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    Empirically, Al-Khouri (2012), Iannotta et al. (2013) and Chan et al. (2016) have reported 
negative findings for samples of Gulf Cooperative Council, European and Chinese banks 
respectively. For example, Iannotta et al. (2013) report that, government holding is related with 
low loan default risk in a sample of 210 banks in 16 European countries over the period 2000-
2009. Chan et al. (2016) also document that government ownership contribute to lower BRT 
in the Chinese banking industry based on 16 banks from 2003 to 2011. 
    As has been discussed in section two, the privatization of state banks to private investors has 
dominated the banking reforms in the region. Nevertheless, national governments still have 
substantial ownership in several banks in ESSA countries (Bokpin, 2016). Hence, the focus on 
government ownership. Due to the weak institutional framework in the region, government 
owned banks may grant credit facility with no economic basis to highly risky sectors of the 
economy such as agriculture sector. They may offer credit or seldom coerced into making 
economically questionable credit to friends and relatives of politicians (Boubakri et al., 2019; 
Mohsni & Otchere, 2014). Accordingly, the study expects ownership of government to increase 
BRT behaviour owing to the use of banks by politicians to follow their political objectives that 
can lead managers to high-risky investments (Boubakri et al., 2019). The next hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H10: A positive association exists between government ownership and bank risk-taking 
behaviour in the ESSA region. 
3.2.3.5. Foreign ownership and bank risk-taking 
    Theoretically, AT theory suggests that the prime origin of conflict between owners of banks 
and senior managers emanates from their diverse opinion of risk (Lassoued et al., 2016). 
Shareholders due to their diversified portfolios tend to encourage excessive BRT for a higher 
projected profit. However, senior managers are conservative in view of safeguarding their 
positions and individual benefits, and maintaining their attained human capital (Lassoued et 
al., 2016; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). From RDT, the entry of foreign investors into the 
domestic market could potentially allow the flow of essential resources into the domestic bank 
(Lassoued et al., 2016). These critical resources may include better human capital, technology, 
and knowledge transfer (Lassoued et al., 2016). 
    Concerning the impact of foreign banks on BRT, it has been suggested that foreign banks 
may experience liabilities of foreignness due to the inherent problems in knowing and orienting 
themselves with the domestic country’s’ regulations and practices (Kobeissi & Sun, 2010). 
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This can lead to extra operating expenses and higher risks in the banking sector of host country 
(Haque, 2019). For example, foreign banks are largely considered as possessing a riskier credit 
portfolio due to proprietary information challenges (Chen et al., 2017). The argument is that, 
local banks may have proprietary information on the creditworthiness of borrowers; however, 
this may not be same with foreign banks. At least at the early stages of entry, foreign banks 
may incur high NPLs because they may be confronted with a pool of customers with poor 
credit history (Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2006). Additionally, there is the tendency for the 
subsidiaries to engage in excessive risk-taking in a form of moral hazards which can increase 
BRT (Boubakri et al., 2013). 
    Further, foreign banks may influence BRT in the host country directly through risk-shifting 
approach (Boubakri et al., 2013). This is mainly done through restructuring of incentives 
packages for managers (Jensen & Heckling, 1976). By offering attractive performance 
incentives to managers, foreign banks can increase the propensity for managers to take more 
risk. Arguably, the implementation of restructuring of banks by more risk oriented foreign 
investors can indirectly lead to a change in BRT profile of acquired banks. For example, John 
et al. (2008) posits that foreign ownership in banks are mainly related with greater bank value 
which is as a result of high risky investments. 
    On the empirical front, prior studies document a positive effect of foreign ownership on 
BRT. For example, using 1300 banks in 32 emerging economies from 2000 to 2013, the 
findings of Chen et al. (2017) reveal that, banks owned by foreign investors engage in more 
risk-taking than their local counterpart. 
    Alternatively, foreign ownership in banks can have several benefits which include foreign 
financing, better managerial skills and more innovative in terms of handling potential 
borrowers (Ismiyanti et al., 2018). For example, the “global advantage hypothesis” suggests 
that banks that are owned by foreigners may rely on more advanced technologies in their credit 
appraisal process (Lensink et al., 2008). Such banks may have as better screening technologies, 
highly skilled employees and improved corporate practices (Lensink et al., 2008). Arguably, 
such superior screening technologies can serve as powerful tools which can help reduce 
potential liabilities of foreignness as well as have better risk controls, which may lower BRT 
behaviour (Haque, 2019; Ismiyanti et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2017). Furthermore, it is possible 
that when foreign banks are entering a new market, they may either have precautionary 
approach to reduce risk or may enter through acquisition, and thus acquire credit portfolio that 
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contains information of borrowers in the domestic market (e.g., Haque, 2019; Delis et al., 
2016). In addition, the ease of access to governance expertise by foreign banks can reduce 
monitoring cost, due to resource availability and previous experience which can reduce 
excessive BRT by managers (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
    Prior studies provide evidence that foreign ownership reduces BRT. For example, Haque 
(2019) report that banks owned by foreigners take less risk in the MENA region. Their evidence 
is based on 144 banks from 2001 to 2012. Similarly, Lassoued et al. (2016) also examine the 
same link with 171 banks in the MENA region covering the period of 2006-2012. They 
document that foreign ownership in banks in the region decrease BRT. Ehsan and Javid (2018) 
also observe an inverse link between foreign banks and BRT in 26 banks in Pakistan. The 
sample period of their study spans from 2000 to 2014. Boateng et al. (2019) reveal that foreign 
banks have fewer NPLs in China. Their evidence is based on 88 banks in China covering the 
period 2003-2014. Employing 6677 banks from 179 countries from 1995 to 2002, Yeyati and 
Micco (2007) observe a negative link between foreign ownership and BRT. 
    Within the ESSA region, the reforms in the banking system attracted a number of foreign 
banks into the region that was formerly controlled d by domestic banks. In in the region, foreign 
investors can be perceived as stimulators for BRT for several reasons. First, foreign banks in 
the region tend to exhibit higher predilection for risk as compared with local shareholders as 
they have superior diversification strategies (Lassoued et al., 2016). Second, foreign banks in 
the region are more resourceful and engage in high risky projects than local banks (Lassoued 
et al., 2016). Based on moral hazard hypothesis, a higher foreign holdings in banks in the region 
may be associated with greater BRT (Boubakri et al., 2019). This is because managers of such 
banks might have the chance to generate their own personal gains due to the absence or remote 
nature of monitoring by foreign owners (Lassoued et al., 2016). 
    Research examining the effect of foreign ownership on BRT in a cross- country sample is 
uncommon in ESSA and therefore, provides avenue to contribute to the extant banking studies. 
Nevertheless, prior research based on single country evidence in the region suggests that 
foreign ownership impact positively on BRT (e.g., Ozili, 2018; Bokpin, 2016). In line with the 
evidence of a few empirical studies in emerging economies, which suggest a positive link 
between foreign ownership and BRT, the next hypothesis to be investigated is structured as 
follows: 
H11: Foreign ownership positively affects risk-taking behaviour in the ESSA banks. 
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3.2.3.6 Competition and bank risk-taking 
    The banking literature provides two contrasting opinions on the relationship between 
competition and BRT (see Cuestas et al., 2020). First, competition-fragility’ view maintains 
that, BRT increases with high levels of competition. This is deeply rooted in franchise value 
hypothesis which suggests that, competition increases BRT because of its negative impact on 
franchise value (Keeley, 1990). Franchise value represents the present value (PV) of the future 
profits that a bank is projected to make as a going concern (Demsetz et al., 1996). Profits are 
earnings over all other costs such as the cost of capital (Arping, 2019; Demsetz et al., 1996).  
    Franchise value has two prime bases. Essentially, regulators (Central Banks) limit 
competition so as to offer banks access to profits. This franchise value that banks obtain due to 
these restrictions of competition imposed by national regulators is known as “market-related” 
(Demsetz et al., 1996). The other franchise value arises from what is referred to as “bank-
related” origins (Demsetz et al., 1996). This included gains in key areas such as efficiency 
distinction and differences in the nature of lending dealings (Demsetz et al., 1996). These bank-
related sources remain as the most important source of franchise value in the banking system 
(e.g., Arping, 2019; Demsetz et al., 1996). To an extent it has been suggested that, as 
competition increases, banks are unable to obtain steady earnings as competition causes them 
to reduce their rates to levels good enough to cater for their operating expenses and other costs 
(Demsetz et al., 1996). Accordingly, competition intensifies in the banking system, the PV of 
anticipated earnings decreases (Keeley, 1990). This makes bank failure less expensive (Keeley, 
1990). 
    The implication is that, banks primarily reduce their BRT as a way of protecting their 
franchise value and monopoly profits (Arping, 2019). However, as banks profit decline with 
increased competition, banks tend to lower margins and thus lower discounted net value. With 
lower net value, banks are more willing to take high risk (Nilsen et al., 2016). The higher level 
of undertaken risk may translate into lower quality of the banks’ asset portfolio (Mustafa & 
Toci, 2018). 
    Another strand of banking literature has investigated the effect of competition on BRT from 
the perspective of adverse selection problem (Mustapha & Toci, 2018). Adverse selection 
denotes to a market situation which happens when a buyer and a seller have differences in 
market information. In banking, this stems from imperfect information in the loan market 
(Heimdal et al., 2015). For example, banks that set the same rate for all their customers may 
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encounter the risk of unfavorably selecting the least gainful borrowers. Further, as competition 
increases in the market, there is the tendency for a declined loan applicant to make a new 
application for a loan in competing banks due to “information dispersion” (Marquez, 2002). 
The adverse selection problem may be mitigated through effective screening procedures 
implemented by banks (Mustapha & Toci, 2018). However, as competition intensifies 
individual banks have minimal information concerning the credit worthiness of borrowers. This 
prevents proper screening by the banks and results in banks granting credit to borrowers with 
poor credit history (Marquez, 2002), thereby lowering the quality of loan portfolio the bank. 
(Marquez, 2002; Boot & Greenbaum, 1993). 
    Empirical literature exploring competition and BRT differ with regards to the selected 
sample, the period under study, competition and BRT proxies as well as the methodology used 
(see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: Summary of studies that establish positive link between competition and risk-
taking 







Findings and conclusions 









Report a positive link between 
Lerner index and NPLs. 
Competition increases risk-
taking consistent with 
competition-fragility view 





1998-2005 Lerner index 
    
Z-score 
NPLs 
 Find a positive link between 
Lerner index and NPLs. As 
competition increases risk 
taking increases. 
 




1994-2009 Lerner index and 
H-statistics 
Z-score Document a positive link 
between Lerner index and Z-
score in support of competition-







1994-2009 Lerner index 
 
Z-score Report that Lerner index relates 
positively with Z-score in line 
with competition fragility view.  





1988-2003 Lerner index 
 
NPLs Establish positive link between 
Lerner index and NPLs in 
support of competition-fragility. 






2000-2009 Lerner index 
 
Z-score They report a positive link 
between Lerner index and Z-
score. As competition increases, 
risk-taking increases 










They document a positive link 
between Lerner index and, loan 
loss provision and Z-score in 












They report a positive link 
between H-statistics and default 




Noman et al. 
(2017) 
5 Asian banking 
industry 
180 banks 





They document a positive link 
between H-statistics and Z-
score and conclude that 












Find a positive link between Z-
score and NPLs in support of 
competition-fragility view 





2004-2013 Lerner index 
 
Z-score Observe a positive connection 
between Lerner index and Z-
score. Competition increases 
bank risk-taking. 










They document a positive link 
between Lerner index and off-
balance sheet risk in support of 
competition-fragility view. 
Sources: Compiled by the author (2020)     
 
    Several studies based on individual countries document evidence in support of Keeley 
(1990) (e.g., Liu & Wilson, 2013; Bofondi & Gobbi, 2004). Similarly, a number of cross-
country investigations have examined the competition-bank risk-taking nexus and provide 
findings that confirm the “competition-fragility” view (e.g., Akande et al., 2018; Leroy & 
Lucotte, 2017; Noman et al., 2017; Beck et al., 2013; Liu & Wilson 2013; Berger et al., 2009; 
Yeyati & Micco, 2007). For example, Liu and Wilson (2013) explore competition effect on 
BRT for Japanese banking system from 2000 to 2009. They report that Lerner index is 
positively related with NPLs in a sample of 732 banks. Berger et al. (2009) conducts similar 
analysis in an international sample of 8235 banks. The banks were selected from 23 developed 
markets from 1999 to 2005. The researchers document that Lerner index positively and 
significantly influences NPLs in the 23 countries.  
    From developing economies perspective, Noman et al. (2017) uses a sample of 180 Asian 
banks from 1990 to 2014. The evidence of their analysis shows that as competition increases, 
bank risk-taking also increases. The results show a positive link between H-statistics and Z-
score. Akande et al. (2018) report that, competition increases BRT in an investigation based on 
440 banks in Africa from 2006 to 2015. In spite of the interest in their research to BRT studies 
in Africa, the risk-taking proxy employed in Akande et al. (2018) study is skewed to only one 
type of BRT in the region, which is off-balance sheet risk. This may limit the generalization of 
their findings. 
    Alternatively, “competition-stability” view states that, BRT decreases with competition. 
This view is built on “risk shifting” hypothesis which was developed by Boyd and De Nicolo 
(BDN) (2005). They propose that, as competition in the banking system intensifies, there is a 
corresponding reduction in the interest rate charged by the banks. BDN (2005) explain that low 
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lending rates lessens the borrowing cost of doing business. This enhances and lead to an 
increase in entrepreneurial activity and investment. As borrowers pay low interest rate on loans, 
their motivation to engage in excessive risk-taking decreases, hence making loans safer in the 
banking system. The implication of this model is that, the quality of banks’ loan portfolio is 
mainly influenced by their borrowers risk-taking behaviour and not determined by the banks. 
They conclude that, the resulting decrease in loan default rates leads to a decline in risk-taking 
in the banking system. 
    Then again, banks that do well in establishing strong franchise value will work to protect 
(Demsetz et al., 1996). As a result, banks with substantial high franchise value might be 
inclined to function more cautious way. For instance, large franchise value banks tend to 
minimize granting of loans to high risk borrowers (Demsetz et al., 1996). In addition, such 
banks have the tendency to typically diversify their credit portfolio as a means of reducing their 
exposure to risk (Demsetz et al., 1996), thereby reducing BRT (Demsetz et al., 1996). 
    Besides, excessive competition in banking offers depositors with more alternatives in terms 
of where to place their deposits (Mustapha & Toci 2018). With more options in the deposit 
markets, depositors may “penalize” excessive risk-taking banks simply by moving their 
deposits to banks they consider less risky and safer (Mustapha & Toci 2018). From the 
perspective of theory of perfect competition, depositors may be more informed on the risk-
behaviour of banks or may receive signals that may help them better assess the risk behaviour 
of individual banks in the market. 
    Empirically, prior studies (see Table 3.4) find evidence for “competition-stability” view 
(e.g., Arping et al., 2019; Mustapha & Toci, 2018; Sarkar & Sensarma, 2016; Tabak et al., 
2015; Schaeck & Cihak, 2014; Boyd et al., 2006). 
Table 3.4: Summary of studies that find negative link between competition and risk-taking 







Findings and conclusions 




Z-score They find positive link between 
HHI and Z-score in support of 
competition stability view 










They establish a negative link 
between Lerner index and HHI, and 











to default  
They document a negative link 
between Lerner and HHI, and Z-
score and distance to default in 
support of competition-stability 
view 
Fu et al. (2014) 14 Asian countries 
786 banks 
2003-2010 Lerner index  
  
Z-score Authors report a negative link 
between Lerner index and Z-score. 
Bank risk-taking decreases with 
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competition in support of 
competition-stability view 






1995-2005 Boone indicator 
 
Z-score They establish a negative link 
between Boone indicator and Z-
score. Competition decreases risk-
taking in the banking systems. 







An increase in competition (H-
statistics) decreases risk-taking (Z-
score and NPLs) in support of 
competition-stability view. 





2005-2012 H-statistics  
 
Z-score The result shows a negative link 
between H-statistics and Z-score, 
suggesting that as competition 
increases, risk-taking decreases. 
Noman et al. (2017) 5 Asian countries 
180 banks 
1990-2014 H-statistics, HHI 






They find that H-statistics relates 
negatively with NPLs, while Lerner 
index relates negatively with both Z-
score and equity ratio in support of 
competition-stability 









They report that competition 
measured by H-statistics reduces 
risk-taking (NPLs) in support of 
competition-stability view. 





1999-2014 H-statistics and HHI  
 
 
Z-score They document a negative link 
between HHI and Z-score. This 
indicates that, as competition 
increases, risk-taking decreases in 
support of competition-stability 
view. 
Note: MENA refers to Middle East and North Africa, HHI denotes Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.      
 
    Boyd et al. (2006) examine the link between competition and bank risk-taking in a sample 
of 2,500 small rural banks in US. In addition, they employ a panel of 2700 banks from 134 
countries. Their sample period starts in 1993 and ends in 2004. They document a negative 
relationship between Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and Z-score. Similarly, Schaeck and 
Cihak (2014) investigate the same link across 10 European countries by sampling 3,325 banks 
from 1995 to 2005. The researchers document an inverse link between Boone indicator and Z-
score. Further, Mustapha and Toci (2018) explore the effect of competition on bank risk-taking 
in 15 European countries. Their investigation contained 1497 banks from 1999 to 2009. They 
also report an inverse link between Lerner index and loans-loss provision.  
    To sum up, due to the FSR, banks in the ESSA region operate in a challenging environment 
characterized by tighter funding conditions with rising competition for deposit and loans (Stijns 
& Revoltella, 2016). In addition, the emergence of pan-African baking groups and 
microfinance institutions have intensified bank competition in the region. The increase in 
competition for deposits among banks has consequences for BRT behaviour. This can 
undermine prudent banking practices, particularly as regulation and supervision in the region 
is weak. For example, as banks pay higher deposit rate due to competition in the region, they 
face higher repayment burden and can lead the banks to undertake high risky investments. 
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Consistent with the above discussion, the study predicts a positive link between competition 
and BRT in ESSA. Thus, the final hypothesis is as follows: 


























4 Methodology and data with descriptive and correlation diagnostics 
    The chapter provides the data, sources of data and empirical specification of the thesis. In 
addition, the chapter presents the descriptive statistics and correlation diagnostic results. 
Specifically, section 4.1 provides the data and sources of the data employed in the study. 
Section 4.2 focuses on all the variables employed in the study and their measurement. In section 
4.3, the empirical specifications that will be used in testing all the hypotheses will be provided. 
Section 4.4 will present the descriptive statistics, whilst section 4.5 discusses the correlation 
diagnostic results of the thesis. 
4.1 Data and sources of data  
    The banks used for the study were drawn from all the 16 countries in ESSA. The countries 
were drawn from the three main blocs in the ESSA region; six countries from East; Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, five countries from West; Ghana, Gambia, 
Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, and five countries from Southern Africa; Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: Country selection procedures 
Panel A: Country selection No.  
Number of SSA countries 46  
Total Non-English-speaking countries (30)  
English-speaking countries 16  
Panel B: Classification of countries by blocs No. % 
East of ESSA 5 100 
West of ESSA 5 100 
South of ESSA 6 100 
Total number of countries 16 100 
 
    The study focused on banks in the ESSA region for a number of reasons. These countries 
were selected because they have a common official language which is English. This facilitates 
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data collection by eliminating language barriers. More importantly, the thesis excluded French-
speaking Sub-Saharan African (FSSA)  countries (see Table 4.1) in the region from the data 
due to resource constraints. In order to include FSSA countries, the researcher will have to 
employ the services of a translator to translate the information contained in the annual report 
from French to English, due to language barrier. As will be discussed in section 4.2, several 
key variables employed in the study including CGI, SBD and some aspects of EC were 
manually collected from the annual reports of the banks. In particular, the measure of the CGI 
is based on information disclosed in the annual report (qualitative) which implied that, to 
correctly collect such information, the researcher needed to have such documents translated 
into English.  
    Moreover, and as will be discussed later, the SBD of most of the banks included in the study 
are not available in major worldwide databases. Accordingly, the study measured SBD through 
content analysis which requires both qualitative and quantitative information contained in the 
annual report of the banks. Thus, the ability of the researcher to correctly collect the qualitative 
information on banks’ SBD initiatives played a crucial role in the exclusion of banks in FSSA 
countries in the region. Besides, this practice is consistent with prior studies on corporate 
governance in the SSA region that similarly excluded banks in FSSA countries in their final 
sample on the ground of language ability of the researcher (Sarpong-Kumankoma et al., 2019; 
Siueia et al., 2019; Waweru et al., 2009).  
    Nonetheless, the 16 ESSA countries have the most matured banking and capital markets in 
the region. The total GDP of the 16 countries stood at US$2,885.78 billion as at 2018 as 
compared to the GDP of the entire SSA of US$4,200.85 billion and accounted for nearly 70% 
of the total SSA GDP (see Table 4.2).  In order to avoid survivorship bias, the study included 
all banks operating in the 16 ESSA countries from 2007 to 2018 to accommodate entry and 
exit of banks during the study period.  
    The study period starts in 2007 and ends in 2018. In line with prior CG and sustainability 
studies (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Albassam, 2014, Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Ntim, 2009), 
the study period spans both pre-and post-2015, the period in which the SDGs were adopted. In 
addition, this was the period in which most of the CG codes in the ESSA countries were either 
implemented or revised. This helps in assessing whether the adoption of the SDGs and the 
implementation or the revision of the CG codes have helped in improving CG standards 
especially with regards to influencing compensation of executives and sustainable banking in 




Table 4.2: The GDP of the countries in ESSA from 2007 to 2018 (US$ billion) 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Botswana 23.3 25.2 23.5 25.8 27.9 29.7 33.6 35.7 35.4 37.4 39.2 41.9 
The Gambia 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.9 
Ghana 77.2 85.8 91.2 99.5 116.0 128.2 139.9 146.6 151.3 158.2 174.3 189.7 
Kenya 86.0 87.8 91.4 100.3 108.6 115.8 124.7 133.8 143.0 152.9 163.4 178.0 
Lesotho 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.7 
Liberia 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.6 5.1 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.8 6.1 6.3 
Malawi 11.9 13.0 14.2 15.3 16.4 17.1 18.3 19.7 20.4 21.1 22.4 23.7 
Mauritius 16.5 17.8 18.5 19.5 20.7 21.9 23.0 24.3 25.4 26.7 28.2 30.0 
Namibia 15.9 16.6 16.8 18.0 19.3 20.7 22.2 24.0 25.3 25.5 26.0 26.7 
Nigeria 595.7 651.0 710.8 800.0 856.6 910.4 976.4 1057.2 1096.5 1090.0 1119.4 1168.8 
Sierra Leone 6.4 6.9 7.1 7.6 8.2 9.7 11.9 12.7 10.2 10.9 11.5 12.2 
South Africa 552.1 580.8 576.2 600.7 633.4 659.8 688.1 713.7 729.8 740.3 764.9 789.7 
Tanzania 75.6 81.4 86.4 93.0 102.4 109.8 119.3 129.7 139.1 150.2 163.4 179.0 
Uganda 50.2 56.5 61.5 67.0 73.1 76.2 81.2 86.4 92.3 95.4 102.1 111.2 
Zambia 33.0 36.2 39.9 44.5 47.9 52.6 56.2 59.9 62.3 65.3 68.9 73.4 
Zimbabwe 21.5 18.3 19.8 24.0 28.0 33.2 34.5 36.0 37.0 37.7 40.2 42.6 
Total 1575.9 1689.0 1769.7 1928.4 2072.4 2199.9 2345.2 2496.0 2585.1 2628.9 2741.9 2885.8 
SSA 2216.2 2386.8 2493.3 2696.6 2925.3 3108.4 3323.3 3556.4 3704.1 3790.5 3973.8 4200.8 
Source: Compilation from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2020 
 
    Furthermore, most of the banks’ annual reports became publicly accessible on their websites 
in 2007. In addition, that was the period that the codes in the region required banks to make 
available EC details in their annual reports. This paved the way for data that previously has 
been publicly unavailable to become accessible. This allowed the researcher to collect data 
from 2007 across the countries in the region. The year 2018 is the end of the sample period 
because that was the most current year that data was available1. The collection of data for the 
study started in October 2016 and ended in December 2019. 
    Following the convention in literature, the study excluded banks with missing data or 
foreign-owned banks that published their annual reports worldwide as consolidated financial 
statements (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019; Akande, 2018). Further, the study focused on banks and 
specialized financial institutions whose nature and operations are like that of commercial 
banks. Consistent with prior banking studies in the region (e.g., Akande, 2018; Motsi et al., 
2018), this was done to ensure uniformity in the sampled banks. The final data consists of 220 
 
1 Data collection for the study were collected in two phases. Financial data were sourced from BankScope in 2016 as well as FitchConnect in 
2019 and supplemented with annual reports where necessary. CG variables were manually collected from the annual reports which were 
sourced from the websites of the banks.  
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banks with 2027 bank-year observations. Table 4.3 captures a list of ESSA countries and the 
number of banks in each country contained in the study. The data is much higher when 
compared with prior banking studies in the region (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019; Oyewumi et al., 
2018; Tijani et al., 2017; Waweru et al., 2009).  For instance, Siueia et al. (2019) study was 
based on 20 banks for two countries over the period 2012-2016 with 100 bank-year 
observations. Tijani et al. (2017) study was based on only one bank in Nigeria over the period 
1992-2014 with only 19 bank-year observations, whereas Oyewumi et al. (2018) sampled 12 
banks in Nigeria from 2010 to 2014 with 60 bank year-observations. In their international 
sample, Waweru et al. (2009) included only 4 banks in South Africa in their final sample in 
2005. 
 
Table 4.3: Composition of the banks by countries 
Country Bank Population Bank Representation (%) 
Botswana 10 10 100 
Gambia 12 8 67 
Ghana 24 24 100 
Kenya 41 30 73 
Lesotho 4 4 100 
Liberia 9 6 67 
Malawi 9 5 56 
Mauritius 21 15 71 
Namibia 8 5 63 
Nigeria 20 19 95 
Sierra Leone 12 4 33 
South Africa 21 20 95 
Tanzania 38 25 66 
Uganda 25 20 80 
Zambia 17 13 76 
Zimbabwe 13 12 92 
Total 284 220 77 
Notes: Population and bank refer to count, and representation refers to bank as a percentage of population. 
 
    The study employed two main types of data for the investigations. The first set of data 
consisted of CG and SBD, which were collected manually from the annual reports of the 
sampled banks. The annual reports were sourced from the websites of the sampled banks. The 
second category comprised of financial data, including executive competition, financial 
performance, competition, bank risk-taking and bank-specific control data which were 
collected from BankScope, FitchConnect and annual reports of the banks. The annual reports 
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of the banks also served as supplementary sources of these data in instances where such data 
were not available in BankScope or FitchConnect. 
    Some of the banks in ESSA countries provide their SBD in the form of qualitative statements 
in their annual reports. Other banks also give accounts of quantitative SBD embarked upon in 
their annual reports. However, most of the banks provide both qualitative and quantitative SBD 
in their annual reports. The study therefore adopts both qualitative and quantitative approaches 
in assessing SBD of the banks. These disclosures were mostly found in the chairperson’s 
address and/or CEO’s report to the shareholders; whilst others were found in the notes to the 
financial statements of the banks. Hence, annual reports serve as the primary source of banks’ 
financial and non-financial SBD information in the ESSA region.  
 
4.2 Variables measurement 
4.2.1 Sustainable banking disclosure measures 
    Prior literature suggests several approaches for measuring SBD. A number of studies use 
ready SBD indices made available in major worldwide databases such as Bloomberg ESG, 
KLD, Asset4 ESG (e.g., Buallay et al., 2020; Elkhashen, 2019; Galant & Cadez, 2017). Others 
develop SBD indices (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019; Lanis & Richardson, 2012). Galant and Cadez 
(2017) suggest that the choice of measure(s) should be informed by data availability and nature 
of research questions. For example, SBD data accessibility in key databases appears to be a 
decisive factor for research in finding the way of assessing SBD in developed countries 
(Elkhashen, 2019). However, rating agencies have limited coverage of banks. For instance, the 
developed indices provide SBD data on banks mainly in developed countries. Accordingly, 
they are relevant to banking studies that are conducted in developed countries.  
    Based on the cross-country nature of this research, where it requires measuring SBD of banks 
in a developing economy (ESSA), this study follows a great deal of prior research (e.g., Siueia 
et al., 2019; Galant & Cadez, 2017; Lanis & Richardson, 2012), and measures SBD based on 
content analysis. This approach involves designing a construct of interest, gathering 
information about the construct and codifying qualitative information to derive the quantitative 
scales that can be used in statistical analysis (Galant & Cadez, 2017). The main advantage of 
this approach is its flexibility for the researcher, as the researcher can specify SBD dimensions 
of interest, collect data based on the selected dimensions and code data numerically for the 
statistical analysis (Galant & Cadez, 2017). 
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    Specifically, and consistent with prior sustainability studies in the banking sector in an 
emerging economy (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Kartadjumena, 2019), and few 
banking studies in ESSA region (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019), the study distinctively developed 
SBD indices based on quantitative and qualitative sustainable banking data collected from the 
annual reports of the banks. Following Kartadjumena and Rodgers (2019), the study argues 
that a combination of quantitative and qualitative disclosures based on content analysis 
technique is more objective and informative as this will provide more information for the 
stakeholders’ interests. This study employs this approach to examine the narration in the 
sustainability reporting, or the annual report, or the corporate responsibility reporting of ESSA 
banks, based on requirement from the Combined CG Code of the ESSA countries. The 
qualitative based scores include: (i) general or rhetorical (including instances of ritualistic and 
repeated) statements deemed to be purely symbolic with no evidence of actual actions/activities 
on the ground (with a score of “1”), and (ii) a description of what has been achieved or 
accomplished or considered to be a message of assurance by the bank (beyond symbolic) with 
a score of “2”.  
    The first quantitative based scores employed in the study focus on whether the qualitative 
statement provided in (ii) above is backed by quantitative or monetary figures (with a score of 
“3”). This is deemed to be substantive as the banks provide indication of the measure of events 
or activities. The second quantitative score relies on information provided in the first 
quantitative measure with a score of “4”. If the first quantitative score above is backed by clear 
valuations of performance (comparative to previous year) or actions (when even they are 
“negative” event), and which permits evaluation between banks employing external reporting 
models/benchmarks/assurance that are considered to be all-inclusive. Examples include 
external assurance of the SBD report by the BIG4 audit firms. 
    Subsequently, the study analysis the content of six broad SBD themes made up of 135 SBD 
disclosures: (i) social investment and service quality (27), (ii) health and safety (40), (iii) ethics 
and human rights (12), (iv) environment (21), (v) community involvement (21) and (vi) 
employees (14). These SBD themes were selected based on the SDGs 2015, 2016 GRI’s 
reporting guidance and the CG codes in the region. This constitutes one of the most 
comprehensive datasets to be employed on SBD in the region. Appendix 1 lists all the 135 




4.2.2 Financial performance measures 
    The financial performance of banks is typically measured with Accounting-Based Indicators 
(ABI) or Market-Based Indicators (MBI). The key advantage of ABI is the availability of data 
for all banks and their comparability. Examples include ROA, ROE and ROS among others 
(Galant & Cadez, 2017). The main limitation of ABI is that, they are historical measures (Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004). In addition, they fail to take into account the size of firms. For example, 
ABI like ROA may be biased if the sample includes companies from different industries due 
to the varying age and structure of assets across industries (Galant & Cadez, 2017). 
    Examples of MBI include Tobin’s Q, market to book ratio and stock returns (Kabir & Thai, 
2017). The key advantage of MBI is their contemporariness, inferring that account reflect 
changes in SBD faster than ABI (Galant & Cadez, 2017). The main limitation of MBI is that 
they are only available for publicly listed banks. Further, MBI incorporate systematic factors 
such as recession (Galant & Cadez, 2017), which may not be bank specific perception of SBD. 
    In line with Esteban-Sanchez et al. (2017), this study applies ROA and ROE as the measures 
of FP. The study chose ROA because it represents a good proxy of economic growth and 
reflects expected future performance of banks (Galbreath, 2011). ROA was also used by several 
scholars to assess the relationships between economic and sustainability performance for the 
banking sector (D’apolito et al., 2019; Siueia et al., 2019; Brogi & Lagasio, 2019, Memon et 
al., 2019; Forcadell & Aracil, 2017, Esteban-Sanchez et al. 2017). In addition, ROA and ROE 
are appropriate indicators of FP because the study is based on banks and as such, the selection 
of these measures does not suffer from industry bias (Maqbool & Zameer, 2018; Galant & 
Cadez, 2017). Consistent with prior studies in the region (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019), and due to 
lack of MBI data, the study excluded MBI because most of the banks in the region are not 
publicly listed. Moreover, these indicators are more sensitive to bank specific (unsystematic) 
perceptions of SBD (Galant & Cadez, 2017). 
4.2.3 Bank risk-taking measure 
    Following prior research (e.g., Moyo, 2018; Mustapha & Toci 2018; Berger et al., 2014), Z-
score, non-performing loans (NPLs), loan-loss provision (LPROV) and capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR), are the dependent variable. Based on well-established studies (e.g., Maji & Hazarika, 
2018; Mustapha & Toci, 2018), Z-score for the sampled banks is calculated as follows: 
                              Z-scoreit =
ROA𝑖,𝑡  – EA𝑖,𝑡
 σROA𝑖,𝑡 




      Where ROAi,t represents return on asset for a bank i at time t, EAi,t   is the equity to total 
assets ratio for bank i at time t, σROAi,t denote is the standard deviation of return on assets of 
bank i at a time t.  Additionally, and in line with Chen and Lin (2016) and Eibannan (2017), 
NPLs is defined as bank ratio of non-performing loans to total loans in a financial year; a larger 
value suggests a riskier credit portfolio. Similarly, and consistent with Mustapha & Toci (2018) 
and Al-Khouri (2012), LPROV is denotes the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans in a 
financial year. Following Mustapha & Toci (2018) and Eibannan (2017), CAR represents the 
ratio of banks’ capital to risk weighted assets in a particular year. These bank risk-taking 
proxies  were chosen because they have been utilized in several studies in order to test the 
association among CG, competition and risk-taking in banks (e.g., Zhou et al., 2019; Mustapha 
& Toci, 2018 Chen & Lin, 2016; Al-Khouri, 2012). 
        
4.2.4 Executive compensation measures 
    In most of the ESSA countries, executive directors’ compensation is mainly in the form of a 
base salary with benefits and a performance based annual bonus (Waweru et al., 2009). The 
bonus payment is based mainly on financial measures such as profits (Waweru et al., 2009). 
Non-executive members of the boards’ compensation are in the form of annual fees and sitting 
allowance for board meetings (Waweru et al., 2009). Consistent with prior studies in the non-
financial sector in the region, EC is measured in three ways (e.g., Ntim et al., 2019; Waweru 
et al., 2009). 
    In line with Ntim et al. (2019), executive directors’ compensation (EPAY) denotes the 
natural logarithm of annual cash compensation to executive directors of the bank scaled by the 
entire number of directors who are executives in a financial year. EPAY includes annual salary, 
cash bonus and any additional stated cash payment to executive directors in a financial year.        
    Similarly, and following Elmagrhi et al. (2020), non-executive directors’ compensation 
(NPAY) refers to the natural logarithm of annual cash compensation to all directors of the 
board who are non-executives scaled by the entire number of non-executive directors of the 
bank in a financial year. NPAY comprises annual sitting allowance, cash bonus and any other 
stated cash payment made to non-executive directors in a financial year.  
    Finally, and as applied by Elmagrhi et al. (2020) the total executive directors’ compensation 
(TPAY) represents the natural logarithm of annual cash compensation to both executive and 
non-executive directors of the board scaled by the sum of executive and non-executive directors 
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of the bank in a financial year. TPAY includes total salary, total cash bonus, and any other 
stated cash payment to all directors in a financial year. 
 
4.2.5 Corporate governance disclosure index and other corporate governance measures    
    First, following Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), a binary CG disclosure index, covering 100 
internal governance provisions were employed in the study. The selection of the 100 CG 
provisions are based on the Commonwealth CG code, individual country CG codes, existing 
literature and annual reports of the banks. Thus, the CGI is a collection of 100 all-inclusive set 
of CG provisions contained in the Combined Code in the ESSA region (Ghana, SEC, 2018, 
2010; Nigeria, SEC 2018, 2011; Kenya, CMA, 2014 and South Africa, King Report, 2016). 
The provisions cover four extensive areas: (i) directors and board disclosures (43); (ii) 
accounting, auditing and transparency disclosures (22); (iii) risk management, internal audit, 
and control disclosures (13); and (iv) compliance, shareholder rights and enforcement 
disclosures (22). The provisions are provided in Appendix 2 as employed by prior researchers 
in the region (e.g., Rashid, 2018; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).  
    A dichotomous method was also applied, whereby a bank was assigned ‘1’ if a CG item was 
fully complied with; otherwise, ‘0’ was awarded (Rashid, 2018; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Appendix 2 lists all the 100 CG items that were included in the score. These studies applied 
this method based on non-financial firms in the region. In addition, it provides explicit 
definitions of the coding instruments used and how the variables were measured. Specifically, 
the study operationalizes the notion of good CG by assessing the presence or absence of 100 
individual CG items2  based on the ESSA Combined Code, with banks scoring higher values 
regarded as better-governed (i.e., good/strong governance) and vice-versa (poor/weak 
governance) (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). This study adopts same in the banking system in the ESSA 
region. It is appropriate to adopt same approach because the internal CG mechanisms of the 
banks have similar structures like the non-financial sector. Notably, this is consistent with prior 
banking studies that have relied on either national (e.g., Grupta & Bala, 2020; Orazalin, 2019; 
Das et al., 2015; Jizi et al., 2014 ), or combined codes of corporate governance (e.g., Liang et 
al., 2020; Tarchouna et al., 2017; Ahmed, 2017 Isukul & Chizea, 2017), in constructing their 
aggregate CG indices.  
 
2 These 100 governance provisions were mainly extracted from the ESSA Combined Code. The study also relied on other sources, such as 
the Commonwealth CG code, UK Cadbury Report, Disclosure and Transparency Rules, and Insider Trading Law, in determining the final 
governance provisions included in the index 
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    The CGI is distinct from prior banking studies in the region in three main aspects. Crucially, 
and unlike prior studies that focus on specific pillars of CG in isolation, for instance, board 
independence (e.g., Ogege & Boloupremo, 2014; Baroko &  Brown, 2008), board size (e.g., 
Ogege & Boloupremo, 2014; Ajala et al., 2012), and shareholder rights (e.g., Foyeke et al., 
2015; Baroko &  Brown, 2008), amongst others, the CGI covers all pillars of CG in the region. 
This permits the existence of potential interactions and interdependences among alternative 
internal CG structures (Ntim, 2009). Further, consistent with prior international banking studies 
(e.g., Liang et al., 2020; Tarchouna et al., 2017), the CGI covers international internal CG 
issues, such as the board and directors, and internal audit (see sections I and II of Appendix 2). 
Finally, the CGI is distinct in its coverage of ESSA banking context specific affirmative action 
and investor protection CG provisions under the Combined CG Code (see section IV of 
Appendix 2).  
    Additionally, to examine the impact of board attributes and ownership structures on the bank 
risk-taking, the thesis employs a number of individual CG variables, measured by employing 
(i) independent financial experts (EXPERT), (ii) number of board meetings (NBMs), (iv) 
institutional ownership (ISONR), (v) government ownership (GOVNR) and (vi) foreign 
ownership (FONR)  
4.2.6 Competition measures 
    The next set of variables are the competition measures. There are several approaches 
established to assess competition in banking. These measures are of two main forms: structural 
and non-structural methods. The structural approach is framed along structural conduct 
performance paradigm. This approach was pioneered by Mason (1939) and Bain (1951). The 
structural conduct performance approach focuses on conduct and performance of banks (Moyo, 
2018), especially with regards to the structural features of the markets in which the banks 
operate (Moyo, 2018). Conduct denotes the manner in which banks function in key aspects 
including pricing, research and development, advertisement, among others. Performance 
denotes efficiency which is largely assessed by the degree of market power, with higher market 
power indicating lower efficiency (Kocabay, 2009). Structural estimates are concerned with 
concentration ratios, number of banks and the Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI).  
    Critics of this approach argue that, the market structure is impacted by conduct and 
performance. In addition, measuring competition based on this approach is criticized because 
competition in banking is not exclusively based on market structure indicators (e.g., Claessens, 
2009; Berger et al., 2004). Claessens (2009), contends that competition in banking ought to be 
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determined based on the actual behaviour of banks. Due to the theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings of the structural conduct performance, a lot of recent studies in banking have 
neglected this approach and focused on direct measure of competition (e.g., Akande, 2018; 
Berger et al., 2014). 
    The non-structural approach focuses on examining the extent of competition directly through 
behavior of banks in the market. The main advantage of this approach is that unlike structural 
conduct performance, the non-structural approach does not measure the competitive conduct 
of banks through the market structure, but directly measure banks’ conduct (Kocabay, 2009). 
The non-structural approach measures of competition include the Lerner index (Lerner, 1934), 
H-statistic (Panzar & Rosse, 1987) and the Boone indicator (2008). The study employed Lerner 
index as the primary measure, while H-statistics served as an alternative measure and thus more 
in-depth discussion on these measures will be provided in the next section.  
    The Lerner index measure is chosen as primary competition measure because of the 
following reasons. First, it is simple, transparent and intuitively appealing index of competition 
which does not require stringent data (Delis et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2014). Second, the index has 
the capacity to directly estimate bank competition as it has straightforward interpretation (Delis 
et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2014).  Third, it is bank-specific, vary over time which permits assessment 
of competition among banks and over a period (e.g., Delis et al., 2016; Beck et al., 2013). 
Fourth, the index can be estimated with a few observations (Leon, 2015). Finally, like all non-
structural approach measures, it allows competition to be measured separately for different 
banking markets. 
    Notwithstanding the above highlighted attributes, it has the following shortcomings. The 
indicator may not precisely capture the degree of product substitutability in the market. Indeed, 
Oliver et al. (2006) indicate that overestimation of competition by Lerner index is possible if 
the risk-taking of banks is not properly accounted for.  
 Lerner index represents the mark-up of price over marginal costs (Berger et al., 2009).  
 
                    Lerner indexit =
P𝑖𝑡 – MC𝑖𝑡
P𝑖𝑡    
                                                                          [Eqn 2] 
 
    In Equation 2, pit is the output price of bank i at time t and is defined as total revenue
 divided 
by total assets. Marginal cost is estimated by differentiating the translog cost function with one 
output (total assets) by output (Delis et al., 2016; Berger et al., 2009). Consistent with past 
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studies (e.g., Delis et al., 2016; Berger et al., 2009), MCit is derived following translog cost 
function as follows:  
 








j=1 + βInTTAit +
1
2⁄ β2(InTAit )












γ4tTInTAit+𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                    [Eqn 3] 
 
Where; 
TCi = the bank’s total costs 
TAi = the total assets 
wi = the price of the factors of production, defined as below: 
w1 = the price of purchased funds: interest expenses/total deposits and short-term funding 
w2 = the price of labor and physical capital: non-interest expenses/fixed assets 
T = the time trend that captures the influence of technological changes that lead to shifts 
in the cost function over time. 
 = error term. 












                [Eqn 4] 
 
    Using marginal costs and price, the study calculated the Lerner index for each bank and for 
each year and thus obtained a direct bank level measure of competition. The index ranges 
between 0 and 1, with zero reflecting perfect competition and high values corresponding to less 
competition or high market power. Although not sustainable in the long run, however the index 
can also be negative in an extreme case where price is less than marginal cost (P<MC) (Delis 
et al., 2016) which would indicate that the bank is making losses in the year as marginal cost 
is higher than price. 
    The study used Panzar-Rosse statistic (PRH) as an alternative measure of competition. PRH 
is defined as the elasticity of revenue with respect to the marginal cost of inputs used in the 
production of banking services (Jeon et al., 2011). Like Lerner index, it has been employed in 
banking competition studies because it requires easily available bank-specific variables (Tabak 
et al., 2012). PRH examines the extent to which a change in input price is translated in the 
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equilibrium revenues earned by a specific bank. It provides a measure referred to as H-statistic 
which ranges between 0 and 1. H-statistics is based on the responsiveness of banks’ revenue to 
changes in factor input prices (Schaeck & Cihak, 2012).  
    PRH has the following advantages. The model is simple and does not pose stringent data 
requirements as the test can be done by running a single equation with a few bank level-
variables (Leon, 2015). It can be estimated for a relatively small number of observations, which 
is critical for studies in less mature banking system (Leon, 2015).  The model is robust to the 
extent of the market as no specific market definition is captured in estimating the revenue 
equation (Shaffer, 2004). Finally, only the data from the banks included in the sample are 
required to estimate the revenue equation and this is a great advantage in cross-country studies 
(Claessens & Laeven, 2004).  
     However, PRH model has some shortcomings. It is sensitive to monopsony power (Neon, 
2015). Monopsony power arises when a single buyer controls the market and dictates prices 
(Leon, 2015). PRH assumes that, inputs should be homogenous and their prices exogenously 
fixed. Meanwhile, the price of deposits is always not fixed. It is possible for a bank to behave 
as a monopsony when alternative savings products are not available. In which case, monopsony 
power will lead to higher values of H-statistic and hence mask any market power present on 
the output side (Shaffer, 2004). Another drawback related with PRH model has to do with the 
continuous nature of H-statistics. The model assumed that, the H-statistics is a continuous 
monotonic index. However, critics of the model have argued that, H-statistics may be a 
continuum under certain conditions, but that may not be the case always.  
    H-statistics is estimated from reduced-form of bank revenue equations. It measures the sum 
of the elasticities of the total revenue of the banks with regards to the banks’ input prices. H-
statistics measures competition by assessing the extent to which a change in the factor input 
prices reflects in equilibrium revenues. The study followed the approach adopted by Fosu 
(2013) and Jeon et al. (2011) to calculate H-statistics by estimating the following reduced-form 
revenue equation:  
In(Pit) = α + β1In(W1, it) + β2In(W2, it) + β3In(W3, it) + γ1ln (Υ1, it) +  γ2ln (Υ2, it)  +
 γ3ln (Υ3, it) + δ D   +  ε it                                                                                                                                              [Eqn 5] 
Pit            - is the ratio of gross interest revenue to total assets (proxy for output price 
of loans) 
W1,it            - refers to the ratio of interest expense to total deposit as proxy for input 
price of deposits 
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W2,it            - refers to the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (proxy for input 
price of labour) 
W3,it            - refers to the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total 
fixed assets (proxy for input price of equipment / fixed capital). The model has a number of 
control variables as captured below; 
Y1,it                           - is the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA) proxy of bank’s leverage 
Y2,it                          - is the ratio of loans to total assets (LTA) account for credit risk exposure 
Y3,it                           - is the total assets (LTA) to control for potential size effects 
D                                - is a vector of year dummies  
The subscript i denotes bank i and the subscript t denotes year t. H-Statistics is equal to β1 + 
β2 + β3.  
H-Statistics is interpreted as follows:  
If H-statistic is zero or negative (H ≤ 0), it indicates pure monopoly. This implies that an 
increase in factor prices leads to a fall in revenue. If the value of H-statistic is between zero 
and one (0 < H < 1), it indicates that banks are in a monopolistic competitive market. Under 
such a circumstance, an increase in factor prices increases average and marginal costs. If H-
statistics is equal to 1 (H=1), it indicates perfect competition where there is free entry and exit. 
Hence, an increase in factor prices leads to a proportional increase in revenue. 
 
4.2.7 Bank-specific control variables 
    It has been suggested that, studies that omit relevant economic variable(s) that predict(s) EC, 
SBD, FP and BRT could lead to wrong conclusions (Ntim, 2009). Accordingly, the study 
controls for the effect of variables, which have been identified in the extant literature to affect 
EC, SBD, FP and BRT. Specifically, a number of  control variables capturing bank-specific 
features were employed. First, the study controls for bank size (FSIZ) measured as the 
logarithm of the total assets. Large banks may have stronger motive to engage in SBD activities 
(Kabir & Thai, 2017). In addition, they may be more equipped to deal with complicated, fast 
SBD strategies because they are more familiar with diversified operations (Kabir & Thai, 
2017).  
    Further, because the public tend to scrutinize large banks more than smaller banks, large 
banks have stronger motivation to commit to SBD (Kabir & Thai, 2017). Also, large banks are 
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likely to maintain a better CG structures that will allow them to attract capital at a cheaper cost 
(Ntim, 2009). This can increase financial profitability and FP. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
there is a positive relationship between firm size, as proxied by naturally logged total assets 
and, SBD and FP of banks. In particular, Delis (2012) posits that large banks have access to 
cheaper sources of capital owing to lower information asymmetries and superior risk-
management capacities (Delis, 2012). The implication of these may be that firm size may have 
an impact on BRT (Delis, 2012). 
    Second, the study controls for leverage (LEV). Debt levels affect the behavior of managers 
by imposing discipline and encouraging them to make decisions that are in the best interest of 
the banks. It also shows management risk tolerance level that influences it attitude towards 
sustainable activities (Maqbool & Zameer, 2018). This is captured by the ratio of debt to total 
equity. From an agency perspective, Jensen (1986) posits that a higher level of debt can increase 
FP of banks. This is achieved through minimization of agency conflicts linked with having 
‘free cash flows’ by opportunistic senior managers (Jensen, 1986).  
    Again, the use of debt financing can enhance FP by imposing extra monitoring by 
bondholders (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). In addition, from capital structure model, interest 
payments are tax deductible (Modigliani & Miller, 1963, p.438), and as such, all else equal, 
banks with more debt may generate higher FP. Similarly, debt levels affect the behavior of 
senior managers by imposing discipline and encouraging them to consider the broader interest 
of stakeholders (Maqbool & Zameer, 2018). This can increase SBD in the banking system. 
Therefore, the study expects a positive relationship between leverage as measured by ratio of 
debt to total assets to be positively linked with FP and SBD.  
    Third, the age (AGE) of the bank. Bank age is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since the bank’s date of incorporation to the year of analysis, as management 
decisions and principles are rooted in time (Maqbool & Zameer, 2018). Also, it has been argued 
that board decisions and principles are deeply-rooted in time (Greiner, 1972). The study expects 
age to be positively associated with FP and SBD of banks in the region. In addition, it has been 
suggested that, older banks may appear to be safer considering that they might have been 
operating in the same market for a longer period, during which they have established good 
lending relationships with their customers. This may give such banks an advantage in terms of 
the information they possess (Mustapha & Toci, 2018). The study expects age to be negatively 
associated with BRT in the region.   
    Fourth, the ratio of liquid assets divided by total assets to control for bank liquidity (LIQ). 
Because liquid banks tend to charge low interest rates on loans, default rate tend to be low and 
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such banks also attract less risky projects (Mustapha & Toci, 2018). Thus, the study expects 
liquidity to be negatively associated with BRT in the ESSA region. 
    Fifth, capitalization (CAP) measured by the ratio of capital to total assets. Better-capitalized 
banks should provide more SBD to reduce the information asymmetry between the bank and 
external stakeholders. The study argues that banks that have higher capitalization will engage 
in more SBD initiatives as a credible means of minimising the probable information asymmetry 
between the bank and external shareholders. Also, it is expected that, better-capitalized banks 
will have higher FP than banks with low capitalization due to the access of cheap source of 
capital in better-capitalized banks. Again, the BRT behavior of banks considerably depends on 
the amount of equity held by the bank (Mustapha & Toci, 2018). Banks with high capital ratio 
tend to be conservative in risk-taking as a way of preserving shareholders value (Mustapha & 
Toci, 2018). 
    Sixth, it has been argued that level of external auditor independence and the quality of the 
audit are closely linked with the audit firm (e.g., Ntim, 2009). It can be inferred that, on average, 
bigger audit firms may have the capacity to resist senior managers of banks pressure in conflict 
circumstances. This stems from the resources (e.g., financial, employees, information and 
knowledge), and independence capabilities that bigger audit firms have over their smaller audit 
firms (e.g., Young et al., 2008). The study therefore expects a positive relationship between 
audit firm size and SBD, as well as FP but a negative association with BRT. A dummy that 
takes ‘1’ if a bank is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), ‘0’ otherwise. 
    Seventh, research and development (R&D) expenditure is considered to be essential control 
variable for assessing the impact of EC on SBD (Nollet et al., 2016). Several studies indicate 
that investments in research and development has effect on SBD (e.g., Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013; Jo & Harjoto, 2012). Therefore, failing to control for R &D expenses may lead to a mis-
specified equation in which case the coefficient on SBD may be biased upwards. Again, R&D 
is also one crucial control variable for examining the impact of SBD on FP (Nollet et al., 2016). 
For example, a number of studies suggest that investment in R&D has an impact on FP (Jo & 
Harjoto, 2012); thus, failing to control could result in a misspecified equation with the 
coefficient on the SBD being biased upwards. 
    Eighth, the study controls for other CG variables such as board size (BSIZE), the log of 
board members of the bank is used to control for the size of the board (Devita & Luo, 2018; 
Don et al., 2017), board gender diversity (BDIVG), the share of female executives on the board 
to control for board diversity. Finally, the study included year and country dummies to account 
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for fixed effects in line with prior studies (e.g., Haque & Ntim, 2020; Maqbool & Zameer, 
2018; Kabir & Thai, 2017). 
 
4.3 Empirical specification 
    This section will provide empirical specifications adopted to examine the association among 
CGI, EC, SBD, competition and BRT in the ESSA countries. Section 4.3.1 will provide the 
empirical specification concerning the association among CGI, EC and SBD. In section 4.3.2, 
the empirical specification on association among CGI, SBD and FP is discussed, whilst section 
4.3.3 presents the empirical specification employed in investigating the association among 
board attributes, ownership structures, competition and BRT. 
4.3.1 Empirical specification on the association among CGI, EC and SBD 
    Following prior banking studies Zhou et al. (2019) and D’apolito et al. (2019), and to address 
the first research question (i.e., whether bank-level CG disclosure index influences executive 
compensation (H1a-H1c), the model below is proposed and tested using the ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression technique initially. 
   ECit = 0 + β1CGIit + β2FSIZit + β3LEVit + β4AGEit +β5CAPit +
   β
6
AFSit + β7R&Dit + β8YDUit + β9CDUit + εt                                                               [Eqn 6] 
 
    Where CGI is the CG disclosure index. EC denote executive compensation measures, 
depending on the specification, which is either EPAY, NPAY or TPAY. The set of variables 
being controlled for, namely, firm size (FSIZ), leverage (LEV), age (AGE), capitalization 
(CAP), audit firm size (AFS), research and development (R & D), year dummies (YDU) and 
country dummies (CDU).   
    Further, this study follows D’apolito et al. (2019) and, Kartadjumena and Rodgers (2019) 
banking studies, to answer the supplementary research question: does EC impacts on SBD with 
an initial OLS regression model to specifically test H2a to H2f as structured below: 
SBDit = 0 + β1EPAYit + β2NPAYit + β3TPAYit + β4FSIZit + β5LEVit +
β
6
AGEit +β7CAPit + β8AFSit + β9R&Dit + β10YDUit + β11CDUit + εt                        [Eqn 7] 
 
    Where  SBDit is the sustainable banking disclosure score, which depending on the 
specification is either the aggregate SBD index or its six sub-indices (ENV, SOC, HAS, EHR, 
CIV and EMP) for bank i at time t.  ECit denote executive compensation measures, depending 
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on the specification, which is either EPAY, NPAY or TPAY. Bank-specific control variables 
include FSIZ, LEV, AGE, CAP, AFS and R&D.  εit refers to the error term. 
    Finally, the study hypothesizes that the SBD of a bank is affected jointly by its CGI and its 
EC. To investigate this, the study adopts Haque and Ntim (2020), and D’apolito et al. (2019) 
studies in the non-financial sector in estimating the moderating effect of CGI on the pay-for-
sustainability sensitivity as shown in Eq. (8). The study adopts this based on banking sample. 
Specifically, to examine H3a-H3b (whether CGI can moderate the pay-for-sustainability 
sensitivity), the study creates an interaction variable by multiplying the CGI and EC as follows: 
CGI times EPAY (CGI*EPAY), CGI times NPAY (CGI*NPAY) and CGI times TPAY 
(CGI*EPAY). Similarly, the model contains the same bank-specific control variables that were 
included in Eq. (6). The next model is as follows:  




+    CONTROLSit)                                              [Eqn 8] 
Where  CGIit ∗ ECitis the interaction variable between EC and CGI. All other variables remain 
same as specified in equation (6). 
 
4.3.2 Empirical specification on the association among CGI, SBD and FP 
    Following Memon et al. (2019) and, Ashraf et al. (2017) studies in an emerging banking 
sector, and to answer the first research question (i.e., whether bank-level CG disclosure 
influences corporate sustainability disclosures (H4a to H4g), the following model is proposed 
and tested using the ordinary least square (OLS) regression technique initially. 
 
   SBDit = 0 + β1CGIit + β2FSIZit + β3LEVit + β4AGEit +β5CAPit +
   β
6
AFSit + β7R&Dit + β8YDUit + β9CDUit + εt                                                                [Eqn 9] 
 
    Where CG disclosure aggregate index is CGI. SBD denote sustainable banking measures, 
depending on the specification, which is either SBD, ENV, SOC, HAS, CIV, EHR or EMP. 
The set of variables being controlled for, namely, firm size (FSIZ), leverage (LEV), age (AGE), 
capitalization (CAP), audit firm size (AFS), research and development (R & D), year dummies 
(YDU) and country dummies (CDU). 
    Second, this study follows Szegedi et al. (2020) and Platonova et al. (2018) studies in the 
banking sector, to answer the supplementary research question: does SBD impacts on FP with 




FPit = 0 + β1SBDit + β2FSIZit + β3LEVit + β4AGEit +β5CAPit +
β
6
AFSit + β7R&Dit + β8YDUit + β9CDUit + εt                                                               [Eqn 10] 
     
   Where  SBDit is the corporate sustainability disclosure score, which depending on the 
specification is either the aggregate SBD index or its six sub-index (ENV, SOC, HAS, EHR, 
CIV and EMP) for bank i at time t.  FPit denote FP measures, depending on the specification 
which is either ROA or ROE. Bank specific control variables include FSIZ, LEV, AGE, CAP, 
AFS and R&D.  εit refers to the error term. 
    Finally, the study hypothesis that the FP of a bank is affected jointly by its CGI and SBD. 
This study follows a number of studies (D’apolito et al., 2019; Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; 
Maqbool & Zameer, 2018) in the banking sector in estimating the moderating effect of CGI on 
the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity as shown in Eq. (11). Specifically, to examine 
H6 (whether CG disclosure index can moderate the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity), 
the study creates an interaction variable by multiplying the bank-level CGI and SBD as follows: 
CGI times SBD (CGI*SBD). The study controls for all the variables included in Eq. (9) in 
estimating the next model, which is stated below: 
 




+    CONTROLSit)                                              [Eqn 11] 
 
Where CGIit*SBDitis the interaction variable between SBD and CG. All other variables remain 
same as specified in equation (9). 
 
4.3.3 Empirical specification on the association among CG, competition and BRT 
    First, to investigate the first research question (whether CG structures influence BRT (H7-
H8), the model below is suggested. Following prior research, the model is first analyzed by 
employing ordinary least square (OLS) regression approach (Hunjra et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 
2019; D’apolito et al., 2019; Felício et al., 2018; Lestari, 2018): 
𝐵𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 0 + β1𝐼𝑛EXPERTit+ β2𝐼𝑛NBMsit+β3InINSONRit +  β4GOVNRit + β5InFONRit +
β
6
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇it + 𝜀it                                                                                                                            [Eqn 12] 
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    Where: BRT  is the dependent variable measured using Z-score, non-performing loans 
(NPLs), loan loss provision (LPROV) and capital adequacy ratio (CAR); EXPERT 
(independent financial experts), NBMs (number of board meetings), ISONR (institutional 
ownership), GOVNR (government ownership), FONR (foreign ownership), are the main 
explanatory variables; and CONT denotes the set of variables being controlled for, including, 
board size (BSIZE), board gender diversity (BDIVG), firm size (FSIZ), capitalization (CAP), 
age (AGE), liquidity (LIQ), country (CDU) and year (YDU) dummies. 
    Second, prior banking literature employs a number of a methods to assess the influence of 
competition on BRT. This include ordinary least squares (see Goetz, 2017; Tabak et al., 2012); 
pooled OLS (see Mohammed et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2013) and fixed-effect GLS method 
(e.g., Liu et al., 2012). In order to endogeneity problems associated with the above methods, 
others such as Soedarmono et al. (2013) use 2SLS approach, whereas Amidu and Wolfe (2013) 
employs 3SLS approach. However, following recent banking literature on competition and 
BRT (e.g., Moudud-Ul-Huq, 2020; Tongurai & Vithessonthi, 2020; Akande et al., 2018), the 
study adopts dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) to examine the influence 
of competition on BRT in ESSA banks. This is because dynamic GMM approach is a superior 
model that is able to resolve econometric issues such as unobserved heterogeneity. The GMM 
approach is also able to fix problems such as dynamic endogeneity and simultaneity (Wintoki 
et al., 2012).  
    In particular, Wintoki et al. (2012) recommends that, researchers exploring the competition-
BRT relationship to adopt choose dynamic GMM model over conventional ordinary least 
squares and fixed effects methods due to the following strengths of the approach. Importantly, 
and unlike the ordinary least squares approach, dynamic GMM technique is capable of 
capturing fixed-effects at the individual bank levels. The implication is that, dynamic GMM 
estimator sufficiently fix any probable endogeneities originating from unnoticed bank-specific 
heterogeneities. Next, it is distinct and superior to conventional fixed effects approach which 
considers active exogeneity. Conventional fixed effects suffer from autocorrelation and 
hetereoscedascity between present and previous values. However, the GMM technique allows 
present values of the independent variable in this case competition to be influenced by previous 
values of the dependent variable in this case BRT.  
    Again, conventional ordinary least squares and fixed effects approaches have shortcomings 
in the economic structure and processes fundamental to the generation of the variables. 
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However, the GMM technique has the capacity to overcome these weakness as it is dynamic. 
By way of illustration, when present values of bank competition variables are linked with 
previous values of BRT, a dynamic GMM approach has the capacity to employ the previous 
values of BRT and competition variables as valid instruments. This is crucial as it helps to 
sufficiently address the presence of any probable dynamic and simultaneous endogeneities. 
Finally, one important strength GMM approach over OLS and fixed-effects is that, GMM 
depends on internal instruments obtained from past values BRT and competition variables in 
the estimation of the relationship. Importantly, this removes the cumbersome problems related 
with searching for valid external instruments (e.g., Ntim et al., 2015; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, to test H12 (to offer insight about the additional research question: whether 
competition influences bank risk-taking), the following model is proposed and tested using the 
GMM technique as applied in prior studies (e.g., Akande eat al., 2018; Delis et al., 2016). 
                      BRTit =  σit + λit -1+πitLIit + ϕit𝚺𝑋it + υit                                                         [Eqn 13] 
    Where BRTit  denotes measures of BRT for bank i at year t. The BRT indicators are the Z-
score, NPLs, LPROV and CAR. σit is a constant; πkit is the coefficient competition measures, 
LI, competition is measured either as Lerner index or H-statistics; ϕit denotes coefficient of 
the vector of bank-specific variables; and 𝜐𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
    As indicated earlier, to address endogeneity and reverse causality concerns, the GMM 
estimation advanced by Blundell and Bond (1998) is adopted (Coldbeck & Ozkan, 2018; 
Akande et al., 2018). The reliability of the GMM estimation is contingent how valid the 
instruments employed are. Importantly, it is desirable to have no high order serial correlation 
in the idiosyncratic element of the error term (Coldbeck & Ozkan, 2018). Initially, the Hansen 
J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions is used to detect presence of any source of correlation 
between the instruments and the error term (Coldbeck & Ozkan, 2018). This tests for the null 
hypothesis of overall validity of the instruments to be employed. In order to examine the 
strength of the instruments used, two additional tests are carried out to check the existence of 
first and second order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (AR1 and AR2) as 
applied by Coldbeck and Ozkan (2018).  
    Specifically, the study follows recent finance studies by estimating Eq. (13) using dynamic 
panel GMM technique (e.g., Tongurai & Vithessonthi, 2020; Coldbeck & Ozkan, 2018). The 
study estimates the two-step dynamic GMM model. Following previous research, this study 
uses the first differences of the two-period lagged values of the same independent variables as 
instruments (e.g., Tongurai & Vithessonthi, 2020; Akande et al., 2018).  
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Table 4.4: Variables definitions 
Variable Abbreviation Description Source 
Panel A Dependent variables    
Financial performance FP  Bankscope 
Return on assets ROA Percentage of operating profit to total assets Bankscope 
Return on equity ROE Ratio of net income to shareholder’s equity Bankscope 
Sustainable banking disclosure SBD A SBD index covering six broad areas as set out by 2016 GRI’s reporting guidance on SBD; Environmental score (ENV) 21 disclosures; 
Social investment and service quality (SOC) 27 disclosures; health and safety (HAS) 40 disclosures; community involvement (21); 
ethics and human rights (EHR) 12 disclosures; and employee (EMP) disclosures 14. Each disclosure ranges from 0 to 4 (where 0-no 
disclosure; 1-general or rhetorical disclosures; 2-narrative of what has been achieved; 3-quantitative or monetary data disclosure; 4-
quantitative or monetary disclosure supported by explicit assessment of performance or events. The results are scaled to a value between 
0 and 100%. 
Annual report 
Executive compensation EC  Annual report 
Executive directors pay EPAY Natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) pay of all executive directors scaled by the 
total number of executive directors in a financial year 
Annual report 
Non-executive directors pay NPAY Natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) pay of all non-executive directors scaled by 
the total number of non-executive directors in a financial year 
Annual report 
Total directors pay TPAY Natural log of annual cash (i.e., cash-bonus, salary and other reported cash remuneration) pay of all executive and non-executive directors 
scaled by the total number of executive and non-executive directors in a financial year 
Annual report 
Bank risk-taking BRT   
Z-score Z-score Banks’ return on assets plus the equity asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns BankScope 
Non-performing loans NPLs The bank-level ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; a larger value indicates  a riskier loan portfolio Annual report 
Loan- loss provision LPROV It is measured by the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans Annual report 
Capital adequacy ratio CAR Ratio of banks capital to risk weighted assets Annual report 
Panel B independent variable    
CG disclosure index CGI CG index containing 100 provisions derived from the commonwealth CG code, individual country CG codes and annual report of the 
sampled banks. The CG provision take a value of 1 if is disclosed in the annual report, otherwise 0 and scaled to a value between 0% 
and 100%. 
Annual report 
Interaction variables INT  Annual report 
TPAY*CGI variable INT1 TPAY*CGI denotes the interaction variable between the CGI and total executive and non-executive directors pay Annual report 
EPAY*CGI variable INT2 EPAY*CGI denotes the interaction variable between the CGI and total executive directors pay Annual report 
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NPAY*CGI variable INT3 NPAY*CGI denotes the interaction variable between the CGI and non-executive directors pay Annual report 
CGI*SBD INT4 CGI*SBD denotes the interaction variable between the CGI and sustainable banking disclosure score Annual report 
Competition measures COMP  Bankscope 
Lerner indicator LERNER Lerner index is the ratio of mark up (difference between output price and marginal cost) to the output price. The index ranges from 0 to 
1, with higher values indicating more market power. 
Bankscope 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistics HSTAT PRH is the sum of the elasticities of the revenue with respect to all input prices. Bankscope 
Board characteristics   Annual report 
Financial expertise EXPERT Percentage of independent financial experts on the board Annual report 
Number of board meetings NBMs The natural logarithm of the total number of board meetings in a year Annual report 
Bank ownership characteristics   Annual report 
Institutional ownership INSONR The percentage of shared owned by institutions in the banks Annual report 
Government ownership GOVNR The percent of shared owned by government in the banks Annual report 
Foreign ownership FONR The percentage of shares owned by foreigners Annual report 
Panel C: Bank control variables    
Firm size FSIZ Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank Bankscope 
Leverage LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets Bankscope 
Age AGE Natural log of the number of years since inception Annual report 
Liquidity LIQ Liquid assets divided by total assets Bankscope 
Capitalization CAP Equity capital divided by total assets Bankscope 
Audit firm size AFS 1 if a bank is audited by the big four audit firm (PricewaterCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernest & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. Annual report 
Research and development R&D Natural logarithm of research and development cost of the bank scaled by total assets Bankscope 
Notes: This table provides the definitions of the main variables employed in the analysis 
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4.4 Descriptive statistics  
    This section presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in investigating the 
association among CGI, EC, SBD, FP and BRT  in the ESSA banks. First, Table 4.5 presents 
the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis of the association among CGI, 
EC, SBD and FP. To remove the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 5 
percent level.  




Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Financial performance      
ROA 2.90 1.87 0.06 -6.46 92.20 
ROE 16.97 14.30 0.16 -1.23 98.83 
Panel B: SBD variables      
SBD Index (%) 34.25 33.89 9.37 6.11 61.11 
ENV (%) 37.58 34.52 17.02 2.38 82.14 
SOC (%) 34.76 34.26 14.29 3.70 75.00 
HAS (%) 22.87 21.25 9.13 1.88 51.88 
EHR (%) 38.53 35.42 16.79 2.08 83.33 
CIV (%) 39.13 40.48 13.98 1.13 69.05 
EMP (%) 50.31 50.00 12.70 3.57 75.00 
Panel C: Compensation variables      
TPAY ($m) 5.67 0.31 31.13 0.05 151.19 
EPAY ($m) 2.04 0.15 8.23 0.01 80.21 
NPAY ($m) 3.63 0.07 29.93 0.01 64.98 
Panel D: CGI       
CGI (%) 64.56 66.00 13.96 23.00 88.00 
Panel E: Interaction variables      
TPAY*CGI 279.04 241.11 21.35 9.05 2146.80 
EPAY*CGI 148.60 107.70 17.50 4.10 794.51 
NPAY*CGI 126.76 101.50 14.60 6.07 805.75 
SBD*CGI 2245.73 2146.48 18.70 244.44 4742.22 
Panel F: Control variables      
FSIZ ($m) 9.52 9.11 2.92 2.35 17.26 
CAP 0.20 0.13 0.32 0.02 0.99 
LEV 0.84 0.86 0.11 0.03 0.95 
AGE 36.00 26.00 29.96 2 178 
R & D ($m) 2.22 1.57 2.49 4.61 10.15 
AFS 0.92 1.00 0.27 0 1 
This tables provides the summary statistics of all the variables used in the regression analysis. Variables are defined as follows: Return on 
Assets (ROA); Return on Equity (ROE), Sustainable Banking Disclosure (SBD), Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service 
quality score (SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and human rights score (HER), employee 
score (EMP), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate governance 
disclosure index (CGI), an interaction between TPAY and CGI (TPAY*CGI), an interaction between EPAY and CGI (EPAY*CGI), an 
interaction between NPAY and CGI (NPAY*CGI), an interaction between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), 
Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided 
in Table 4.4 
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    Second, Table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis 
of the association among board attributes, bank ownership variables, competition and BRT. 
Similarly, and to remove the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 5 percent 
level.  





Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A. Dependent variable                                          
Z-score 0.610 0.26 0.980 0.030 2.42 
NPLs 5.17 2.30 9.07 0 68.00 
CAR 18.53 16.90 9.59 -13.00 136.40 
LPROV 1.52 0 3.26 0 37.00 
Panel B. Competition variables      
Lerner index 0.37 0.36 0.28 0.13 0.61 
H-statistics 0.48 0.42 0.67 0.07 0.89 
Panel C. Board variables      
EXPERT (%) 58.23 57.14 14.77 10.00 88.83 
NBMs (%) 4.98 5.00 1.46 2.00 12.00 
Panel D. Ownership variables      
ISONR (%) 75.54 92.66 18.51 11.78 100.00 
GOVNR (%) 5.46 35.10 20.08 0.00 100.00 
FONR (%) 17.62 21.69 7.77 0.00 42.07 
Panel F. Bank control variables      
BSIZE 9.00 9.00 3.19 4.00 24.00 
BDIVG (%) 24.79 25.00 13.45 0.00 83.33 
This tables provides the summary statistics of all the variables used in the regression analysis. Variables are defined as follows: Z-score (Z-
score), Non-performing loans (NPLs), Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Loan Loss Provision (LPROV), Independent directors who are financial 
experts (EXPERT), Number of board meetings (NBMs), Institutional ownership (ISONR), Government ownership (GOVNR), Foreign 
ownership (FONR), board size (BSIZE) and Board Gender Diversity (BDIVG). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
4.5 Correlation diagnostic  
    This section presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in investigating the 
association among CGI, EC, SBD, FP and BRT of banks in the ESSA region. First, the study   
presents the correlation coefficients of Pearson matrix of all the variables used in the analysis 
of the association among CGI, EC, SBD and FP. Specifically, Table 4.7 provides the 
correlation matrix of all variables used in the regression analysis. As a rule of thumb, a 
correlation of 0.7 or higher in absolute value may suggest a multicollinearity issue (Liu et al., 
2014). Further, if the correlation coefficient between the explanatory variables is greater than 
0.80, there is an indication of major multicollinearity (Guajarati, 1995). The results in Table 
4.7 show that, there is statistically significant correlation between the dependent variables and 
the explanatory variables, as well as the bank-specific control variables.  
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Table 4.7: Pearson’s correlation matrices of the variables for CGI, EC, SBD and FP for the 2027 bank year observations 
Variable ROA ROE SBD ENV SOC HAS EHR CIV EMP TPAY EPAY NPAY CGI INT1 INT2 INT3 FSIZ LEV CAP AGE AFS R&D 
ROA 1.00                      
ROE 0.43 1.00                     
SBD 0.03** 0.03* 1.00                    
ENV -0.06** -0.02 0.08* 1.00                   
SOC 0.08*** 0.09* 0.08* 0.03 1.00                  
HAS -0.04*** -0.01 0.07* 0.32* 0.05 1.00                 
EHR -0.06** 0.03* 0.07* 0.07 0.03 0.04* 1.00                
CIV -0.07** -0.04** 0.06* 0.03 0.03* 0.05 0.04 1.00               
EMP -0.02 0.05** 0.05 0.05* 0.04 0.02* 0.03* 0.18 1.00              
TPAY 0.03** 0.05** -0.05*** 0.01* -0.07** -0.06** -0.01 -0.11*** 0.08*** 1.00             
EPAY 0.01* 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.02* 0.02* 0.04** 0.01 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.08 1.00            
NPAY -0.04* -0.07* -0.01*** -0.05** -0.08** -0.05** -0.05** -0.13*** -0.01* 0.03 0.25 1.00           
CGI 0.05*** 0.03* 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.16** 0.03*** 0.12*** 0.16*** -0.02** -0.07** -0.11** 1.00          
INT1 0.07* 0.03*** -0.02 -0.001 -0.03 -0.02* -0.13* 0.061 -0.07 0.002 0.01 0.03 0.007 1.00         
INT2 0.01** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.10** 0.07** 0.004** 0.08** 0.03* 0.006** 0.001 0.03 0.04* 0.05* 0.15 1.00        
INT3 0.06* 0.08** 0.01** 0.04* 0.14 0.19* 0.18* 0.07** 0.12* 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07 1.00       
FSIZ -0.04** -0.01* -0.09** -0.01** -0.08** -0.09** -0.04* -0.17** 0.08*** 0.07** 0.06** 0.16** -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.11 1.00      
LEV -0.11 0.01** 0.01 0.03 -0.03* -0.03 0.04** 0.01 0.05** -0.08 -0.09* -0.05 0.11* -0.09 0.27 0.08* 0.04 1.00     
CAP 0.31*** -0.14** -0.10 -0.14** -0.03* -0.04** -0.12** -0.11** 0.09*** 0.10** 0.07** 0.06* -0.05* 0.07 0.41 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 1.00    
AGE 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.04** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.17* 0.06** 0.04** 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08* 0.14 0.01 0.08 1.00   
AFS -0.06** 0.01** 0.08*** 0.03* 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.03 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.03 0.33 0.08 0.21* 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 1.00  
R&D 0.01** 0.01** 0.02 0.08*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.10*** 0.04** 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.06 0.09* 0.18* 0.06 0.11 -0.10 0.20* -0.08* 1.00 
Notes: The figures indicate the Pearson’s correlation coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate that the correlation is respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Return on Assets (ROA); Return on Equity (ROE), 
Sustainable Banking Disclosure (SBD), Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service quality score (SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and human rights 
score (EHR), employee score (EMP), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate governance disclosure index (CGI), an interaction between TPAY and 
CGI (TPAY*CGI), an interaction between EPAY and CGI (EPAY*CGI), an interaction between NPAY and CGI (NPAY*CGI), an interaction between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), 
Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4 
124 
 
    The correlation between the independent variable, financial performance (return on asset and 
return on equity) and dependent variables (corporate governance disclosure index and 
sustainable banking disclosure score) are mostly significant at conventional levels. In addition, 
they also have the expected signs. For example, correlation coefficients in Table 4.7 indicate 
statistically strong associations among the FP (return on assets and return on equity) and 
sustainable banking disclosure scores. For instance, the findings suggest that banks with higher 
sustainable banking disclosure scores have significantly higher financial performance. In 
addition, the CG variable (CGI) is negatively and significantly correlated with the executive 
compensation measures (EPAY, NPAY and TPAY). The correlation among the independent 
variables are relatively low and statistically insignificant. A weak correlation of the 
independent variables is desirable since it suggests that multicollinearity is not a major problem 
(Liu et al., 2014). Overall, the results in Table 4.7 show that all the correlation coefficients have 
absolute values lower than 0.7. 
    Next, Table 4.8 presents the correlation matrix of of all the variables used in the analysis of 
the association among board attributes, bank ownership variables, competition and BRT. This 
analysis was carried out to detect if there any serious probable multicollinearity challenges. It 
has been suggested that, an absolute correlation of 0.7 or above will infer the presence of 
multicollinearity issue (Liu et al., 2014). The findings captured in Table 4.8 reveal that all the 
correlation coefficients have absolute values that are less than 0.7. This evidence confirms the 
absence of any major multicollinearity issues (Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2014).                                      
    Also, Table 4.8 findings reveal that, the board attributes are negatively associated with the 
bank risk-taking variables. For instance, the EXPERT has a negative and significant correlation 
with Z-score, NPLs, CAR and LPROV. The table suggests significant correlation between the 
ownership structures and bank risk-taking variables. For example, ISONR has negative and 
significant correlation with all of the bank risk-taking measures except CAR. 
    Finally, the table shows that the correlations between competition and bank risk-taking 
variables significant and positive. For example, there is a positive and significant correlation 
between the two competition measures (Lerner index and H-statistics) and the four proxies of 





Table 4.8: Pearson’s correlation matrices of the variables for CG, competition and BRT for the 2027 bank year observations 
Variable Z-score  NPLs CAR LPROV LERNER H-STA BSIZE  EXPERT  BDIVG  NBMs INSONR GOVNR FONR CAP FSIZ LIQ AGE 
Z-SORE 1       
 
          
NPLs 0.03 
 
1                
CAR -0.03 0.12 1               
LPROV 0.18 0.32 -0.25 1              
LERNER 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 0.12** 1             
H-STA 
 
0.05** 0.04*** 0.14* 0.03* 0.001  
1 
           
BSIZE 0.04** 0.03* -0.10* 0.11 -0.05** 
 
-0.02* 1           
EXPERTS -0.08** -0.01* -0.04* -0.09** -0.05** 0.03** 0.05**  
1 
         




0.1 1         
NBMs -0.03*** -0.05* -0.08* -0.026* -0.01 -0.02* 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 
 
1        
INSONR -0.009* 
 
-0.008* -0.03 -0.02* -0.07 -0.04* -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1       
GOVNR 0.04** 
 
0.02 0.17** 0.03 0.01 -0.004* -0.007 -0.02 -0.03 -0.005 -0.009 1      
FONR 
 
0.01 0.06* 0.06* 0.06** -0.07** -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.009 0.09 -0.02 1     
CAP -0.01 -0.05** 0.02* -0.18* 0.04 0.007** -0.04* 0.02 
 
-0.04 0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.13 1    
FSIZE -0.01*** -0.03** -0.02* -0.19* 0.03 0.05* -0.02 0.06* 0.035 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 1 
 
  





0.02** 0.06** 0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.01 1 
Notes: The figures indicate the Pearson’s correlation coefficients. ***, ** and * indicate that the correlation is respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Variables are defined as follows: 
Z-score (Z-score), Non-performing loans (NPLs), Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Loan Loss Provision (LPROV), Independent directors who are financial experts (EXPERT), Number of board 
meetings (NBMs), Institutional ownership (ISONR), Government ownership (GOVNR), Foreign ownership (FONR), board size (BSIZE) and Board Gender Diversity (BDIVG). Full definitions   




5 Empirical results of the association among CGI, EC and SBD 
    This chapter focuses on providing empirical results on the association among corporate 
governance disclosure index, executive compensation and sustainable banking disclosures in 
the ESSA banks. Specifically, section 5.1 provides the results on the association between 
corporate governance disclosure index and executive compensation. In section 5.2, the study 
presents the results on the impact of executive compensation on sustainable banking 
disclosures.  Finally, section 5.3 provides the findings on the moderating effect of corporate 
governance disclosure index on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity in the ESSA banks. 
5.1 The empirical findings of effect of CG disclosure on executive compensation 
    Table 5.1 provides the results of the effect of CG disclosure index (CGI) covering 100 main 
components obtained from the regional Combined CG Code provisions on executive 
compensation (EC) in ESSA banks as captured in Eq. (6).  
 
Table 5.1: The effect corporate governance disclosure index and executive compensation 



























































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 2027 2027 2027 
R-squared 0.672 0.641 0.678 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect CGI on EC. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Variables are defined 
as follows: Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate governance 
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disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit 
firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4 
 
    Precisely, Table 5.1 provides the results concerning the impact of CGI on the pay package 
of executives given by EPAY, NPAY and TPAY as the dependent variables. Prior research 
indicates that good internal CG mechanisms can reduce agency conflicts by enhancing 
managerial monitoring ability (Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Fama, 1980). This may prevent senior 
managers from misappropriating shareholders’ wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In order to 
analyse this, the study investigates the effect of CGI on EC. The coefficients of CGI on TPAY, 
EPAY and NPAY (-0.008, -0.013 and -0.165) in Table 5.1 are all negative and statistically 
significant at 1%. Largely, the findings offer empirical support for H1a, H1b and H1c. This 
evidence supports the suggestion that banks that are better-governed tend to pay substantially 
lower level of compensation to their executives than banks that are poorly-governed in the 
ESSA region3.  
    The inverse link between CGI and EC offers empirical support for the provisions of ESSA 
regional codes (e.g., Ghana SEC code, 2018; Nigeria SEC code, 2018; The Kings Report, 2016; 
Kenya CG code, 2016). In addition, the findings offer support to prior CG research (e.g., 
Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Newton, 2015; Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2012; Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
Theoretically, the evidence also offers empirical support for both MPH and OCT. The evidence 
suggests that under poor governance settings (MPH) senior managers of banks may dominate 
board decisions and award themselves with disproportionately substantial compensation 
packages (Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ntim et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007). In a weak governance 
banking environment, opportunistic senior managers may misappropriate the wealth of 
shareholders by having power in terms of setting their own compensation schemes (Cho et al., 
2014; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
    However, under good CG conditions (OCT), senior managers of banks have minimal control 
in terms of setting their own compensation packages. This provides the necessary platform for 
the board to structure compensation packages in such a manner that it ensures EC is more 
 
3 Standard errors can be clustered in a number of ways in regression models to take into consideration group effects (Al-Najjar, 2018; Al-
Najjar & Clark, 2017). The regression models in the study are based on one-way clustering. These models have been adopted so to be consistent 
with previous CG studies in the ESSA context (see e.g., Siueia et al., 2019; Ibitamuno et al., 2018; Ghosh, 2017). Additionally, this was done 
in accordance with prior international CG studies (e.g., Abdelbadie & Salama, 2019; Nawaz, 2019; McGuinness, et al., 2017; Brick & 
Chidambaran, 2010). Nevertheless, the study also conducted an additional cluster based on firms with the inclusion of country dummies to 
determine the consistency of the findings. Although the results are not reported, no changes were reported in this analysis. 
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closely linked with the performance of senior managers of the bank (Elmagrhi et al., 2020; 
Dong, 2014; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009). The implication is that, this limits excessive executive 
compensation in the banking system. 
    Concerning the control variables, firm size and age have positive impact on EC, indicating 
that large and older banks pay higher level of compensation to their executive than small and 
newer banks. AFS seems to have insignificant effect on EC, whiles investments in research 
and development positively impact on EC. Leverage has insignificant link with the EC 
measures except in Model 1 where there is a negative and significant relationship. Similarly, 
CAP has positive association with EC measures except in Model 1 where the link is 
insignificant. 
    To further investigate the robustness of the results presented in Table 5.1 concerning the 
effect of the CGI on EPAY, NPAY and TPAY, the study divides the sample according to the 
mean value of internal CG disclosure index and re-estimate Eq. (6) in the sub-samples. 
Specifically, and in line with Elmagrhi et al. (2020) the study conducts this analysis in different 
sub-samples. This led to two groups: better-governed and poorly-governed banks. In the case 
of better-governed banks, the sub-sample contains banks with a CGI value over the average 
score of 64%. Similarly, for poorly-governed banks, sub-sample contains all banks with CGI 
value lower than the average score of 64%. This analysis was done to provide more informative 
inferences about the data (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). The results are provided in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Break sample analysis of the effect of corporate governance on executive pay with 
clustered errors 
 Better-governed banks Poorly-governed banks 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
         TPAY 












































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 1166 1166 1166 861 861 861 
R-squared 0.663 0.623 0.676 0.735 0.757 0.604 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect CGI on EC. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate     
the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Variables are defined 
as follows: Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate governance 
disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit 
firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4 
 
    Concerning better-governed banks, the coefficients of CGI on TPAY (-0.010), EPAY (-
0.014) and NPAY (-0.289) are negative and statistically significant in all the models. In 
addition, the findings in Models 4 to 6 reveal that the coefficients of the CGI on TPAY (-0.012), 
EPAY (-0.018) and NPAY (-0.007) for poorly-governed banks are negative. However, the 
relationships are all not statistically significant, offering further empirical support for H1a to 
H1c.  
    The evidence suggests that well-governed banks pay significantly lower cash compensation 
to executive directors, non-executive directors, and all executive directors, than poorly-
governed banks in the ESSA region. Importantly, the negative impact of corporate governance 
disclosure on executive compensation offers empirical support for the provisions of the 
Combined CG Code issued in the ESSA and the findings of prior CG studies in the non-
financial sector (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020). Theoretically, the evidence offers empirical 
support for both MPH and OCT, suggesting that in poor governance banking system senior 
managers of banks can influence the decision of the board and offer themselves with 
excessively generous compensation as suggested by MPH framework (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). 
However, in banking system with effective CG structures, senior managers do not have the 
power to determine their compensation as indicated by OCT perspective. Therefore, this can 
enable the board to structure efficient compensation incentives that may be consistent with the 
long-term sustainability of the banks (Ntim et al., 2015). 
5.2 Empirical findings of the effect of executive compensation on sustainable banking 
disclosure 
    The empirical findings of executive compensation along with bank-specific control variables 
on sustainable banking disclosure (SBD) are provided in Table 5.3. The table provides the 
results of seven models concerning the effect of three individual EC (i.e., TPAY, EPAY and 
NPAY) on the aggregate SBD score (Column 1) and the individual dimensions of SBD 
(Columns 2-7). With reference to executive directors pay, the positive and significant 
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Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 
R-squared 0.548 0.510 0.683 0.589 0.617 0.519 0.579 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect individual EC on SBD. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and year. 
Variables are defined as follows: Sustainable Banking Disclosure (SBD), Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service quality 
score (SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and human rights score (EHR), employee score 
(EMP), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate governance disclosure 
index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size 
(AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4 
    This evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Optimal contrasting theory 
(OCT) of a positive relationship between executive pay and SBD. Optimal contrasting theory 
posits that EC packages results from arms-length arrangements between strong corporate 
boards and senior managers (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). Therefore, EC packages can potentially be 
used to enhance the performance of senior managers of banks especially in areas such as 
achieving corporate sustainability goals (Conyon, 2014; Edmans & Gabaix, 2009). From OCT 
perspectives, banks can achieve long-term value creation by linking EC to sustainability 
performance. This is mainly due to the assumption that senior managers have less power in 
setting their own remuneration (Elmagrhi et al., 2020).  
    Observably, the findings contribute to a small, but growing findings which show that 
executive pay has a positive impact on SBD (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019; Callan & 
Thomas, 2014). The findings lend empirical support for the recommendations of sustainable 
banking and CG codes in the ESSA that incorporate the expectation that, EC will be linked 
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with SBD. It also provides significant support for the recent call for banks to direct executive’s 
attention towards SBPs by linking executive pay to progress in sustainability related 
performance (e.g., Nwagwu, 2020; Wasiuzzaman & Wan Mohammad, 2020; Shumsky, 2019). 
    By contrast, NPAY and TPAY are negatively and significantly linked with SBD as reported 
by other studies in the non-financial sector (e.g., Miles & Miles, 2013; Cai et al., 2011). These 
findings do not provide empirical support for H2b and H2c, respectively. Theoretically, this 
results confirm the argument of MPH that non-executive compensation packages result from 
close negotiations between weak executives and strong independent board. The outcome of 
such negotiations is the design and implementation of inefficient compensation schemes, 
leading to an increase in agency conflicts (Mallin et al., 2015; Cho et al., 2014). Therefore, 
MPH expects a negative link between TPAY and NPAY, and SBD in the banking system. This 
is because non-executive directors in the banking system have the power to determine their 
own compensation (Van Essen et al., 2015). The Combined CG Code in the region 
recommends that pay within banks should be determined by a committee of non-executive 
directors. For example, based on the recommendations of the Ghana CG Code (2018), the 
remuneration committee in the banks are made up of non-executive directors including the 
chairperson. This suggests that, non-executive pay is largely determined by non-executive 
members in negotiation with the executives, especially the CEO. This could partly explain the 
negative link in the ESSA banking system.  
    Concerning the effect of the individual EC on the individual dimensions of SBD, the results 
are contained in Models 2 to 7 of Table 5.3. First, the coefficients of EPAY on SOC, EHR, 
CIV and EMP in Table 5.3 are all positive and statistically significant. This infers that H2d is 
accepted. Theoretically, these findings support the view of OCT which suggests that banks can 
rely on executive pay as a partial remedy to resolve agency conflict (Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 
2019). The theory indicates that shareholders through the board provides an optimal 
compensation contract with an efficient payment scheme for senior managers to act in 
accordance with broader stakeholders’ interests, aiming to maximise their value (Kartadjumena 
& Rodgers, 2019; Conyon, 2014). Executive pay incentives involving broader sustainability 
performance-linked compensations can minimize agency problems (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), 
since it can ensure that senior managers think and act like stakeholders (Ntim et al., 2015).  
    From OCT perspective, the objective of this approach is to direct the attention of senior 
managers of banks towards long-term value creation by linking EC to SBD. Therefore, OCT 
predicts a strong positive relationship between executive pay and SBD, due to the assumption 
that executives have less control in setting their own pay (Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014; Dong et 
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al., 2010). However, the insignificant influence of EPAY on ENV and HAS does not provide 
support for H2d. The evidence is contrary to the findings of Kartadjumena and Rodgers (2019) 
who report that higher executive pay in Indonesian banking sector motivates managers to 
commit to more climate and environmental concerns. 
    Second, results reported in Models 2 to 7 of Table 5.3 indicate that NPAY has negative effect 
on all the six dimensions of SBD, except in Model 4 (HAS) where the association is 
insignificant. These findings are contrary to H2e; hence the positive link prediction is not 
empirically supported. Theoretically, these findings offer support for MPH perspective, which 
maintains that non-executive compensation arrangements as a result of tight negotiations 
between influential non-executive directors and weak executives that may lead to the 
implementation of ineffective incentive contract that increases agency conflicts (Mallin et al., 
2015; Cho et al., 2014). Under such arrangement, linking EC to SBD may not necessarily lead 
to improved SBD performance. This is because influential non-executive directors on 
remuneration committee are presumed to set their own compensation packages and as such 
whether EC is linked to SBD or not MPH expects a negative EC-SBD nexus. 
    Finally, the results in Models 2 through to 7 of Table 5.3 show that TPAY has negative 
influence on all the six SBD dimensions, except in Model 4, where TPAY has a negative but 
insignificant relationship with HAS. These findings offer no empirical support for H2f. The 
findings are however consistent with MPH which predicts a negative relationship between total 
EC and SBD. It argues that agency conflict in the banking system arises because non-executive 
directors may reward powerful CEOs and senior managers with an excessively high pay in 
return for a similar and reciprocal support from the CEO and the executives (Ntim et al., 2019; 
Morse et al., 2011). Essentially, under such arrangement linking EC to SBD may not 
necessarily lead to improved SBD performance. This is because executive and non-executive 
directors are assumed to set their own pay in a reciprocal (give-and-take) arrangement. Thus, 
in such weak CG environment, whether EC is linked to SBD or not (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003), 
MPH expects a negative EC-SBD nexus. 
    Regarding bank-specific control variables, contrary to the prediction of the study, FSIZ is 
negatively related with the SBD in the models. This evidence is inconsistent with the argument 
that large banks have stronger motive to engage in SBD activities (Kabir & Thai, 2017). It 
suggests that large banks do not assume more activities with greater impact on society in ESSA 
(Khan, 2010). In addition, the suggestion that stakeholders in society tend to scrutinise larger 
banks therefore, they would be under greater pressure to engage and report their SBD activities 
to legitimise their business is not supported in the region (Khan, 2010). Leverage appears to be 
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insignificantly related to SBD. This is in line with similar findings of prior banking studies (Jizi 
et al., 2014; Khan, 2010; Reverte, 2009). 
    Consistent with the expectation that older banks may be involved in higher SBD due to their 
long-standing relationship with their stakeholders, the results show that age has positive 
relationship with SBD across all the models. This evidence supports the view that more 
established and older banks disclose extensive SBD in the region (Orazalin, 2019). The results 
for the SBD proxies and CAP show negative association. The implication is that the assertion 
that better-capitalized banks provide more SBD to reduce the information asymmetry between 
the bank and external stakeholders is not supported, which is contrary to the findings of Siueia 
et al. (2019). In line with the expectation of the study, there is a positive association between 
R&D and SBD in all the Models. These findings are similar to the findings of Jo and Harjoto 
(2012). Finally, the coefficient on audit firm size in the models generally show the predicted 
sign, as there is positive and significant relationship between AFS and the SBD measures across 
all the models except in Model 5 which is negative. 
 
5.3 Executive compensation and SBD-nexus: The moderating effect of CGI 
    The chapter also distinctively investigates whether CGI can moderate the pay-for-
sustainability sensitivity (PSS) by estimating Eq. (8). Table 5.4 provides the ordinary least 
squares regression results exploring the probable moderating impact of CGI on the EC-SBD 
nexus. Observably, the findings indicate that bank-level CGI has a moderating impact on the 
pay-for-sustainability sensitivity. Specifically, the result in Model 2 shows that CGI*EPAY 
has a positive impact on SBD. The evidence, thus, offer empirical support for H3a that bank 
level internal governance disclosures positively moderate the relationship between executive 
compensation packages and SBD. 
     The findings also lend support for the predictions of OCT. Similarly, the results in Model 3 
of Table 10 indicate that CGI*NPAY has a positive effect on SBD, however the association is 
weak as the relationship is insignificant. This does not offer empirical support for H3b. In 
contrast, Model 1 of Table 5.4 shows that CGI*TPAY has a negative but insignificant impact 
on SBD which does not provide support for H3c, thus H3c is rejected. Theoretically, strong 
managerial monitoring associated with sustainability progress linked to EC by strong boards 
can incentivise managers to engage in more SBD (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). Further, compliance, 
shareholder rights and enforcement structures can mitigate agency conflicts (Ntim et al., 2015). 
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For instance, good CG mechanisms such as greater activism by institutional investors can 
enhance the EC-SBD nexus (Ntim et al., 2015).  
 
Table 5.4: The moderating effect of CGI on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity with 
clustered errors  
Dependent Variable 
Model 
                 SBD          















   0.082*** 
(3.594) 
EPAY*CGI  0.034*** 
(6.167) 
 
EPAY  2.488*** 
(6.430) 
 
NPAY*CGI                 0.001 
(0.178) 
NPAY   -1.002*** 
(3.132) 











































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 2027 2027 2027 
R-squared 0.552 0.652 0.563 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect CGI on the EC-SBD nexus. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. 
Variables are defined as follows: Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), 
Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate governance disclosure index (CGI), an interaction between TPAY and CGI (TPAY*CGI), an interaction 
between EPAY and CGI (EPAY*CGI), an interaction between NPAY and CGI (NPAY*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage 
(LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4 
     In drilling deeper, Table 5.5 offers insight into the moderating effect of CGI on the EC-SBD 
link in the sub-sample. In doing this, the study divides the sample based on the average score 
of CGI in line with Elmagrhi et al. (2020) and re-estimate Eq. (8) in the sub-samples. This 







Table 5.5: The moderating effect of CGI on pay-for-sustainability sensitivity in sub-sample 
analysis with clustered errors 
Break sample  Better-governed banks Poorly-governed banks 
Dep. Variable 
Model 
   SBD    
   (1) 
 SBD 
  (2) 
SBD 
(3) 
  SBD 





TPAY  -0.325*** 
(2.854) 
  -0.546* 
(1.741) 
  
TPAY*CGI  -0.031 
(1.322) 
  -0.009 
(1.414) 
  












EPAY*CGI   0.054*** 
(4.613) 
  0.011** 
(2.280) 
 
EPAY   2.981*** 
(4.814) 
  1.547*** 
(2.897) 
 
NPAY*CGI    0.002 
(0.312) 
  0.305 
(1.413) 
NPAY    -0.856*** 
(4.581) 




       























































































 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs.  1166 1166 1166 861 861 861 
R-squared  0.515 0.686 0.505 0.432 0.260 0.220 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect CGI on the EC-SBD nexus. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. 
Variables are defined as follows: Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate 
governance disclosure index (CGI), an interaction between TPAY and CGI (TPAY*CGI), an interaction between EPAY and CGI (EPAY*CGI), 
an interaction between NPAY and CGI (NPAY*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and 
development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4 
      The findings contained in Table 5.5 indicate that banks with higher CGI value (better-
governed banks) tend to have higher positive and significant (0.054) EPAY*CGI moderating 
effect on SBD. Similarly, the positive moderating effect of EPAY*CGI on SBD is significantly 
lower (0.011) in poorly-governed banks (i.e., banks with lower CGI values). Consistent with 
OCT, the evidence shows that in banking system where the internal CG mechanisms are good, 
EC packages can be structured in such a manner that it aligns the interest of senior managers 
and the wider stakeholder groups (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
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    However, in line with managerial power hypothesis, in poor CG banking environment, 
influential but opportunistic senior managers may expropriate the wealth of shareholders and 
stakeholders (Cho et al., 2014; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Proponents of MPH argue that EC 
packages that are overly determined by senior bank managers may lead to a reduction in long-
term bank value and a decoupling of pay-for-sustainability sensitivity (Pepper & Gore, 2015; 
Bebchuk & Fried, 2005). This is because senior bank managers determine their own 
compensation packages, linking executive pay to corporate sustainability goals may not 
necessarily lead to higher improvement in SBD in banks due to the weak CG structures. 
6.4. Robustness checks 
    The study conducted a number of tests to check the robustness of the findings. The study 
carried out two different tests, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) and lagged structure model. 
Overall, the results of robust analyses suggested that the findings are not driven by any latent 
endogeneity and sample selection bias issues.  
    It is possible that the relationships that this chapter reports between banks’ CGI and EC are 
being driven by a reverse causality or by a latent variable (Ntim et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2015). 
Prior CG studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2015; Jian et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013) address this 
endogeneity issues by using a 2SLS approach, and so the chapter adopts similar method. 
However, choosing an appropriate instrument for a 2SLS model is often a challenge (Jian et 
al., 2015). Previous research used one or two-year lagged levels of CGI as primary instrument 
(e.g., Choi et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015). Similarly, the study proposes that lagged CGI could 
be appropriate instruments for the analysis. This is because the study anticipate that CGI is 
endogenous, lagged CGI is used as instrumental variable for the endogenous CGI. In each of 
the Models, the Durbin score and Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests are used to check the 
appropriateness of using the 2SLS approach. The results of the Durbin score and Wu-Hausman 
statistics show large P-values in the three models, which suggest that the study fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous. 
    Specifically, the endogeneity tests results confirm that the CGI variable in all the models are 
exogenous, suggesting that the OLS estimates are reliable. Due to the lagged variables, the 
number of observations were reduced to 1820 in the 2SLS regressions. In the first stage 
regression, the study tests whether the instruments used are weak. The results in all the models 
show that, the partial R-square which measures the correlation between the CGI and lagged 
CGI variables are high (partial R-sq. > 0.730). In addition, the F-statistics are also much higher 
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than the critical values in all the models. Thus, the test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are weak, suggesting that the instruments have good explanatory power for the 
endogenous CGI.  
    The results in Table 5.6 show that the coefficients of CGI on TPAY, EPAY and NPAY are 
negative and significant (see Models 1 to 3), thereby suggesting that the evidence that CGI has 
negative impact on EC is robust to latent endogeneities that may stem from missing variables. 
More importantly, the results are consistent with the OLS regression (see Table 5.1), which 
confirms that H1a to H1c hold regardless of the regression approach employed. Specifically, 
the broad CGI has negative and significant association with all the three individual components 
of EC, TPAY, EPAY and NPAY, respectively in Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6: Effect of CGI on EC using 2SLS and lagged structure models with clustered errors 
Robust Test 2SLS Model Lagged Model 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
     TPAY 
       (1) 
 EPAY 
    (2) 
NPAY 
   (3) 
 TPAY 
   (4) 
EXPAY 
  (5) 
NPAY 












Bank-level controls       





















































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 1820 1820 1820 2026 2026 2026 
R-square    0.697 0.571 0.531 
Partial R-squared 0.796 0.7359 0.736    
F-sta 4948.25 4948.25 4948.25    
Endogeneity 0.029 0.801 0.642    
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS and lagged regression results on the effect CGI on EC. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and *    indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. 
Variables are defined as follows: Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate 
governance disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) 
and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
    Although, the endogeneity test results of the 2SLS estimates confirm that the CGI variable 
in all the models are exogenous, the study followed prior CG studies (e.g., McGuinness et al., 
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2017; Choi et al., 2013; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010), who similarly conducted a 2SLS 
approach so as to make the findings comparable. 
    The study conducted an additional investigation based on lag effect. Theory and evidence 
suggest that there is a time lag in the CGI-EC relationship in which this year’s CGI structures 
may be associated with next year’s EC (e.g., Ntim et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013; Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010). This is based on the argument that, decisions made by the board of banks may 
have a gestation period. The implication is that the potential benefit of good corporate 
governance disclosures on executive pay may not materialize in the year of implementation but 
may be seen in the subsequent year. For example, when the CEO and chairperson roles are 
split, this may not impact on executive compensation in the same year (Albassam, 2014). 
Following prior research (e.g., McGuinness et al., 2017; Ntim et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013), 
endogeneity issues that may be caused by probable time lags between the implementation of 
CGI and EC are controlled for by re-estimating Eq. (6), with one-year lagged structure as 





CGIit‐1 + β2FSIZit‐1 + β3LEVit ‐1 + β4AGEit‐1 +β5CAPit‐1 +
   β
6
AFSit‐1 + β7R&Dit‐1 + β8YDUit + β9CDUit + εt                                                      [Eqn 14] 
   
    Models 4 to 6 of Table 5.7 provide the regression results of the lagged structure. The results 
in Table 5.7 show that the coefficients of CGI on TPAY, EPAY and NPAY are negative and 
significant across all the models in the lagged structure. This suggests that the findings in Table 
5.1 are robust to estimating lagged CGI-EC model. Hence, the results of the lagged test are 
consistent with the findings un-lagged structure reported earlier in Table 5.1. These findings 
demonstrate that the CGI is a dominant factor in determining EC in the ESSA banks. 
    Additionally, the study conducts 2SLS robust analysis focusing on the two sub-groups; 
better- governed and poorly-governed banks. The six regression Models in Table 5.2 are 
repeated using 2SLS estimation approach, and the results are presented in Table 5.7. For each 
regression, CGI is assumed to be endogenous. Following prior studies (e.g., Choi et al., 2015; 
Ntim et al., 2015), a one-year lagged scores of CGI and the control variables are used as 
instruments. In each of the Models, the Durbin score and Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests are 





Table 5.7: Break sample investigation of the impact of CGI on EC based on 2SLS approach 
with clustered errors 
Break sample analysis Better-governed banks-2SLS Poorly-governed banks-2SLS 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
       TPAY 
        (1) 
EPAY 
  (2) 
NPAY 
  (3) 
TPAY 
  (4) 
EPAY 
  (5) 
NPAY 
  (6) 












Bank-level controls       




















































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 963 963 963 720 720 720 
Partial R-squared 0.759 0.759 0.759 0.778 0.778 0.777 
F-sta 2911.77 2911.77 2911.77 2400.25 2400.25 2400.25 
Endogeneity 0.106 0.201 0.444 0.773 0.875 0.622 
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS results on the effect of CGI on EC. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the 
coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Variables are defined as 
follows: Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate governance disclosure 
index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size 
(AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
    The results of the Durbin score and Wu-Hausman statistics show large P-values in the six 
models, which suggest that the study fail to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are 
exogenous. The results reported in Models 1 through to 6 are consistent with those reported in 
the main results in Table 5.2. More importantly, the sign of the coefficients and the significance 
levels are comparable. For example, the CGI has negative and strong significant association 
with all the individual components of EC; TPAY, EPAY and NPAY in better-governed banks 
in Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. However, the results in Models 4, 5 and 6 of Table 5.7 show 
that, the CGI has negative but weak association with TPAY, EPAY and NPAY, respectively. 
    In additional regression with regards to the sub-sample, the study conducts lag effect analysis 
where a current-year’s EC is explained by prior year’s CGI and control variables in line with 
prior CG studies (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; McGuinness et al., 2017; Ntim et al., 2015; 
Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). Similarly, following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), the study 
estimates a lagged CGI-EC structure in order to additionally address potential endogeneity 
issues, in which case CGI and EC may be simultaneously determined, instead of the implicit 
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theoretical and empirical assumption that CGI impacts on EC. The results are provided in 
Models 1 to 6 of Table 5.8. The results in all the six Models are similar and comparable to the 
earlier findings reported in Table 5.2. For example, CGI has negative and significant effect on 
TPAY, EPAY and NPAY in Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively, suggesting that in well-governed 
banks, the link between EC and CGI is negative. However, the results in Models 4 to 6 show 
that CGI has negative but weak association with TPAY, EPAY and NPAY, respectively. This 
shows that the findings are robust to estimating a lagged EC-CGI model. 
 
Table 5.8: Break sample analysis of the effect of CGI on EC using lagged structure with 
clustered errors 
Break sample analysis Better-governed banks-Lagged Poorly governed banks-Lagged 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
         TPAY 
            (1) 
EPAY 
  (2) 
NPAY 
  (3) 
TPAY 
  (4) 
EPAY 
  (5) 
NPAY 

































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 1165 1165 1165 860 860 860 
R-squared 0.573 0.506 0.679 0.408 0.412 0.312 
Notes: This table presents the lagged regression results on the effect of CGI on EC. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Variables 
are defined as follows: Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), corporate 
governance disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) 
and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
    With regards to robust check on the effect of EC on SBD, the study accounted for potential 
endogeneity problems by employing a 2SLS approach. Consistent with prior literature, the 
study adopted a one-year lagged value of the EC and all the control variables as instrumental 
variables (e.g., Platonova et al., 2018; Ntim & Soobaroyem, 2013). The result of the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of exogenous variables in some of the Models. 
Hence, the study concludes that OLS results may be biased and inconsistent. Accordingly, the 
study re-estimates Eq. (7) using 2SLS to deal with any potential endogeneity between EC and 
SBD.       
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    Specifically, the seven regression results in Table 5.3 are repeated using 2SLS approach, and 
the results are presented in Table 5.9. It is also noteworthy that, the results are consistent with 
the findings reported in Table 5.3. For example, TPAY has inverse relationship with all the 
SBD variables across the seven Models except in Model 4 where the association is 
insignificant. 
 
Table 5.9:  Effect of EC measures on SBD using 2SLS regression with clustered errors 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
     SBD 
    (1) 
     ENV 
     (2) 
 SOC 
  (3) 
HAS 
  (4) 
  EHR 


















































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 1820 
Partial R-sq 0.5131 0.630 0.513 0.504 0.554 0.504 0.554 
F-sta 772.83 735.17 755.18 772.83 735.18 735.18 735.18 
Endogeneity 0.139 0.119 0.450 0.818 0.171 0.721 0.029 
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS regression results on the effect of the individual EC variables on the individual dimensions of SBD. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by country and time. Variables are defined as follows: Sustainable Banking Disclosure (SBD), Environmental score 
(ENV), Social investment and service quality score (SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and 
human rights score (EHR), employee score (EMP), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay 
(TPAY). ), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). 
Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 
    Similarly, EPAY has a positive association with all the seven dimensions of SBD reported in 
Table 5.9. However, in Models 2 and 4 the relationships are weak as they are statistically 
insignificant. Finally, the results in Models 1 to 7 reveal that TPAY has an inverse association 
with all the SBD scores. However, the negative association in Models 2 and 7 are statistically 
insignificant. Thus, the 2SLS estimated coefficients are comparable to those from OLS 
regression results in Table 5.3 and the significance levels are also consistent. This observations 
suggest that, the results of the 2SLS test are consistent and reaffirm the main findings in the 
OLS analysis as reported in Table 5.3. 
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    The study deepens analysis on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity by considering lag effect. 
Importantly, to check potential simultaneity issues that may originate from possible lag effect 
between the EC and SBD, the study follows prior studies (e.g., McGuinness et al., 2017; Choi 
et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), and introduce a one-year lag between SBD and EC in 
which present years’ SBD depends on last years’ EC (t-1 effect) in Eq. (7) below: 
 
SBDit = 0 + β1EPAYit‐1 + β2NPAYit‐1 + β3TPAYit‐1 + β4FSIZit ‐1 + β5LEVit ‐1 +
β
6
AGEit‐1 +β7CAPit ‐1 + β8AFSit ‐1+ β9R&Dit‐1 + β10YDUit + β11CDUit + εt                  [Eqn 15] 
 
    The results of the lagged structure reported in Table 5.10 offer additional support for those 
reported in Table 5.3. Similarly, results in Table 5.10 point out the importance of executive pay 
(EPAY) in encouraging sustainable banking disclosures in the ESSA region. Specifically, 
EPAY has a positive association with all the seven dimensions of SBD reported in Table 5.10 
except in Models 2 and 4 where the relationships are statistically insignificant. All in all, the 
evidence offers strong support for hypothesis H2d. 
 




  SBD 
  (1) 
   ENV 
     (2) 
  SOC 
  (3) 
  HAS 
   (4) 
   EHR 
    (5) 
   CIV 
















































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 
R-squared 0.535 0.513 0.618 0.589 0.612 0.522 0.517 
Notes: This table presents the lagged regression results on the effect of EC on SBD. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Variables 
are defined as follows: Sustainable Banking Disclosure (SBD), Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service quality score 
(SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and human rights score (EHR), employee score (EMP), 
Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY). ), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), 




    However, the results for TPAY and NPAY run counter to hypothesis H2e and H2f, 
respectively. The analysis reported in the table 5.10 shows that TPAY has inverse relationship 
with all the SBD variables across the seven Models. But the results indicate the absence of a 
significant negative TPAY effect on health and safety score. Nonetheless, the results reaffirm 
the earlier findings of TPAY on SBD in the OLS regression model. Likewise, the results in 
Models 1 to 7 reveal that NPAY has an inverse association with all the SBD scores. However, 
the negative association in Models 2 and 7 are weak as they were found to be statistically 
insignificant. These confirm that the evidence is robust to estimating of lagged EC-SBD 
structure.  
    Finally, following Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and consistent with prior CG, EC, and SBD 
studies (e.g., McGuinness et al., 2017; Ntim et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013), the study performs 
two additional analysis to investigate possible endogeneities by assessing a lagged CGI-PSS 
structure and 2SLS approach. To address simultaneity issues resulting from the occurrence of 
a lagged CGI-PSS structure, the study includes a one-year between SBD and EC*CGI in which 
present years’ SBD depends on last years’ EC*CGI. Table 5.11 provides the results of the 
moderating effect of CGI on the EC-SBD nexus using 2SLS and lagged models. The positive 
coefficient of EPAY *CGI on SBD (0.029, t = 4.09) in Model 2 and EPAY*CGI on SBD 
(0.024, t = 4.216) in Model 5 are noticeable in Table 5.11. The results are therefore consistent 
with those provided in Model 2 of Table 5.4. This suggest that the evidence is robust to 
estimating of 2SLS and lagged EC*CGI-SBD models. The other results reported in Table 5.11 
are also consistent with those provided in Table 5.4.  
         
Table 5.11: Moderation effect of CGI on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity using 2SLS 
and lagged models with clustered errors 
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   (1)  
 SBD 
   





































EPAY*CGI  0.029*** 
(4.09) 
  0.024*** 
(4.216) 
 
EPAY  1.987*** 
(4.879) 
  1.713*** 
(3.541) 
 
NPAY*CGI   0.001 
(0.53) 
   0.001 
(0.283) 
NPAY   -0.897*** 
(3.547) 
  -0.745*** 
(2.624) 























































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1820 1820 1820 2026 2026 2026 
R-square    0.361 0.382 0.411 
Partial R-sq 0.621 0.679 0.782    
F-sta 708.10 1252.96 1705.4    
Endogeneity 0.152 0.432 0.265    
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS and lagged regression results on the moderating effect of CGI on the EC-SBD nexus. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered by country and time. Variables are defined as follows: Sustainable Banking Disclosure (SBD), Environmental score (ENV), Social 
investment and service quality score (SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and human rights 
score (EHR), employee score (EMP), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), ), an 
interaction between EPAY and CGI (EPAY*CGI), an interaction between NPAY and CGI (NPAY*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization 
(CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are 
provided in Table 4.4. 
    Also, Table 5.12 provides the 2SLS analysis based on the break sample. The results are 
comparable with the findings reported in Table 5.5, that the positive moderating effect of 
EPAY*CGI on SBD is higher in well-governed banks than in poorly-governed counterparts. 
Specifically, the EPAY*CGI moderating impact in Model 2 of Table 5.12 is positive and 
significantly higher in magnitude (0.036) than the EPAY*CGI positive moderation (0.003) in 
Model 5 of Table 5.12. The evidence is thus consistent with the OLS results in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.12: A 2SLS regression of the moderating effect of CGI on the pay-for-sustainability 
sensitivity in sub-sample with clustered errors 
Break sample Better-governed banks Poorly-governed banks 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
  SBD    
   (1) 
 SBD 
  (2) 
SBD 
(3) 
  SBD 



























EPAY*CGI  0.036*** 
(4.76) 
  0.003* 
(1.838) 
 
EPAY  2.589*** 
(3.547) 
  1.357*** 
(3.148) 
 
NPAY*CGI   0.001 
(0.26) 
  0.024 
(0.663) 
NPAY   -0.687*** 
(2.897) 
  -0.132*** 
(3.854) 
























































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 963 963 963 720 720 720 
Partial R-sq 0.643 0.771 0.773 0.602 0.694 0.294 
F-sta 553.59 1034.84 1045.72 344.87 530.43 802.31 
Endogeneity 0.979 0.637 0.877 0.302 0.634 0.500 
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS regression results on effect CGI on the EC-SBD nexus. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. 
Variables are defined as follows: Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay (NPAY), 
Total directors pay (TPAY), an interaction between EPAY and CGI (EPAY*CGI), an interaction between NPAY and CGI (NPAY*CGI), Firm 
size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   
of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
       
    Likewise, the study follows prior studies (e.g., McGuinness et al., 2017; Ntim et al., 2015; 
Choi et al., 2013) to test for potential lag effect in the moderating effect of CGI on the pay-for-
sustainability sensitivity (PSS) in the sub-sample by re-estimating Eq. (8) and including a one-
year lag between  the interaction variable CGI*EC and the SBD as captured in Eq. (16) below:  
 




+    CONTROLSit‐1)                                    [Eqn 16] 
 
    Table 5.13 reports the findings of lagged structure on the moderating impact of EC*CGI on 
SBD. Results in Table 5.13 indicate that banks with higher CGI values (better-governed banks) 
tend to have higher positive and significant (0.028) EPAY*CGI moderating effect on SBD, 
whilst the positive moderating effect of EPAY*CGI on SBD is significantly lower (0.013) in 
poorly-governed banks (i.e., banks with lower CGI values). These findings are similar to the 
original OLS results reported in Table 5.5, suggesting that the EC*CGI analysis is robust to 
lagged structure. The results suggest that CGI positively and significantly moderates the 
executive directors pay-for-sustainability sensitivity in ESSA banks.  
    Similar to earlier findings, the study finds positive but insignificant association between 
NPAY*CGI and SBD, suggesting that the moderating effect of CGI on the NPAY-SBD nexus 
is weak. This does not offer empirical support for H3b. By contrast and similarly, the results in 
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Table 5.13 shows that, the moderating effect of CGI on the TPAY*SBD nexus is negative and 
insignificant. Thus, H3c is rejected. In general, the inference of the robust analyses show that 
the findings are not driven by any probable endogeneity problems. 
Table 5.13: Effect of CGI moderating effect on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity based on 
lagged model with clustered errors 
Break sample Better- governed banks-lagged Poorly-governed banks-lagged 
Dependent Variable 
Model 
    SBD    
     (1)  
 SBD 
  (2)  
SBD 
(3) 
     SBD 


























        (2.985) 
EPAY*CGI  0.028*** 
(2.661) 
  0.013*** 
(2.137) 
 
EPAY  2.457** 
(2.364) 
  1.301*** 
(4.258) 
 
NPAY*CGI    0.001 
(0.983) 
             0.325 
(1.459) 
NPAY   -0.557*** 
(2.875) 
  -0.148*** 
(3.587) 






















































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1165 1165 1165 860 860 860 
R-squared 0.508 0.682 0.579 0.322 0.256 0.246 
Notes: This table presents the lagged regression results on the effect of CGI on the EC-SBD nexus. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and 
time. Variables are defined as follows: Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), Executive directors pay (EPAY), Non-executive directors pay 
(NPAY), Total directors pay (TPAY), an interaction between EPAY and CGI (EPAY*CGI), an interaction between NPAY and CGI 
(NPAY*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size 
(AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 







    Overall, Fig 3.6 presents the actual conceptual framework obtained after investigating the 
association among corporate governance disclosure index, executive compensation and 
sustainable banking disclosures in the ESSA banks. It shows how broad corporate governance 
disclosure index  can  limit all the individual components of executive compensation variables: 
executive directors pay, non-executive directors pay and total pay of all directors as explained 
by the hypotheses (H1a- H1c). It also shows how executive compensation increases sustainable 
banking disclosures  as suggested in the hypotheses (H2a-H2f). 
    Finally, Fig 3.6 shows how corporate governance disclosure index interacts with executive 
directors pay to enhance the executive directors pay-for-sustainability sensitivity in the ESSA 
banking sector as highlighted in the hypotheses (H3a). However, the study finds that, the 
interaction of corporate governance disclosure index with non-executive pay (CGI*NPAY) has 
no significant influence on sustainable banking disclosure score and thus, H3b is rejected. Also, 
the study does not document any significant impact of the interaction of corporate governance 
disclosure index and total directors pay (CGI*TPAY) on sustainable banking disclosure score 
in the ESSA region. Accordingly, H3c is also rejected.
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 Empirical results on the association among CGI, SBD and FP 
    This chapter focuses on providing empirical results on the association among corporate 
governance disclosure index, executive compensation and sustainable banking disclosures in 
the ESSA banks. Specifically, section 6.1 provides the results on the association between 
corporate governance disclosure index and sustainable banking disclosures. In section 6.2, the 
study presents the results on the influence of sustainable banking disclosures on financial 
performance of banks in ESSA region. Finally, section 6.3 provides the estimation results on 
the moderating effect of corporate governance disclosure index on the sustainability-for-
performance sensitivity in the ESSA banks. 
6.1 The empirical findings of the effect of corporate governance disclosures on SBD 
    Prior research indicates that good CG mechanisms can lead to a reduction of agency conflicts 
by enhancing the monitoring role of the board. Increased managerial monitoring capacity has 
been suggested to be associated with increased SBD activities (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). To 
test this, the study examines the impact of CGI on SBD in ESSA banking system. Table 6.1 
provides the results of the effect of CG disclosure index (CGI) covering 4 main aspects 
obtained from 100 CG provisions, on SBD as captured in Eq.(9). 
 
Table 6.1: Effect of corporate governance disclosure index on sustainable banking 




  (1) 
Better-governed  
      (2) 
Poorly-governed 
        (3) 
 
 
Corporate governance index: 
CGI  0.047*** 
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Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  
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Country effect Yes Yes Yes  
R-squared 0.413 0.490 0.621  
No. of observations 2027 1166 861  
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the impact of CGI on SBD. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. Variables 
are defined as follows: Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), Corporate governance disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization 
(CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are 
provided in Table 4.4. 
    Noticeably, the coefficients of CGI on SBD (0.047) in Model 1 of Table 6.1 is positive and 
statistically significant at 1%. In general, the findings provide strong empirical support for H4a. 
The evidence suggests that the higher the level of CGI of the banks, the higher the SBD 
activities they engage in. This result is also consistent with other studies that document a 
positive effect of CGI on SBD (e.g., Platonova et al., 2018; Jizi et al., 2014). 
    After examining the effect of CGI on SBD in the whole sample and in drilling deeper, the 
study divided the sample into two sub-groups. Specifically, the analysis reported in Models 2 
and 3 reflect two sub-sample: one for CGI score below the average value of the banks (mean 
< 64%), and another for CGI score above the mean score of the banks (mean > 64%). The study 
defines well-governed and poorly-governed banks in accordance with Elmagrhi et al. (2020).  
The first sub-group referred to as well-governed banks are banks having a CGI value above the 
average score of 64%. The second sub-group denoted as poorly-governed banks are banks with 
a CGI score lower than the mean value of 64% as applied by Elmagrhi et al. (2020). This was 
done to provide deeper understanding about the data (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). The findings are 
provided in Models 2 and 3 of Table 6.1. Concerning well-governed banks, the coefficients of 
the CGI on the SBD is positive and statistically significant at (1%). The coefficient is also high 
in magnitude (0.254). This evidence offer further strong empirical support for H4a. Although 
the coefficients of the CGI on the SBD for poorly-governed banks is also positive, however, it 
is statistically significant at 10%, and it is also much lower in magnitude (0.004). These results 
imply that H4a is empirically reinforced. 
    The related positive coefficient of the CGI on SBD is higher in magnitude as well as in terms 
of significance in Model 2 than in Model 3. This supports the argument that well-governed 
banks tend to substantially undertake SBD activities than poorly-governed banks. The 
inference is that, on average, better-governed banks tend to actively engage in more SBPs 
agenda. Overall, the positive effect of the CGI lends empirical support for the recommendations 
of the Combined Code in ESSA countries. Theoretically, the evidence confirms the prediction 
of AT, SHT and NIT, indicating that under poor governance conditions (AT), managers may 
employ charity approach to gain endorsement and respect from local business leaders 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985). However, under good CG conditions (NIT), managers tend to fortify the 
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existence of the banks and earn social acceptance by engaging in SBD initiatives such as 
contributing to the well-being and prosperity of the society (Khan, 2010). Similarly, from SHT 
perspective, better-governed banks will engage in more SBD initiatives as reliable means of 
showing their CG quality to their stakeholders (Beekes & Brown, 2006). 
    Next, the SBD consists of six different dimensions, as such it is probable for the impact of 
the CGI on each of dimensions to vary, with some possibly exhibiting strong associations with 
the CGI and others demonstrating weak connections (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Hence, to 
examine the association between each of the SBD dimensions and the CGI, the study re-
estimates Eq. (9) by replacing the SBD with ENV, SOC, HAS, EHR, CIV or EMP scores one 
at a time, and the results are reported in Models 1-6 of Table 6.2, respectively.  
    Similarly, the apparent sensitivity of the evidence in Table 6.2 suggests that, the CGI-SBD 
link can vary based on the SBD dimension employed. For example, CGI has positive 
association with SOC, HAS and EMP. Further, the results show that the link between CGI and 
HAS is generally strong, followed by EMP and SOC, respectively. The findings of the analysis 
support H4c, H4d and H4g, respectively. These findings suggest that, CGI promote social, 
health and safety, and employee disclosures in the ESSA banks. The evidence also confirms 
the theoretical frameworks explained in section 3 that predict a positive association between 
CGI and SOC, HAS and EMP in the ESSA banking system. Thus, it can be inferred that the 
higher the level of internal governance disclosures, the better the ESSA bank’s performance in 
SOC, HAS and EMP dimensions of SBD. 
    With regards to the relationship between CGI and the individual disclosure level of 
individual dimensions of SBD, the other results are inconsistent with the hypotheses of the 
study as the investigation results detect no significant associations. Specifically, contrary to the 
theoretical prediction and the expectation of the Combined CG Code in ESSA countries, the 
study finds no significant association between CGI and ENV, EHR and CIV dimensions of 
SBD. These findings do not offer empirical support for H4b, H4e and H4f. This suggests that 
internal corporate governance disclosure index does not impact on these dimensions of SBD in 
the ESSA banks.  
    Regarding control variables, as predicted it was observed that firm size has negative and 
significant relationship with the SBD scores in all the Models except in Model 3. This suggests 
that large banks have stronger motive to engage in SBD activities (Kabir & Thai, 2017). In 
addition, large banks assume more activities with greater impact on society (Khan, 2010). 
Hence, stakeholders in society tend to scrutinize larger banks, therefore, they would be under 
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much greater pressure to engage and report their SBD activities to legitimize their business 
(Khan, 2010). 
 
Table 6.2: Effect of CGI on the individual dimensions of SBD with clustered errors 
Dependent Variable (1) ENV (2) SOC (3) HAS (4) EHR (5) CIV (6) EMP 

































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 2027 
R-squared 0.269 0.368 0.314 0.217 0.205 0.371 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the impact of CGI on SBD sub-indices. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and 
time. Variables are defined as follows: Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service quality score (SOC), Health and safety 
score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and human rights score (EHR), employee score (EMP), Corporate governance 
disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit 
firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 
     Leverage does not appear to be significantly related to SBD. This is consistent with similar 
findings of prior banking studies (e.g., Jizi et al., 2014; Khan, 2010; Reverte, 2009). However, 
the evidence is contrary to the suggestion that highly geared banks disclose more SBD 
information to give surety to the creditors that management are less likely to evade their 
covenant claims (Khan, 2010; Schipper, 1981), and to meet the needs of lenders (Cooke, 1989). 
    Consistent with the expectation that older banks may be involved in higher SBD 
engagements due to their long-standing relationship with their stakeholders, the results show 
that age has positive and significant relationship with SBD across all the models except in 
Models 1 and 4. This evidence supports the view that more established and older banks disclose 
extensive SBD with higher application levels (Orazalin, 2019). However, the results for CAP 
show negative and significant relationships in the Models except Model 3. The implication is 
that, the assertion that better-capitalized banks provide more SBD projects to reduce the 
information asymmetry between the bank and external stakeholders is not supported in ESSA, 
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which is contrary to the findings of Siueia et al. (2019).  In line with the expectation of the 
study, the coefficient on R&D is positive and significant in all the models except in Model 5. 
These findings are similar to the findings of Jo and Harjoto (2012). Finally, the coefficient on 
audit firm size in the models in Table 6.2 show the predicted sign as there is positive and 
significant relationship between AFS and the SBD proxies across all the models except in 
Models 1, 4 and 5. 
 
6.2 The results relating to sustainable banking disclosure-performance nexus 
    The empirical results of the impact of sustainable banking disclosure (SBD) and bank-
specific control variables on financial performance (FP) of ESSA banks are contained in Model 
1 to Model 4 of Table 6.3 as captured in Eq. (10).  
 
Table 6.3: The effect of SBD on financial performance with clustered errors 
Dependent Variable (1) ROA (2) ROA (3) ROE (4) ROE 




























































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2027 2027 2027 2027 
R-squared 0.302 0.398 0.301 0.389 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect of sustainable banking disclosures on financial performance. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered by country and time. Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity, Sustainable banking disclosure, 
Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service quality score (SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score 
(CIV); Ethics and human rights score (EHR), employee score (EMP), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), 




   
  Specifically, Table 6.3 provides the results of four models regarding ROA (Models 1 and 2) 
and ROE (Models 3 and 4). The evidence in Model 1 shows that, SBD has a positive and 
significant relationship with ROA. This evidence is consistent with the proposed hypothesis 
H5a. It also confirms the theoretical arguments proposed by Mellahi et al. (2016), suggesting 
that SBD initiatives undertaken out by banks may have a long-term effect on FP of banks. The 
positive effect of SBD on FP may be due to the positive impact of SBD initiatives on the 
reputation of the banks in the region. Subsequently, banks that are more sustainability active 
tend to potentially enhance their customer loyalty (Platonova et al., 2018). In addition, 
sustainability conscious banks may obtain the support of a much broader variety of 
stakeholders (Platonova et al., 2018; Kabir & Thai, 2017), thereby positively improving the FP 
of the banks. Also, the positive and significant empirical results may also indicate that investors 
take into consideration banks’ SBD initiatives (Platonova et al., 2018). 
    However, noticeably the results in Model 3 of Table 6.3 show a positive coefficient on the 
SBD, but insignificant. This does not offer empirical support for H5a. Nevertheless, this lends 
support for the findings of prior investigation that suggest that there is a positive, but weak 
direct relationship between composite SBD and FP (e.g., Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Cai et al., 
2012). The results confirm findings of prior studies that suggest that SBD investments can help 
reduce unnecessary risks, avoid waste and, improve energy and material efficiency (e.g., 
Emerton & Jones, 2019; Székely & Knirsch, 2005), thereby enhancing FP of banks. 
    In line with the suggestion of some researchers (e.g., Platonova et al., 2018; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999), who propose that, it is crucial to focus on individual dimensions of SBD when 
examining the impact of SBD on FP, suggesting that ‘explanatory information is lost’ when 
only aggregate measure of SBD is used. Hence, additional analysis of the SBD-FP nexus was 
conducted based on the six individual SBD dimensions by re-estimating Eq. (10) while 
replacing the SBD with individual dimensions. 
    Model 2 of Table 6.3 presents the estimation results of the effect of the six dimensions of 
SBD on ROA. It is evident that SOC and EHR have positive relationship with ROA as 
predicted. These results are consistent with the proposed hypothesis H5c and H5e, respectively. 
Although EMP has a positive association with ROA, the relationship is insignificant, and thus 
H5g is not empirically supported. Similarly, SOC, EHR and EMP have positive and significant 
relationship with ROE, thereby offering empirical support for H5c, H5e and H5g. These 
findings are consistent with the evidence of Scholtens (2009) who documents that ethical and 
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employee’s dimensions of SBD have positive effect on FP. Theoretically, the evidence is 
consistent with the predictions of NIT perspective, which stresses on legitimation and 
efficiency reasons for banks to engage in SBD initiatives (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). The 
ability of banks to deliver superior service is dependent on recruiting and retaining employees 
with appropriate talent and skills. For example, banks that adopt good employee practices may 
improve efficiency and FP by attracting highly skilled labour, motivating employees and 
creating a bonding mechanism for them (Bhattacharya et al., 2008).  
    From RDT perspective, by engaging and disclosing ethics and human rights practices, banks 
may increase customer loyalty, which can increase business through gaining access to key 
resources, such as finance, contracts and deposit (Haque & Ntim, 2020). EMP disclosures can 
also help towards increasing employee motivation, productivity and loyalty, hiring of good 
employees and reducing employee turnover (Kabir & Thai, 2017). Within SHT framework, 
compliance with ethics and human rights in banks due to either coercive or regulative 
institutional pressures in the form of increased EHR practices can improve the legitimacy of 
bank operations and services by enhancing their reputation. This can positively impact on FP 
of banks. Further, greater commitment to ethically commendable practices, can lead customers’ 
and other stakeholders to perceive the bank as adopting sustainable practices which can 
enhance the reputation of the bank. Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2012) contend that, 
banks with high reputation are associated with stronger profitability and better credit quality of 
borrowers, which tend to increase FP. 
    On the contrary, the results in Models 2 and 4 of Table 6.3 indicate that, ENV has a strong 
and negative relationship with ROE. This evidence does not provide support for H5b. But, its 
association with ROA is negative but insignificant which does not support H5b. Concerning 
the negative association between ENV and FP, some of the empirical studies support the notion 
of a negative relationship between ENV and FP (e.g., Kartadjumena & Rodgers, 2019). They 
explain that environmentally accountable banks incur high expenses that may place such banks 
at greater economic disadvantage compared with less accountable banks (Devinney, 2009), 
hence leading to a negative ENV-FP nexus. Sustainable operations such as environmental 
management involves substantial investment and major modifications of banking operations in 
order to reduce pollution and energy consumption and/or to use renewable sources of energy 
(Albertini, 2013). As these initial environmental investments increase operational costs that 
cannot be incorporated in the product selling prices, they negatively affect FP of banks at least 
in the short-term (Albertini, 2013). In particular, opponents of ENV investments in banking 
contend that being environmentally active through minimising environmental damage can be 
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expensive and give rise to an administrative burden (Barnett & Salomon, 2006), which may 
reduce FP of banks.  
    Next, the results in Model 2 and 4 of Table 6.3 report positive relationship between SOC 
and the two FP proxies ROA and ROE, respectively. Based on SHT, satisfying the needs of 
different groups of stakeholders will lead to enhanced FP due to greater effectiveness and 
efficiency (Platonova et al., 2018). Further, good relationship with key stakeholders can help 
generate valuable goodwill, which will protect banks from unexpected social issues and open 
new prospects, which can lead to an improvement in the FP of banks (Platonova et al., 2018).                 
    On the contrary, the empirical results shown in Table 6.3 report a negative and significant 
relationship between HAS and ROA. Similarly, the table shows that HAS also has negative 
and significant link with ROE, which does not offer empirical support for H5d. 
    Also, CIV has a negative and significant relationship with both ROA and ROE in Models 2 
and 4 of Table 6.3, respectively. These results do not offer empirical support for H5f. 
Opponents of community investments argue that being active in the community through 
engaging in charity projects, supporting and promoting community welfare can be expensive 
and give rise to an administrative burden (Barnett & Salomon, 2006). In order to incur these 
costs, banks will have to forgo competitive investments/products and services. Hence, 
engaging in CIV activities and disclosure may create financial burden for banks, which reduces 
FP.  
    With respect to bank-specific control variables, FSIZ and CAP have negative associations 
with both ROA and ROE, whereas AGE and R&D have positive relationships with ROA. 
These findings are consistent with prior research (e.g., Siueia et al., 2019; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013). Altogether, the estimated results are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Siueia, et al., 
2019; Platonova et al., 2018). For example, the evidence is consistent with Platonova et al. 
(2018) who investigate the SBD-FP nexus, and document positive relationship between SBD 
and FP in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) banks. 
 
6.3 The moderating effect of CG index on the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity 
    Table 6.4 provides the findings of exploring the probable moderating impact of corporate 
governance disclosure index (CGI) on the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity (SPS) in 
the ESSA banking system as captured in Eq. (11). The evidence indicates that CGI significantly 
influences the SPS. The result in Model 1 of Table 6.4 shows that the interaction variable 
CGI*SBD has a positive and significant relationship with ROA. Model 2 of Table 6.4 shows 
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the estimation results concerning the moderation impact of the interaction variable CGI*SBD 
on ROE. Observably, the coefficient of CGI*SBD on ROE is also positive and significant. The 
findings, thus, provide empirical support for H6 that CGI positively moderates the SBD-FP 
link. This evidence suggests that the sustainability-for-performance (SPS) is contingent on the 
quality of banks internal governance structures in the banking system in the ESSA countries. 
 
Table 6.4: The moderating effect of CGI on the sustainability-for-performance link with 
clustered errors 
Dependent Variable        (1) ROA           (2) ROE 










































Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes 
Observations 2027 2027 
R-squared 0.219 0.249 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. 
Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), an interaction 
between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) 
and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 
         
     In a similar vein, after examining the effect of the CGI on the SPS in the entire sample, the 
study conducted further analysis by dividing the sample into two main sub-groups: (i) better-
governed banks (banks with a CGI value more than the average score of 64%); and (ii) poorly-
governed banks (banks with a CGI value lower the mean score of 64%) as applied by Elmagrhi 
et al. (2020). The results in Table 6.5 lend empirical support for H6 that CGI positively 
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moderates the relationship between SBD and FP, with the SPS being stronger in banks with 
high CGI score. The results in Table 6.5 show that the interaction variables CGI*SBD has 
positive and significant influence on the two components of FP (ROA and ROE) in all the four 
Models in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5: Break sample analysis of the moderating effect of CGI on the SBD-FP link with 
clustered errors 
Dependent Variable (1) ROA 

























































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1166 861 1166 861 
R-squared 0.358 0.267 0.301 0.215 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus in the sub-sample. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
country and time. Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), 
an interaction between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and 
development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 
    Of special note, the magnitude of the coefficient of the CGI*SBD on ROA increased from 
0.048 in Model 1 of Table 6.4 (entire sample), to 0.089 in Model 1 of Table 6.5 (better-
governed banks) but decreased in magnitude to 0.002 in Table 6.5 (poorly-governed banks). 
Similar to the results of ROA, the magnitude of the coefficient of the CGI*SBD on ROE also 
increased from 0.055 in Model 2 of Table 6.4 to 0.078 in Model 3 of Table 6.5 but reduced to 
0.001 in Model 4 of Table 6.5, respectively. The implication is that bank-level CGI moderates 
the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity, with the SPS being stronger in banks with high 
CGI score (Elmagrhi et al., 2020). It is evidently observable from the findings that, irrespective 
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of the FP measure employed, the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity has noticeably 
improved in better-governed banks, suggesting that H6 is empirically supported.  
    Theoretically, the findings are consistent with the predictions of NIT, which highlights 
efficiency and legitimation impact of SBD investments on FP in the banking system. The 
implication of the findings is that, in better-governed banks, senior managers are more likely 
to undertake SBD initiatives which can legitimize the banks’ operations. In addition, this 
ensures congruence with stakeholder interest and high-order value (Ntim & Soobaroyem, 2013; 
Aguilera et al., 2007). Based on efficiency NIT purview, the findings indicate that better-
governed banks have greater propensity to undertake more SBD, which enhances corporate 
efficiency and FP. Hence, CGI can act as a crucial positive catalyst on the SPS by minimizing 
conflict of interest among several stakeholders (e.g., Ntim & Soobaroyem, 2013; Jo & Harjoto, 
2011). 
 
6.4. Robustness checks 
    The study conducts additional analyses to check the robustness of the findings. To begin 
with, it is possible that the relationships that the study reports between banks’ CGI and their 
SBD are being driven by a reverse causality or by a latent variable (Jiang et al., 2015). Prior 
studies address this endogeneity issues by using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, 
and so the study adopts similar approach (Jian et al., 2015; Choi et al., 2013). However, 
choosing an appropriate instrument for a 2SLS model is often a challenge (Jian et al., 2015). 
Previous researchers (e.g., Choi et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyem, 2013; Ntim, 2009) used one 
or two-year lagged levels of CG as primary instrument.  
    Similarly, this study proposes that lagged CGI could be appropriate instruments for the 
study. This is because the study anticipates that the CGI is endogenous, and hence a lagged 
CGI is used as instrumental variable for the endogenous CGI variable. In each of the models, 
the Durbin score and Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests are used to assess the appropriateness of 
using the 2SLS approach. The results of the Durbin score and Wu-Hauman statistics show large 
P-values in some of the Models, which suggest that the study fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the variables are exogenous.  
    Firstly, the endogeneity test results confirm that the CGI variable in all the Models are 
exogenous, suggesting that the OLS estimates are reliable. However, the study conducted the 
2SLS estimation approach to make the findings of the thesis comparable to prior studies such 
as Choi et al. (2013) and Brick and Chidambaran (2010). The results in Table 6.6 (Model 1 to 
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Model 3) reveal that the coefficients of CGI on SBD are positive and significant, thereby 
suggesting that the evidence that CGI has positive impact on SBD is robust to latent 
endogeneities that may arise from omitted variables. Further, the results in Table 6.6 are also 
comparable to the findings reported in Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 6.1. For example, the 
coefficient of CGI on SBD in Model 2 (better-governed banks) is higher in magnitude (0.346) 
than the coefficient in Model 3 (poorly-governed banks) of 0.021.  
 




  (1) 
Better-governed  
      (2) 
Poorly-governed 
        (3) 
 
 




















































   Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  
    Country effect Yes Yes Yes  
    Constant 7.221 *** 0.789*** 0.874***  
 (9.619) (8.978) (8.412)  
    Partial R-Sq 0.735 0.634 0.622  
    F-sta 4948.25 214.10 213.93  
    Endogeneity 0.172 0.161 0.176  
    No. of observations 1820 963 720  
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS regression results on the impact of CGI on SBD. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. 
Variables are defined as follows: Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), Corporate governance disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), 
Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables 
used are provided in Table 4.4. 
    Secondly, the endogeneity test results in Table 6.7 confirm that the CGI variables in all the 
Models are exogenous except in Model 5, suggesting that the Ordinary Least Squares estimates 
are reliable. In Model 5 of Table 6.7, the Durbin score and Wu-Hausman statistics have small 
p-values; hence, the test rejects the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous, and the 
study was right in treating CGI as endogenous variable. The implication is that the Ordinary 
Least Squares results may be misleading and that the 2SLS approach should be adopted for the 
analysis (McGuineness et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2013). Due to the lagged variables, the number 
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of observations reduced to 1820 in the 2SLS regressions. In the first stage regression, the study 
tests if the instruments used are weak. The results in all the Models show that, the partial R-
square which measures the correlation between the CGI and lagged CGI variables are high 
(partial R-Sq > 0.630). In addition, the F-statistics are also much higher than the critical values 
in all the Models. Thus, the test rejects the null hypothesis that instruments are weak, 
suggesting that the instruments have good explanatory power for the endogenous CGI variable.  
        
Table 6.7:  Effect of CGI on individual dimensions of SBD nexus using 2SLS regression 
with clustered errors 
Dependent Variable (1) ENV (2) SOC (3) HAS (4) EHR (5) CIV (6) EMP 
Independent 
variables 


































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1820 1820 1810 1820 1820 1820 
Partial R-sq 0.736 0.735 0.736 0.736 0.734 0.735 
F-sta 4948.25 4948.25 4948.25 4948.25 4948.25 4948.25 
Endogeneity 0.355 0.936 0.163 0.789 0.008 0.167 
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS regression results on the impact of CGI on SBD sub-indices. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and 
time. Variables are defined as follows: Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service quality score (SOC), Health and safety 
score (HAS), Community involvement score (CIV); Ethics and human rights score (EHR), employee score (EMP), Corporate governance 
disclosure index (CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) and Audit 
firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
        
    The results in Table 6.7 above reveal that the coefficients of CGI on SOC, HAS and EMP 
are positive and significant, suggesting that the evidence that CGI has positive impact on these 
dimensions of SBD is robust to possible endogeneities that may arise from omitted variables. 
The association between CGI and CIV is positive but insignificant. Similarly, CGI has negative 
but insignificant link with ENV and EHR in Model 1 and 4 of Table 6.7, respectively. In all, 
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the results contained in Models 1 to 6 of Table 6.7 are fairly consistent with the findings 
reported in Table 6.2 (Models 1 to 6). 
    Thirdly, following prior studies and in order to account for a potential endogeneity between 
SBD and FP, the study employs a 2SLS regression with a one-year lagged value of the SBD 
and all the control variables as instrumental variables (e.g., Platonova et al., 2018; Ntim & 
Soobaroyem, 2013). The result of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of 
exogenous variables. Hence, the study concludes that OLS results may be biased and 
inconsistent.       
    The study estimates Eq. (10) using 2SLS to deal with any probable endogeneity between 
SBD and FP. Specifically, Models 1 and 2 of Table 6.8 present the results of the effect of SBD 
on return on assets, whilst Models 3 and 4 of the table provide the impact of SBD on return on 
equity. The result in Model 1 indicates that the coefficient of SBD on ROA is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. However, the result in Model 3 of Table 6.8 shows that, the 
coefficient of SBD on ROE is positive but statistically insignificant as reported in the main 
analysis in Model 3 of Table 6.3. These findings reaffirm the OLS results reported in Table 
6.3. 
    For a deeper analysis, the thesis examines the impact of the various components of SBD 
(ENV, SOC, HAS, EHR, CIV and EMP) on the two components of FP (ROA and ROE) using 
a 2SLS approach. The results these investigations are reported in Table 6.8. In Model 2, the 
results show that both SOC and EHR dimension of SBD have positive and significant influence 
on ROA, whilst HAS is negatively associated with ROA. However, ENV, CIV and EMP have 
no influence on ROA. Also, the results in Model 4 of Table 6.8 indicate that SOC, EHR and 
EMP are positively and significantly associated with ROE, whereas ENV, HAS and CIV have 
negative associations with ROE. Together, the 2SLS reported in Table 6.8 are consistent with 
the main models in Table 6.3 as the estimated coefficients are comparable to those from OLS 
regression results and the significance levels generally comparable. 
 
Table 6.8:  Effect of SBD on FP using 2SLS regression approach with clustered error 
Dependent Variable (1) ROA  (2) ROA (3) ROE (4) ROE 






























































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1820 1820 1820 1820 
 Partial R-squared 0.836 0.579 0.836 0.579 
F-sta 1307.38 188.57 1306.55 188.42 
Endogeneity 0.158 0.029 0.083 0.001 
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS regression results on the effect of sustainable banking disclosures on financial performance. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered by country and time. Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity, Sustainable banking disclosure, 
Environmental score (ENV), Social investment and service quality score (SOC), Health and safety score (HAS), Community involvement score 
(CIV); Ethics and human rights score (EHR), employee score (EMP), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), 
Research and development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 
      Fourth, it has been suggested that it is possible to have a time lag between the possible 
impact of sustainable banking initiatives on financial performance in the banking system. In 
this case, the current years’ SBD may be associated with the following years’ FP (e.g., 
Platonova et al., 2018; Choi et al., 2013). This is because the benefits of sustainable banking 
initiative may not materialise immediately. Further, it also possible for banks with better 
current SBD to improve their internal CG mechanisms in the following year as a way of 
attracting critical resources, as well as to increase their FP (e.g., Hoi et al., 2013; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Chenhall & Moers, 2007). To test simultaneity 
problems that may arise due to the presence of a lagged sustainability-for-performance 
sensitivity (SPS), the study follows prior studies (e.g., Choi et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 




                         FPit = 𝑓 (
CGI SCORESit‐1 
SBD SCORESit‐1
CGI SCORESit‐1 × SBD SCORESit‐1
+    CONTROLSit‐1)         [Eqn 17] 
 
   Where everything remains the same as specified in Eq. (11) except that the study includes a 
one-year between the FP on the left side of the equation and, the interaction variable CGI*SBD 
and other control variables on the right side of the equation. Thus, the current years’ FP of 
banks depends on previous years’ CGI*SBD. The results of the lagged investigations are 
presented in Models 1 and 2 of Table 6.9. The positive coefficient of the interaction variable 
CGI*SBD on both ROA (0.034, t = 1.789) and ROE (0.030, t = 1.744) are noticeable in Model 
1 and 2 of Table 6.9, respectively. Importantly, these findings are consistent with those reported 
in the un-lagged Models 1 and 2 of Table 6.4. The results of the bank-specific control variables 
in Table 6.9 are also reinforced by the results of the bank-specific control variables in Table 
6.4. Specifically, the control variables exhibit the same sign and significance as reported in the 
un-lagged structure. Overall, the similarity of evidence of lagged and un-lagged structures for 
the two models reaffirms that the original evidence of the positive moderation effect of CGI on 
the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity is robust. 
         
Table 6.9: Moderation effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus using lagged regression with 
clustered errors 
Dependent Variable (1) ROA (2) ROE 










































Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes 
Observations 2026 2026 
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R-squared 0.278 0.257 
Notes: This table presents the lagged regression results on the effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and 
time. Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), an interaction 
between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) 
and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 
    Next, in order to account for potential endogeneities that may be caused by omitted variable 
bias, the study employs 2SLS approach as robust test. In particular, the study follows prior 
corporate governance studies that also adopted 2SLS technique to address potential 
endogeneity problems (e.g., Ntim et al., 2019; McGuinness et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2013; Brick 
& Chidambaran et al., 2010). In the regression, the SBD, CGI, and CGI*SBD variables are 
assumed to be endogenous. In the 2SLS regression, a one-year lagged value of the CGI*SBD, 
CGI and SBD variables are used as the instrumental variables as applied by Choi et al. (2013). 
After controlling for endogeneity, the results in Table 6.10 show that the impact of SBD on FP 
is positively and significantly moderated by CGI, and this association is robust to potential 
endogeneities that may arise from omitted variables. Specifically, in Model 1 of Table 6.10, 
the interaction term CGI*SBD has a positive and significant association with ROA (β =0.020, 
t = 2.72). Similarly, the results in Model 2 of Table 6.10 indicate that, the interaction term 
CGI*SBD is positively and significantly associated with ROE (β =0.025, t = 3.94). The 
evidence is consistent with that of the Ordinary Least Squares regression results reported in 
Table 6.4, which confirms that H6 holds regardless of the regression method employed. 
Table 6.10: Moderation effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus using 2SLS regression with 
clustered errors 
Dependent Variable        (1) ROA                (2) ROE 










































Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes 
Observations 1820 1820 
Partial R-sq 0.726 0.725 
F-stat 1491.69 1490.80 
Endogeneity 0.203 0.029 
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS regression results on the effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and time. 
Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), an interaction 
between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and development (R&D) 
and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
 
    Again, the study conducts additional regression with regards to the sub-sample (better-
governed banks and poorly-governed banks). Similarly, the study conducts a lag effect analysis 
where a current-year’s FP is explained by prior year’s interaction variable SBD*CGI and the 
control variables in line with prior CG studies (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2020; McGuinness et al., 
2017; Ntim et al., 2015; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). The results are provided in Models 1 to 6 
of Table 6.11. The results in all the four Models are similar and comparable to the earlier 
findings reported in Table 6.5. For example, there is a positive and significant impact of the 
interaction variable SBD*CGI on both ROA and ROE in Models 1 to Model 4. More 
importantly, the results in Models 1 to 4 of Table 6.11 show that, the moderation effect of CGI 
on the SBD-FP nexus is higher in magnitude in the Model 1 (0.092) and Model 3 (0.081) for 
better-governed banks than in Model 2 (0.001) and Model 4 (0.002) in the case of poorly-
governed banks. This shows that the findings are robust to estimating a lagged structure. 
 
Table 6.11: Break sample analysis of the moderating effect of CGI on the SBD-FP link using 
lagged structure with clustered errors 
Dependent Variable (1) ROA 

















































































Constant -1.425*** -1.687*** 0.358*** 0.564*** 
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(4.568) (3.684) (3.284) (2.874) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1165 860 1165 860 
R-squared 0.326 0.259 0.324 0.256 
Notes: This table presents the lagged regression results on the effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus in the sub-sample. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
country and time. Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), 
an interaction between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and 
development (R&D) and Audit firm size (AFS). Full definitions   of variables used are provided in Table 4.4. 
  
    Also, the study estimates Eq. (11) in the sub-sample using 2SLS approach to deal with any 
probable endogeneity between the interaction variable SBD*CGI and FP. The result of this 
investigation is provided in Table 6.12. Similarly, the results in Table 6.12 suggest that, the 
interaction variable SBD*CGI has positive and significant effect on ROA (Model 1 and 2) and 
ROE (Model 3 and 4). Likewise, the  moderation effect of CGI on the sustainability-for-
performance in better-governed banks (Models 1 and 3) are higher in magnitude (0.074) in 
Model 1 and (0.083) in Model 3 when compared with that of poorly-governed banks (0.003) 
in Model 2 and 4. Altogether, these findings are consistent with the results of the OLS analysis 
in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.12: Break sample analysis of the moderating effect of CGI on the SBD-FP link using 
2SLS approach with clustered errors 
Dependent Variable (1) ROA 







Independent variables     
SBD 0.005 
(1.09) 














CGI   0.010*** 
(2.854) 
   0.002*** 
(2.75) 
   0.036*** 
(2.98) 
  0.003*** 
(3.42) 

























































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 963 720 963 720 
Partial R-squared 0.754 0.734 0.741 0.698 
F-stat 1498.54 1498.21 1495.34 148.66 
Endogeneity 0.354 0.315 0.068 0.052 
Notes: This table presents the lagged regression results on the effect of CGI on the SBD-FP nexus in the sub-sample. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by 
country and time. Variables are defined as follows: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE), Sustainable banking disclosure (SBD), 
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an interaction between SBD and CGI (SBD*CGI), Firm size (FSIZ), Capitalization (CAP), Leverage (LEV), Age (AGE), Research and 




    Overall, Fig 3.7 presents the actual conceptual framework obtained after investigating the 
association among corporate governance disclosure index, sustainable banking disclosures and 
financial performance in the ESSA banks. It shows how broad corporate governance disclosure 
index (CGI) is associated with an increase in sustainable disclosure index (SBD), social 
investment and service quality score (SOC), health and safety score (HAS) and employee score 
(EMP). This implies that H4a, H4c, H4d and H4g are accepted. However, the study finds no 
significant association between CGI and environmental score (ENV), ethics and human rights 
score (EHR) and community involvement (CIV), hence H4b (0), H4e (0) and H4f (0) are 
rejected. 
    It also shows how sustainable banking disclosure influences the financial performance of 
banks in the ESSA region. Specifically, Fig 3.7 shows that sustainable banking disclosure 
score, social investment and service quality score, ethics and human rights score and employee 
score are positively and significantly associated with the financial performance of banks. These 
suggest that H5a (+), H5c (+), H5e (+) and H5g (+) are accepted. However, Fig 3.7 show that 
environmental score, health and safety score and community involvement score are negatively 
and significantly associated with the financial performance of banks in the ESSA region. These 
suggest that H5b (-), H5d (-) and H5f (-) are rejected.  
    Finally, Fig 3.7 shows how the corporate governance disclosure index interact with 
sustainable banking disclosure score to enhance the sustainability-for-performance sensitivity 
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7 Empirical results on the association among corporate governance, competition and 
bank risk-taking 
    This chapter focuses on providing empirical results on the association among corporate 
governance, competition and bank risk-taking in the ESSA banks. Specifically, section 7.1 
provides the results on the association between corporate governance and bank risk-taking. 
Section 7.2 discusses the empirical findings on the impact of competition on bank risk-taking 
in the ESSA banking system. 
7.1 The empirical findings of the effect of corporate governance on bank risk-taking 
    The internal governance structures of banks play a vital role with regards to controlling, 
monitoring and setting bank risk-taking behaviour (Ozkan, 2007). This implies that corporate 
governance is expected to safeguard the best interest of shareholders and all the other various 
stakeholders (Elmagrhi et al., 2020; Ozkan, 2007). Accordingly, the thesis investigates the 
impact of five key corporate governance structures including independent directors who are 
financial experts, number of board meetings, institutional ownership, government ownership 
and foreign ownership in the ESSA banking system. 
7.2.1 The empirical findings of the effect of corporate governance on bank risk-taking 
    Table 7.1 provides the empirical findings of the influence of various components of 
corporate governance on bank risk-taking. More precisely, Table 7.1 provides the findings 
concerning the impact of board and ownership mechanisms on bank risk-taking (BRT) proxied 
by Z-score, non-performing loans (NPLs), loan-loss provision (LPROV) and capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) as the dependent variables.  
    Firstly, previous research proposes that independent directors who are financial experts 
(EXPERT) may enhance the monitoring capacity of the board (Ntim et al., 2015; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). This can contribute towards reducing agency conflicts and thus prevent 
excessive BRT (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To test this, the study examines the impact of 
EXPERT on BRT. The coefficients of EXPERT on Z-score and LPROV (-0.009 and -0.007) 
in Table 7.1 are negative and statistically significant at 1% respectively. However, the 
coefficients of EXPERT on NPLs and CAR although negative, however they are not 




    The evidence suggests that EXPERT serving on the board is a crucial governance tool that 
can enhance the board supervisory role and help reduce BRT. The evidence is consistent with 
the theoretical prediction of agency theory (AT) that EXPERT have appreciable knowledge 
and understanding of banking transactions which can lead to better oversight and reduce BRT 
(Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2017). The finding is also supported by resource dependence theory 
(RDT) that suggests that banks can benefit from the expertise of EXPERT in terms of early 
spotting of risk and preferring of risk-mitigation solutions. Further, stakeholder theory (SHT) 
suggests that the presence of EXPERT is essential in terms of protecting stakeholders’ rights. 
The result corroborates empirical findings of prior studies which suggest EXPERT encourage 
managers to take less risk (e.g., Drobetz et al., 2018; Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2017). 
    Secondly, the findings in Table 7.1 provides empirical findings on the association between 
the number of board meetings (NBMs) on the four measures of BRT (Z-score, NPLs, LPROV 
and CAR). The results of the investigation reported in Table 7.1 point to the evidence that, the 
NBMs has a negative and statistically significant influence on Z-score and LPROV at 1% 
significance level. These findings partly support H8. However, NBMs has negative but 
insignificant relationship with NPLs and CAR, implying that H8 is not empirically supported.       
From AT perspective, as the NBMs increases, the monitoring activity of the board increases 
which translate into effective supervision and coordination, thereby limiting the scope of 
excessive BRT by managers. In addition, regular board meetings can enable the board to 
provide strategic advice on key investment decisions, as well as help identify valuable 
investment opportunities which can reduce BRT. The evidence confirms the findings of 
previous research that observe a negative link between NBMs and BRT (e.g., Battaglia & 
Gallo, 2017; Dong et al., 2017; Liang et al., 2013). 
    Thirdly, Table 7.1 also provides the findings of OLS regression of ownership variables 
institutional ownership (ISONR) government ownership (GOVNR) and foreign ownership 
(FONR) along with the control variables on BRT in the ESSA region. In connection with 
ownership mechanisms, the findings provided in Table 7.1 indicate that ISONR is negatively 
associated with the BRT. Specifically, ISONR is negatively and statistically associated with Z-
score, NPLs and CAR at 1% respectively. These infer that H9 is empirically supported. But, 
the insignificant impact of LPROV on BRT indicates that H9 is rejected. The results support 
the theoretical prediction. For example, AT explains these findings by suggesting that 
institutional shareholders are better at monitoring senior managers from engaging in excessive 




         Table 7.1: Effect of various components of corporate governance variables on bank risk-taking with clustered errors 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Z-score  NPLs  LPROV  CAR  
 Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
EXPERT -0.009 3.134*** -0.0001 0.219 -0.007 2.189** -0.001 0.067 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.025)  (0.016)  
NBMs -0.336 2.289** -0.040 0.393 -0.743 2.683*** -0.834 0.953 
 (0.147)  (0.119)  (0.396)  (0.875)  
ISONR -0.005 3.795*** -0.003 3.505*** -0.002 0.163 -0.015 2.291** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.007)  
GOVNR 0.003 1.701* 0.007 5.106*** 0.014 0.839 0.002 0.144 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.011)  
FONR 0.005 3.782*** 0.003 3.510*** 0.002 0.157 0.015 2.278** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.007)  
BSIZE 0.231 2.015** 0.113 1.723* 0.306 0.304 1.435 2.277** 
 (0.115)  (0.083)  (0.004)  (0.630)  
BDIVG -0.001 0.533 -0.0003 0.184 -0.017 0.766 -0.008 0.586 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.023)  (0.015)  
FSIZ -0.061 3.775*** -0.004 2.372** -0.171 1.204 -0.027        0.456 
 (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.142)  (0.089)  
   CAP -0.001         0.028 -0.346          2.359** -0.163                0.640 -0.153            1.012 
 (0.001)  (0.146)  (0.815)  (0.139)  
LIQ 0.058 2.716*** 0.136 3.653*** 0.355 2.166** 0.3002 1.678* 
 (0.427)  (0.311)  (0.732)  (0.341)  
AGE 0.111 2.301** 0.007 2.077** 0.074 1.715* 0.151 1.671* 
 (0.048)  (0.003)  (0.421)  (0.264)  
Constant -3.913 8.769*** 1.519 4.823*** 1.182 6.718*** 5.003 2.394** 
YDU Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CDU Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2027  2027  2027  2027  
R-squared 0.448  0.423  0.414  0.467    
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results on the impact of board and bank ownership structures on bank risk-taking proxies. Standard errors are clustered by country and time which are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The definitions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 4.4. Variables are defined as follows: Individual financial directors who are financial experts (EXPERTS), number of board meetings (NBMs), institutional ownership 




    In addition, SHT also predicts that when institutional investor’s stakes increase, there is the 
tendency for them to join forces with management to safeguard their investments and this may 
curtail excessive BRT (Boubakri et al., 2013). The findings confirm the evidence of prior 
studies that document negative link between ISONR and BRT (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013; 
Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 2008; Knopf & Teall, 1996).  
    Fourth, Table 7.1 results report that GOVNR exhibits a significant positive association with 
Z-score and NPLs. This implies that H10 is accepted. However, the results in Table 7.1 (Model 
3 and 4) show that GOVNR has no significant association with CAR and LPROV. These 
findings imply that H10 is partly rejected. This evidence supports  the argument that 
government ownership in the ESSA countries encourage banks to take more risk. Moreover, 
these findings are in line with the theoretical prediction of AT that, banks with substantial 
government ownership engage in excessive BRT. This is because, it allows government to 
finance risky and non-profitable projects aimed at ensuring the government re-election and 
political tenure (Boubakri et al., 2013). The finding corroborates evidence of previous research 
(e.g., Tabak et al., 2015; Chou & Lin, 2011; Iannottaa et al., 2007; Micco et al., 2007). 
    Fifth, the results in Model 1, 2 and 4 in Table 7.1 indicate that FONR has positive association 
with Z-score, NPLs and CAR, respectively. This results offer empirical support for H11. 
Nevertheless, the results in Model 3 of Table 7.1 reveal a positive association between FONR 
and LPROV, however the relationship is insignificant, implying that H11 is partly rejected. 
The positive relationship is also supported by AT, which suggests that foreign banks encounter 
liabilities of foreignness because of inherent difficulties in recognizing and accustoming to the 
domestic country regulations and procedures (Kobeissi & Sun, 2010). This difficulty is even 
heightened in emerging economies, such as ESSA, where there is virtually no reliable credit 
history of borrowers (Andrianova et al., 2015). These results also confirm the theoretical 
proposition of AT notion that foreign investors directly increase BRT through risk-shifting 
approach (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2013; Jensen & Heckling, 1976). 
    Finally, concerning bank-specific control variables, the results in Table 7.1 show that BSIZE 
has positive effect on Z-score, NPLs and CAR. The evidence shows that BSIZE increases BRT 
in the region. The results in the table also suggest that BDIVG has negative but insignificant 
effect on all the BRT proxies. Generally, banks in the region have low representation of female 
directors on their boards. This can partly explain the insignificant relationship between BDIVG 
and BRT in ESSA banks. The findings of the other bank-specific control variables are largely 
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consistent with the predicted signs. For example, firm size has negative impact on BRT which 
suggests that large banks tend to have low BRT. The evidence supports Delis (2012) suggestion 
that that large banks have access to low cost capital owing to lower information asymmetries 
and superior risk-management capacities. For example, larger banks have lower NPLs, it seems 
stronger financial position and better managerial ability at large banks play a role in mitigating 
risk-taking behaviour in ESSA region. Contrary to the prediction of the study, bank age seems 
to be positively connected with the BRT measures, suggesting that older banks engage in more 
BRT than younger banks. This does not support the “older bank hypothesis” that older banks 
are safer because they have good lending relationships with their customers. The evidence 
confirms previous research that observes a weak link between bank age and BRT in emerging 
economies (see Karim et al., 2010). 
    The findings reveal that LIQ has a linear relationship with BRT in the ESSA banks. This 
indicates that liquid banks tend to increase risk-taking due to the greater opportunities for them 
to augment the size of their market share. The evidence does not support the findings of 
Mustapha &Toci (2018) that liquid banks charge low interest rates on loans, which tend to 
attract less risky projects and hence low default rate. The coefficient of CAP is significantly 
negative in the Model 2. This imply that that well-capitalized banks are associated with reduced 
risk-taking in the region. This supports the evidence of Mustapha &Toci (2018) who report 
that banks with high CAP tend to engage in less BRT. The risk-taking behavior in the banking 
system is considerably dependent on the amount of equity holdings by the banks (Mustapha & 
Toci, 2018). Banks with high capital ratio tend to be conservative in risk-taking as a way of 
preserving shareholders value (Mustapha & Toci, 2018).        
7.2 The empirical findings of the effect of competition on bank risk-taking 
    The empirical findings of competition measures together with the bank-specific control 
variables on BRT are provided in Table 7.2. The table presents generalized method of moments 
(GMM) results of four estimates concerning Z-score, NPLs, LPROV and CAR. The 
coefficients of competition measured by LERNER on Z-score, NPLs, LPROV and CAR 
(0.049, 0.026, 0.054 and 0.236) in Table 7.2 are statistically positive at 1%. (Model 1-3) and 
5% Model 4, respectively.  The results provide strong empirical support for H12. The evidence 
shows that competition measured by LERNER increases BRT in the ESSA countries regardless 
of the BRT proxies. 
175 
 
Table 7.2: Dynamic GMM regression results of the effect of competition on bank risk-taking 
 
Variables (1)  (2)        (3)      (4)  
 Z-score                        NPLs  
                         
LPROV  CAR  
 Coefficient t-statistics      Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
LERNER 0.049 2.725*** 0.026 5.360*** 0.054 2.810*** 0.236 1.960** 
 (0.022)  (0.005)  (0.027)  (0.123)  
HSTAT 0.028 4.570*** 0.020 1.645* 0.139 1.060 0.010 0.530 
 (0.060)  (0.015)  (0.131)  (0.163)  
FSIZ -0.167 3.090*** -0.037 1.968** -0.054 2.240** -0.462 1.980** 
 (0.054)  (0.039)  (0.485)  (0.241)  
CAP -0.228 0.870 -0.404 1.680* -1.470 2.148** -1.697 1.680* 
 (0.264)  (0.256)  (0.459)  (1.044)  
LIQ 0.439 1.810* 0.089 0.210 0.129 1.979** 0.125 2.26** 
 (0.356)  (0.418)  (0.484)  (0.889)  
AGE 0.113 2.170** 0.015 2.07** 0.761 1.790* 0.007 1.203 
 (0.052)  (0.084)  (0.426)  (0.241)  
YDU Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
AR1 0.000  0.002  0.013  0.026  
AR2 (prob.) 0.336  0.139  0.541  0.913  
Hansen J (prob) 0.489  0.215  0.681  0.647  
Obs 1779  1779  1779  1779    
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. AR1 and AR2, respectively denote tests for first- 
order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Hansen denotes a test of over-identifying restrictions under the null hypothesis of overall 
validity of instruments used. The definitions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 4.4. Variables are defined as follows: Non-performing loans (NPLs), loan loss provision (LPROV). Capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR), Lerner index (LERNER), H-statistics (HSTAT), firm size (FSIZ), capitalization (CAP), liquidity (LIQ) and age (AGE). 
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    Similarly, HSTAT exhibits a positive association with all the bank risk-taking proxies, 
however, the association with LPROV and CAR is statistically insignificant. Hence, the 
evidence reveals that competition measured by HSTAT positively impact on BRT measured 
by Z-score and NPLs. The findings suggest that as competition intensifies in the ESSA banking 
system, the propensity of the banks to increase their risk-taking also increases. The results lend 
further support to H12. 
    The evidence is consistent with “competition-fragility” view; however, it is in sharp contrast 
with ‘competition-stability” view. Briefly, “competition-fragility” view articulates that 
increasing competition in the banking system stimulates bank to engage in excessive risk-
taking (Keeley, 1999). This is grounded on the argument that increasing competition in the 
banking system provides several lending avenues to banks which lowers prudent lending. At 
the same time, an increase in competition decreases the profit of banks, erodes their charter 
values and pushing banks to ignore prudent lending, thereby resulting in a deterioration of 
excessive BRT. Within ESSA context, the positive competition-NPLs nexus suggests that as 
competition increases in the deposit market, banks pay higher deposit rate. They face higher 
repayment burden, hence the banks charge high loan rate which attract high risky investments. 
Borrowers of the bank therefore assume greater risk, thereby increasing NPLs in the banking 
system in the region. Tongurai & Vithessonthi (2020) suggest that the probability for 
borrower’s business ventures to succeed decreases as the interest rates they pay on loans 
increase.  
    Primarily banks in the ESSA region increase their interest rates due to intense competition 
in the deposit market. The increase in interest rate reduces earnings on undertaken projects by 
borrowers (Tongurai & Vithessonthi, 2020). This motivates borrowers to opt for business 
opportunities that tend to have reduced chances of success. However, these high risk projects 
tend to have substantial earnings if successful (Tongurai & Vithessonthi, 2020). Subsequently, 
this shift of borrowers of bank risk-taking behaviour due to rising interest rate may translate 
into a high NPLs levels in the ESSA banking system. 
    In addition, due to the intense competition in the loan market in the region, the banks tend 
to have looser acceptance criteria for granting loans to attract more demand (Bolt & Tieman, 
2004). This reduces the quality of the banks’ loan portfolio which gives rise to higher default 
probabilities in the region. The evidence reaffirms the work of Akande et al. (2018) who show 
that although deposit insurance which motivates banks to engage in excessive BRT is yet to be 
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a popular phenomenon in the region, BRT in the region has been linked to moral hazard 
behaviour. Consequently, banks in the region tend to act less prudently because the government 
and depositors hold responsibility for their actions. The result is consistent with previous 
investigations that show that competition increases BRT in emerging economies (e.g., Noman 
et al., 2017; Kabir & Worthington, 2017). On the contrary, the findings differ from studies that 
establish a negative relationship between competition and BRT in developing economies (e.g., 
Sarkar & Sensarma, 2016; Tabak et al., 2015) 
    With respect with the bank-specific control variables, first the coefficient of FSIZ which 
measures the size of the bank, has a negative coefficient across all the models. This suggests 
that larger banks are linked with low BRT propensity. Larger banks reduce their risk-taking so 
as to be safe. This may be in part attributed to the advantage that large banks have in terms of 
possessing borrower-specific information, superior risk-management capacities stemming 
from their strong financial position (Toci & Mustapha, 2018).  
    Second, other control variables that have statistically significant relationship with the BRT 
measures are liquidity and age. For instance, bank age seems to have a positive link with BRT 
measures, suggesting that older banks engage in more BRT than younger banks. This does not 
support the “older bank hypothesis” that older banks are safer because they have good lending 
relationships with their customers. In particular, Karim et al. (2010) document that age has a 
weak linear link with BRT in the Malaysian banking sector. Liquidity also has a positive impact 
BRT in all the Models. Thus, it seems that highly liquid banks in the region have a tendency to 
take more risk in order to grow their market share. The implication is that managers of these 
banks may choose to deviate from appropriate screening, hence facilitating low-quality 
borrower’s access to credit.  
    In addition, capitalization has the predicted sign, but the link with BRT is found to be 
insignificant in all the Models except in Models 2 and 3. Generally, the findings contained in 
Table 7.2 reveal that as competition intensifies in the ESSA banking system, bank risk-taking 
behaviour also increases, after taking into consideration bank and country specific control 
variables. This evidence is consistent with the findings of previous research that establish a 
positive link between competition and BRT (e.g., Tongurai & Vithessonthi, 2020; Akande et 
al., 2018; Berger et al., 2009).  
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7.3 Robustness checks 
    Finally, the study conducted further analysis to ascertain the robustness of the findings 
reported earlier. It is possible that the relationships that the study report between the CG 
variables and BRT are being driven by reverse causality or by latent variable (see Jiang et al., 
2015). Notably, previous scholars (see Jiang et al., 2015, Choi et al., 2013, Hilary & Hui, 2009) 
address such endogeneity concern by employing a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, 
and so the study adopt their approach. Prior studies used lagged one-year lagged levels of the 
CG variables as primary instruments (e.g., Choi et al., 2013). Similarly, the study proposes that 
lagged CG variables could be appropriate instruments for the endogenous CG variables. The 
result for the 2SLS estimation is presented in Table 7.3. For each of the Models, the Hausman 
endogeneity test is employed to ascertain the appropriateness of using the 2SLS approach. The 
results of the Hausman endogeneity test confirm that the CG variables in all the four models 
are endogenous. This evidence supports the use of 2SLS technique in the robust analysis with 
lagged of the CG variables as instruments consistent with previous research (e.g., McGuinness 
et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2013).  
    The results reported in Models 1 to 4 of Table 7.3 show that, the 2SLS findings are consistent 
with those reported findings in Table 7.1. For example, the results show that EXPERT has 
negative effect on BRT in Models 1 and 4 similar to the earlier findings. Consistent with the 
OLS results, the table shows that NBMs has an inverse relationship with BRT in Models 1 and 
3 of Table 7.1. In respect of ownership variables, the results in Table 7.3 suggest a negative 
relationship between ISONR and the three of the bank risk-taking measures (Z-score, NPLs 
and CAR) in Models 1, 2 and 4 respectively, thus confirming the findings of the OLS results 
in Table 7.1. Also, the findings in relation to government ownership in Table 7.3 indicate that 
GOVNR is positively associated with Z-score and NPLs in Models 1 and 2, respectively. This  
is in line with the earlier findings reported in Table 7.1. The estimation results reported in Table 
7.3 reveal that, FONR has positive association with all the BRT proxies except in Model 3 
(LPROV) where the association is insignificant. Overall, these findings of the 2SLS approach 
offer further empirical support to the main results (OLS) reported in Table 7.1.  
    Finally, in terms of control effects, the coefficients of the bank specific control variables for 
the OLS and 2SLS models are similar. Precisely, FSIZ has negative influence on all the risk-
taking proxies in the models except Model 3. Table 7.3 results show that LIQ has positive 
relationship with all the risk-taking proxies. These offer further support for the robustness of 




Table 7.3: The association between various components of corporate governance variables and bank risk-taking with 2SLS with clustered errors 
Variables 
                (1)  
              Z-score  
               (2)  
              NPLs  
           (3)  
      LPROV  
             (4)  
            CAR  
 Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
  EXPERT -0.009        3.172*** -0.0005          0.284 -0.007           1.646* -0.004            0.277 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.025)  (0.016)  
NBMs -0.246 1.695* -0.044 0.392 -0.744 2.682*** -0.312 1.477 
 (0.159)  (0.112)  (0.395)  (0.888)  
ISONR -0.004 3.565*** -0.0032 3.504*** -0.001 0.163 -0.026 4.035*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.006)  
GOVNR 0.002 1.841* 0.007 5.105*** 0.015 0.838 0.008 0.783 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0.011)  
FONR 0.004 3.549*** 0.002 3.511*** 0.002 0.157 0.026 4.027*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.010)  (0.006)  
BSIZE 0.229 1.995** 0.112 1.641* 0.305 0.304 1.572 2.441** 
 (0.115)  (0.081)  (0.005)  (0.644)  
BDIVG -0.001 0.556 -0.0003 0.183 -0.018 0.767 -0.03 0.859 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.025)  (0.014)  
FSIZ -0.059 3.641*** -0.003 2.172** 0.171 1.203 -0.021 2.384** 
 (0.017)  (0.001)  (0.142)  (0.085)  
CAP -0.008 0.417 -0.346 2.358** -0.162 0.640 -0.162 0.640 
 (0.208)  (0.147)  (0.815)  (0.815)  
LIQ 0.587 2.376** 0.137 3.653*** 0.355 2.066** 0.355 1.610* 
 (0.427)  (0.311)  (0.732)  (0.732)  
AGE 0.107 2.216** 0.007 2.076** 0.074 0.175 0.073 0.175 
 (0.048)  (0.003)  (0.420)  (0.421)  
YDU Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
CDU Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs 1820  1820  1820  1810  
Partial R-Sq 0.38  0.41  0.39  0.42  
F-sta 1407.5  1541.2  1532.4  1498.1  
Endogeneity 0.023  0.041  0.09  0.074   
 
Notes: This table presents the 2SLS regression results on the impact of board and bank ownership structures on bank risk-taking proxies. Standard errors are clustered by country and time which are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The definitions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 4.4. Variables are defined as follows: Individual financial directors who are financial experts (EXPERTS), number of board meetings (NBMs), institutional ownership 





8 Conclusion and avenue for future research  
    This chapter provides conclusion and avenue for future research of the thesis. Specifically, 
section 8.1 offers conclusion to include a summary of the chapters and overview results of the 
chapters. In section 8.2, the policy implications of the study are provided, whilst the limitations 
of the study are discussed in section 8.3. Finally, suggestions for future research are provided 
in section 8.4.   
 
8.1.1 Summary of the chapters 
    The governance reforms and regulatory changes in ESSA, starting with the 1994 South 
African CG code on improving the governance of banks, have served to make banks 
accountable. More importantly, much of the attention on the reforms has focused on the 
assumption that, internal CG mechanisms can limit excessive executive pay, enhance 
sustainable banking disclosures and performance of banks in the countries. Accordingly, 
present-day, banks in ESSA are confronted with increased pressure from the public and policy 
makers to adopt better governance practices. As the largest sector in the financial system and 
one of the largest economic sectors in ESSA, policy makers are progressively pushing for well-
established internal governance principles like that found in developed economies (e.g., UK 
and US). Given the importance of the implementation of several banking reforms and 
significant regulatory changes regarding corporate governance, this study reveals a number of 
crucial implications on executive pay, sustainable banking disclosure, financial performance 
and risk-taking nature of banks in the ESSA banking system in the post reforms period. 
8.1.2 Overview results of the chapters 
    In chapter 5, the study investigates whether broad corporate governance disclosure index 
(CGI) can determine compensation received by executives, and subsequently explores the 
possibility of CGI moderating the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity (PSS) for English-Speaking 
Sub-Saharan African banks. Specifically, the chapter examines the influence of CGI on 
executive directors pay (EPAY), non-executive directors pay (NPAY) and total pay for all 
directors (TPAY). Additionally, the chapter explores the relationship between executive 
compensation (EPAY, NPAY and TPAY) and sustainable banking disclosures (SBD). 
Furthermore, the chapter ascertains whether bank CGI has any moderating effect on the PSS 




    The results of the chapter reveal that in relation to internal governance, the CGI effect on 
executive compensation (EPAY, NPAY and TPAY) and SBD in the ESSA region is crucial. 
This is an important finding, especially in the light of extensive internal governance reforms in 
the region. The main findings of chapter 5 are briefly summarized in Table 8.1 after testing the 
hypotheses. Consistent with the expectation of the chapter and the theoretical prediction, the 
results of the effect of CGI on EC (EPAY, NPAY and TPAY) are negative and significant in 
the whole sample and in better-governed banks. This evidence suggests that, internal level 
corporate governance disclosures limit excessive EC in ESSA banks This implies that as the 
banks disclose more internal governance information in their annual reports, the less likelihood 
that senior managers may have the opportunity to expropriate shareholders wealth. More 
importantly, this findings also offer empirical support for the expectation of the Combined CG 
code in the ESSA countries that seeks to limit excessive EC in the banking system.   
    However, analysis of the impact of CGI on EC (EPAY, NPAY and TPAY) reveal that in a 
banking environment where there are weak internal governance structures (poorly-governed 
banks), the link between CGI and EC are insignificant. This lends support for both optimal 
contrasting theory and managerial power hypothesis. Again, this evidence is consistent with 
the prediction of the Combined Code in the region that in poor governance environment, 
executives can influence the decision of the board and offer themselves with excessively 
generous compensation schemes.  
    Next, in line with the hypotheses of the chapter, the findings of the chapter show that 
executive directors pay (EPAY) positively influences SBD, thereby providing support for 
optimal contrasting theory and managerial power hypothesis. This evidence suggests that, the 
arrangement of executive directors pay in the ESSA banks can be designed in such a manner 
that it can potentially increase SBD, thereby offering support for the linking of EPAY with 
sustainability targets as specified by the Combined CG Code in ESSA region.  But, on the 
contrary, non-executive (NPAY) and total executive pay (TPAY) have negative link with SBD. 
This evidence suggests that, the linking of NPAY and TPAY in the ESSA banks may not 
potentially influence progress in SBD initiatives in the ESSA region and thereby providing 
support for managerial power hypothesis.   
    In respect of the association between the various components of executive compensation 
variables (EPAY, NPAY and TPAY) and the individual dimensions of sustainable banking 




outcomes. Consistent with the expectation of the Combined CG Code in the region, the findings 
report that executive directors pay increases all the individual dimensions of SBD. 
Nevertheless, the link between EPAY and, ENV and HAS were found to be weak in ESSA 
banks. Alternatively, and despite the high expectations of the Combined CG Code, the results 
demonstrate that, NPAY has negative influence on three dimensions of SBD namely SOC, 
HAS and CIV. But there is no indication of a significant connection between NPAY and the 
other three components of SBD (ENV, EHR and EMP) in the ESSA banks. Despite major SBD 
reforms, the results of the individual analysis reaffirm that, TPAY exhibits an inverse link with 
SBD among the ESSA banks. Specifically, TPAY exhibits significant negative association 
with ENV, SOC, EHR, CIV and EMP; but the results establish no statistically significant link 
between TPAY and HAS in the ESSA banks. 
    The chapter also investigates the influence of CGI on the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity 
(PSS). The results of the analysis show that, CGI has a positive moderating effect on the PSS. 
Overall, the results suggest that CGI has impact on executive pay and sustainable banking in 
the ESSA region. In particular, the chapter reports that whilst the PSS increases in better-
governed banks, it was found to decrease in poorly-governed banks in the region. Specifically, 
the analysis confirms that banks with stronger CG mechanisms tend to have substantially 
stronger PSS than poorly-governed banks. Notably, this findings provide support for both OCT 
and MPH. It also reaffirms the expectation of the Combined CG Code in the region that 
corporate governance structures are key determinants of executive directors pay and 
sustainable banking disclosures in the ESSA region.  
Table 8.1: Summary findings of chapter 5 
Variables name Expected sign Actual sign Agrees with hypothesis Applicable theory 
Panel A: CGI and EC     
CGI and EPAY -  (-)* Yes OCT and MPH  
CGI and NPAY - (-)* Yes OCT and MPH 
CGI and TPAY - (-)* Yes OCT and MPH 
Better-governed banks      
CGI and EPAY - (-)* Yes OCT and MPH 
CGI and NPAY - (-)* Yes OCT and MPH 
CGI and TPAY - (-)* Yes OCT and MPH 
Poorly-governed banks     
CGI and EPAY - - Yes OCT and MPH 
CGI and NPAY - - Yes OCT and MPH 




Panel B: EC and SBD     
EPAY and SBD + (+)* Yes OCT and MPH 
NPAY and SBD - (-)* No OCT and MPH 
TPAY and SBD - (-)* No OCT and MPH 
Panel C:CGI on EC-SBD     
EPAY*CGI and SBD + (+)* Yes OCT and MPH 
NPAY*CGI and SBD + + No OCT and MPH 
TPAY*CGI and SBD + - No OCT and MPH 
Where * denote insignificant 
    In chapter 6 of the thesis, the study examines the relationship among corporate governance 
disclosure index (CGI), sustainable banking disclosures (SBD) and financial performance (FP), 
and consequently explores whether CGI can improve the sustainability-for-performance 
sensitivity (SPS) in the ESSA banks. More importantly, the chapter highlights that SBD and 
FP of banks in the region are driven by internal corporate governance structures in the region. 
The summary findings of chapter 6 are provided in Table 8.2. In line with the theoretical 
framework and the hypothesis of the chapter, the result of the effect of CGI on SBD is positive 
and significant, which supports the argument that SBD enhances the FP of banks.  
    More crucially, further analysis provides evidence suggesting that, banks with stronger CG 
structures have a tendency to engage in substantially higher SBD initiatives than banks with 
weak internal governance structures. This provides support for the integrated theoretical 
framework of both optimal contrasting theory and managerial power hypothesis. The study 
also deepens the analysis on the CGI-SBD by exploring the impact of CGI on the individual 
dimensions of SBD. The results show that CGI exhibits positive association with SOC, HAS, 
and EMP; but a negative but insignificant relationship with ENV and CIV dimensions of SBD.  
    Also, the study investigates the impact of SBD on the FP of banks in the region. Consistent 
with the hypothesis of the chapter, SBD has a positive and significant impact on ROA. 
However, the effect of SBD on ROE is positive, but is insignificant, suggesting a weak positive 
link between SBD and ROE. This is a crucial finding, especially in the light of major SBD 
reforms in the region that seek to promote SBD as a way of enhancing long term growth and 
sustainability of banks. Additionally, an investigation concerning the effect of the individual 
components of SBD on FP reveals that, SOC and EHR are positively related with ROA; but 
HAS and CIV have negative and significant effect on ROA. However, ENV and EMP have no 
significant influence on ROA. Again, the results reveal that SOC, EHR and EMP dimensions 




relationship with ROE. These findings reflect individual SBD dimensions impact on FP of 
banks in the ESSA region. 
    The study also shows that in relation to SBD-FP, internal governance structures effects are 
important. More specifically, the findings reveal that, CGI has a positive influence on the 
sustainability-for-performance sensitivity (SPS). The positive impact of CGI on the SPS 
increases significantly in better-governed banks than their poorly-governed counterpart. In 
general, the results in this chapter suggest that CGI is a key determinant of sustainable banking 
as it enhances the SPS in the ESSA banks. 
Table 8.2: Summary findings of chapter 6 
Variables name Expected   sign Actual sign Agrees with hypothesis Applicable theory  
Panel A: CGI and SBD     
CGI and SBD + (+)* Yes AT and RDT 
Better-governed banks     
CGI and SBD + (+)* Yes AT and RDT 
Poorly-governed banks     
CGI and SBD + (+)* Yes AT and RDT 
Panel B: SBD and FP     
SBD and ROA + + Yes RBV, SHT and NIT 
SBD and ROE + (+)* No RBV, SHT and NIT 
Panel C:CGI on SPS     
SBD*CGI and ROA + (+)* Yes AT, RBV, RDT and SHT 
SBD*CGI and ROE + (+)* Yes AT, RBV, RDT and SHT 
Where * denote insignificant 
    In chapter 7, the thesis examines the relationship among board attributes, ownership and 
competition on risk-taking in ESSA banks. Table 8.3 provides key findings of chapter 7. 
Consistent with the expectation of the chapter and the theoretical prediction, the results show 
that independent directors who have financial expertise are important in the region. More 
specifically, the findings show that board independent financial experts have relatively strong 
voice in promoting safe banking by reducing bank risk-taking. The study also observes that the 
intensity of board monitoring activity as assessed by meetings organized by the board 
negatively influence the behaviour of risk-taking in the banking system. This evidence suggests 
increasing the number of times the board meets allows the board to provide strategic advice 
and effective oversight duty which can limit excessive risk-taking ESSA countries.  
    Next, the chapter examines the influence of ownership structures on BRT. The results 




findings also reveal that institutional owners in banks in the region have more incentives to 
monitor managers which reduces risk-taking. In particular, institutional shareholders in the 
ESSA region who are predominantly public pension fund have low risk-taking preferences. 
Thus, such influential institutional investors tend to impose their low risks preferences on 
managers which could potentially reduce bank risk-taking. Finally, the evidence of the study 
reveals that competition exacerbates the risk-taking behaviour of banks consistent with 
“competition-fragility” view.  
    Specifically, this study finds that competition assessed by Lerner index has positive 
influence on all the four bank risk-taking measures namely Z-score, non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and loan-loss provision and capital adequacy ratio. In a similar vein, the chapter finds 
that competition measured by H-statistics has positive impact on Z-score and non-performing 
loans; but has positive but insignificant relation with loan-loss provision and capital adequacy 
ratio. These findings confirm the prediction of “competition-fragility” view which argues that, 
as competition intensifies banks are more encouraged to engage in high risk-taking tendency. 
This is mainly as a result of an increase in lending avenues, thereby reducing profits and the 
eroding of the charter value of banks in the region. 
Table 8.3: Summary findings of chapter 7 
Variables name Expected sign Actual sign Agrees with hypothesis Applicable theory 
Panel A: Board and BRT     
EXPERT and BRT -  (-)* Yes AT, SHT and RDT 
NBMs and BRT - (-)* Yes AT and SHT 
Panel B: Ownership and BRT     
ISONR and BRT  - (-)* Yes AT and SHT 
GOVNR and BRT + (+)* Yes AT, SHT and RDT 
FONR and BRT + (+)* Yes AT and RDT 
Panel C: Competition and BRT + (+)* Yes Competition fragility view 
Where * denote insignificant 
    In conclusion, the results present strong evidence that CG structures have substantial 
implications on the ESSA banks’ executive pay, sustainable banking disclosures and bank risk-
taking behaviour in the post governance reforms period in the region. 
8. 2 The implications of the thesis 
    The evidence of the thesis has different policy implications for banking practitioners, policy-




8.2.1 Implication for banking practitioners  
    With respect to the banking system in the ESSA region, this thesis has important implications 
concerning how the banks are managed. Managerially, the results of the thesis help in 
understanding of responsible banking practices by uncovering new dynamics that affect 
sustainable banking practices and can assist corporate executives to strategically manage 
sustainable banking initiatives of their banks. For example, given the evidence of the positive 
moderating effect of corporate governance on the association between sustainable banking 
disclosures and financial performance of banks, this should serve as a strong motivation for 
banking practioners to adopt quality internal governance systems as a key tool to drive the 
financial performs of their banks.  
    Moreover, this thesis offers insight to corporate executives on the need to be transparent and 
communicate their bank’s sustainable banking engagements to the society, investors and other 
stakeholders. Further, the implication of the result of the study confirms sustainable banking 
investments as a win-win business model and so banking practitioners are encouraged to 
integrate sustainable banking initiatives into their core operations, rather than considering it as 
a peripheral corporate activity. Also, based on the results of the study, the adoption of good 
corporate governance standards will also benefit banking practitioners in the region, as it can 
limit excessive bank risk-taking, thereby safeguarding the banking system from collapse and 
loss of jobs. 
8.2.2 Implications for policy-makers 
    The results of this thesis have important implications for policy-makers in the ESSA region. 
First, sustainable banking disclosure score of the banks is generally low when compared with 
reported scores in other developing countries. Consequently, policy-makers such as the 
Security and Exchange Commission in the various countries should endeavour to provide 
explicit guidelines on sustainable banking reporting so as to improve sustainable banking 
disclosures in the region. For example, policy-makers should introduce detailed guidelines to 
ensure that sustainable banking disclosures are based on actual performance and not symbolic 
disclosures that are intended to deceive investors and the general public. It is also crucial for 
policy-makers to administer such sustainable banking disclosure standards as an obligatory 
policy in the ESSA banking system. 
    Second, the results of this thesis show that, for greater effectiveness and commitment to 




alignment (EC) should be jointly pursued. For example, for maximum impact, it is 
recommended that the design of clear sustainable compensation-based executive compensation 
should constitute a considerable share of total executive pay in order to bring into line corporate 
managers interests with other stakeholders. More importantly, such reforms should be carried 
out with corresponding corporate governance reforms by policy-makers.  
    Again, the results of this thesis demonstrate that, it is imperative for policy-makers to 
enhance the role of internal governance structures in the regions’ banking system. One probable 
way of doing so is to ensure that banks in ESSA comply with the requirements of corporate 
governance disclosures. In particular, the evidence of the study raises the need for policy-
makers  to put in place effective governance structures as such mechanisms are proved to limit 
bank risk-taking. For example, employing independent financial experts and encouraging more 
board meetings can help in reducing bank risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, policy-makers 
should ensure that, future corporate governance reforms establish criteria for the selection of 
independent directors who are financial experts to the board. 
    Finally, the small number of females on the board of banks in the ESSA region suggests that 
female appointment to the board may be done for symbolic reasons or as a form of token. This 
may limit the contribution of female directors to decision-making process in the boardroom. 
This seems to indicate that, board gender diversity may need to be improved substantially 
before it can be expected to influence bank risk-taking in the ESSA region. Accordingly, 
policy-makers may set a criteria for the inclusion of female directors into the board.  
8.2.3 Implication for regulators 
    The findings of the thesis  has policy implications for the regulation of the governance of 
banks in the ESSA region. First, the results on the effect of independent directors who are 
financial experts on bank-risk taking support the notion for recommending greater independent 
directors who are experts (in particular relating to financial expertise) as this can mitigate 
excessive bank risk taking behaviour in the region. Second, evidence relating to the impact of 
institutional ownership on bank risk-taking calls for regulators (especially Central Banks) to 
encourage individuals to invest through institutional investors. Third, the results of the 
association between government ownership and bank risk-taking should encourage regulators 
to promote less government investment in the banking sector by putting in place extensive 




    Fourth, the evidence on the impact of competition on bank risk-taking calls for regulators 
especially Central Banks to design and implement optimal financial liberalization policies such 
as mergers and acquisitions to curtail intense bank competition. In addition, regulators may 
encourage entry of foreign banks through mergers and acquisition as way of helping such 
foreign banks to overcome any liabilities of foreignness. Fifth, for regulators, the results of this 
thesis should motivate them to put more pressure on banks to adopt sustainable banking 
practices, particularly, on less responsible banks in the region. Finally, the evidence from the 
ESSA cross-country level may also be relevant to regulators and Central Banks in other regions 
and countries. 
8. 3 Limitations of the thesis  
    Comparable to all archival research with similar notion, this thesis has some limitations that 
must be acknowledged. The first limitation of the study is that, the data is limited to ESSA 
banks and thus, the findings should be interpreted within this context. The study focused on 
banks in ESSA countries due to language barrier. Specifically, the study excluded banks in 
French-speaking countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (FSSA) because the annual reports of banks 
in FSSA are reported in French. In particular, the corporate governance and sustainable banking 
disclosures were manually extracted from the annual reports of the banks, which is a highly 
labour-intensive activity (Ntim, 2009). As a result, practical limitations of  language barrier, 
time, effort and finance meant that the banks  had to be from countries where the corporate 
governance disclosures and sustainable banking information in the annual reports of the banks  
are reported in English language. 
    More importantly, this criteria led to a sample that  is substantially large enough to make a 
significant contribution, whilst at the same time guaranteeing that the thesis is done within the 
scheduled time-frame of a PhD research work. Besides, this is consistent with  prior corporate 
governance studies (e.g., Sarpong-Kumankoma et al., 2019; Siueia et al., 2019) in the region 
that similarly excluded banks in FSSA countries from their final sample, which facilitated 
drawing comparisons with the findings of these studies. Nonetheless, together, the ESSA 
countries account for nearly 70% of the total GDP of the Sub-Saharan Africa. 
     The second limitation is that, the study employs corporate governance disclosure index and 
sustainable banking disclosure information provided by the banks. This is because corporate 
governance disclosure and sustainable banking information in ESSA banks are not available as 




limitation of the thesis is that, the study could not include all the banks in ESSA due to the 
availability of the required governance information. A larger set of banks in the region would 
have improved the generalization of the results. Nevertheless, it must be indicated that the 
accessibility of corporate governance variables for that kind of data may be scarce as this is the 
main motive that accounted for the adoption of the data size of this study. Fourth, it must also 
be acknowledged that another limitation of the study is that, some bank specific control 
variables (such as the loan portfolio size, deposits and capital adequacy) were not included in 
the models. Notwithstanding, the bank specific control variables employed in the study are 
consistent with prior banking studies that conducted similar investigations in the ESSA region.      
    The final  limitation of the study is that, apart from country dummies, the study did not 
control for country differences with governance indicators (such as political instability, 
corruption and government effectiveness) and macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inflation 
and unemployment. Together, these weaknesses may potentially limit the generalisation of the 
thesis findings. The findings of this thesis should therefore be interpreted in the light of the 
above highlighted limitations. Thus, these limitations present avenues for future research. 
Therefore, the subsequent section discusses potential avenues for future research and 
improvements. 
8.4 Suggestions for further studies 
    The study provides a fertile ground for further research and improvements in the field in the 
region as highlighted below. First, for deeper insights, the study encourages further studies to 
expand and explore other governance data (executive characteristics such as CEO education, 
age and culture, and external governance mechanisms) as such data become available in the 
ESSA region. Second, in terms of improvement in the pay-for-sustainability sensitivity 
investigation, the study encourages future research to investigate other financial performance 
variables such as market based indicators as and when data become available in the ESSA 
banking sector. Also, future studies can expand this study by adopting diverse research 
methodology. This may include qualitative and event study research designs. Importantly, such 
investigations will offer new insights. This might contribute to the understanding of the 
relationships among corporate governance, sustainable banking and financial performance of 
banks.  
    Third, the study examined direct and indirect relationships among the dependent and 




relationships by employing structural equation modelling (SEM) which might help detect these 
relationships with multiple dependent variables which is not available with regression models 
that depend only one dependent variable at a time. Finally, the study did not include country 
differences with regards to governance indicators (such as political instability, corruption and 
government effectiveness) and macroeconomic variable such as GDP, unemployment rate and 
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Appendix 1: SBPs Disclosure Index 
 
SBD category  SBD item: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
   scores per theme 
     
(i) Social investment and 1. Provision of support to students by way of sponsorship for needy but  0–4  
Service quality  brilliant students   
 2. Education policy. 0–4  
 3. Support for educational infrastructure such as building schools 0–4  
 4. Support for educational campaign and sensitization such as girl child 0–4  
  education   
 5. Support for training of teachers 0–4 108 
 6. Housing policy 0–4  
 7. Support for building of affordable houses and community centres  0–4  
  among others   
 8. Power and energy policy to address issues related to electricity and 0–4  
  power   
 9. Support for rural electrification projects 0–4  
 10. Investment in renewable energy (e.g. Solar energy, wind among others) 0–4  
 11. Investment in potable water projects such as boreholes 0–4  
 12. Investment in water treatment projects and water conservation 0–4  
 13. Road policy in place to address issues related to provision of  0–4  
  road.   
 14. Investment in road construction, road construction equipment, street 0–4  
  lights among others.   
 15. Provision of internship facilities for university students with or without 0–4         
  cash allowance.   
 16. Sponsoring of local, national and international sports events  0–4  
   (e.g., national soccer teams, U17, Olympics teams among others)   
  17. Donation to people affected by natural disaster (e.g. flood, earthquake)    0–4  




 19. Donation to Rotary club, Lion’s club, Red cross among others.  0–4  
 20. Policy on social products (e.g., educational loans and climate products) 0–4  
 21. Sponsorship of tournaments (e.g., golf, tennis, beach soccer, hockey).  0–4  
 22. Establishment of policy in relation to customer feedback 0–4  
 23. Strategies for future investments in social products and services 0–4  
 24. Organization of customer loyalty promotions 0–4  
 25. Customer appreciation (e.g., gifts and souvenirs to customers) 0–4  
 26. Donation of frail and difficult –to-reach customers 0–4  
      27. Cash donation or support for customers                                                                                                                                                                                                                                0-4  
Total 27 SBD items  108 







SBPs Disclosure Index 
 
SBD category  SBD item: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
   scores per theme 
     
(ii) Health and Safety 28. Implementation of detailed policy in relation to the issue of health and 0–4  
  safety   
 29. Health education 0–4  
 30. Involvement in blood donation exercise 0–4  
 31. Adoption, implementation and or/enforcement of public health and 0–4  
  safety measures (e.g., fire drills, call tree test amongst others)    
 32. Medical health screening for employees 0–4  
 33. Donation in support of costly surgery (e.g., heart, kidney transplant) 0–4  
 34. Policy on physical health and fitness of staff (e.g., participation in 0–4  
  keep fit clubs among others)   
 35. Organization of health programs for staff (e.g., health talk,  0–4  




 36. Policy on mental health (e.g., counseling, stress level assessment)  0–4  
 37. Safety in the workplace 0–4  
 38. Product and customer safety 0–4  
 39. Cash donation to children’s hospital to support operational expenses 0–4  
 40. Donation to purchase equipment to help the aged and children with 0–4 160 
  hearing impairment   
 41. Donation of vehicles to hospitals to support operation (e.g., ambulance, 0–4  
  bus among others)   
 42. Contribution to national health fund (e.g., heart foundation fund, 0–4         
  Sickle cell foundation amongst others).   
 43. Partnership with international medical charity organizations to perform 0–4  
  surgical operations for children born with cleft lips and palates   
  44. Donation in support of children with autism disorder    0–4  
 45. Medical products (e.g., medical loan, maternal health support scheme) 0–4  
 46. Donation to the media (e.g., TV stations, Radio among others) 0–4  
 47. Contribution towards elimination of avoidable blindness 0–4  
 48. Financial support for staff in costly surgical operation 0–4  
 49. The overall bank’s HIV/AIDS policy 0–4  
 50. Annual disclosure of total allocated budget to HIV/AIDS programs 0–4  
 51. The nature of healthcare provision for HIV/AIDS patients 0–4  
 52. Workplace-related HIV/AIDS programs and interventions 0–4  
 53. Monetary support for HIV/AIDS patients  0–4  
      54. Healthcare provisions available to employee family members                                                                                                                                                                                                                                0-4  
Total 54 SBD items  216 
     
 
Appendix 1 (continued) 
  
 
SBPs Disclosure Index 
 
SBD category  SBD item: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
   scores per theme 




(ii) Safety and Health 55. Involvement and donation in support of malaria treatment and   0–2  
  malaria eradication campaigns   
 56. Policy on malaria prevention  0–2  
 57. Policy on Ebola 0–4  
 58. Donation and budgetary support of local and national campaigns   0–4  
  aimed at Ebola prevention.    
 59. Support for Ebola patients 0–4  
 60. Health screening and supply of free medication. 0–4  
 61. Donation of cash in support of costly medical equipment in different  0–4  
    hospitals.   
 62. Participation in local and national breast cancer awareness campaign 0–4  
  and donation for treatment of breast cancer patients   
 63. Donation to national and mutual health insurance shemes. 0–4  
 64. Support for cholera and hepatitis awareness campaigns 0–4  
 65. Support to accident victims 0–4  
 66. Offering health assistance to disabled and underprivileged children 0–4  
 67. Donation into hospitals in support of treating eye patients 0–4  
(iii) Ethics and Human      
       Rights 68. Implementation of detailed policies and practices in relation to bribery 0–4  
  and corruption.   
 69. Disclosure on cash donations in support of political parties and 0–4        48 
  political activities.   
 70. Policies and practices relating to handling of issues such as labour 0–4  
  union, human rights amongst others.   
 71. Policy on working hours 0–4  
 72. Labour rights 0–4  
 73. Indigenous people relations 0–4  
 74. Fair business practice 0–4  
 75. Code of business ethics 0–4  
 76. Right to embark on strike  0–4  
 77. Right to form labour unions 0–4  
 78. Policy on gender and minorities  0–4  
 79. Whistle blowing policy 0–4  




      81. Reduced environmental cost                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       0-4  
Total 81 SBD items  324 
     
 
 
SBPs Disclosure Index 
 
SBD category  SBD item: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
   scores per theme 
     
(iv) Environment 82. Overall bank’s policies and concerns with regards to environmental  0–4  
  issues, standards and achievements   
 83. Implementation of comprehensive environmental management systems. 0–4  
 84. Energy saving strategies in place to address environmental issues 0–4  
 85. Detailed environmental projects aimed at protecting natural resources  0–4  
  such as recycling and raw material conservation.   
 86. Any other activities relating to aesthetics, sustainability among others 0–4  
 87. Support for projects designed to protect the environment 0–4  
 88. Support in a form of cash for environmentally friendly projects (e.g 0–4  
   checking of river erosion, pollution reduction).   
 89. Contribution to the fight against illegal mining by way of national 0–4  
  campaigns or cash donations.  84 
 90. Environmental reporting 0–4  
 91. Environmental certification 0–4  
 92. Support of recreational activities 0–4  
 93. Donation towards land reclamation and restoration 0–4  
 94. Recognition (e.g., recipient of local or international awards for CSR 0–4  
  Projects or initiatives)   
 95. Implementation and promotion of environmental awareness through 0–4  
  effective communication.   
 96. Support for skills acquisition and training on conservation of the  0–4         
  environment.   
 97. A detailed policy on the banks ‘support and strategies for the oil and 0–4  




  98. Policy on climate change 0–4  
 99. Policy on greenhouse gas emission and global warming 0–4  
 100. Clean energy policy 0–4  
(v) Community involvement 101. Participation in tree planting exercise 0–4  
 102. Community service 0–4  
 103. Volunteer programs 0–4  
 104. Distribution of new and used cloths to the aged and less privileged  0–4  
 105. Donation to care and orphanage homes 0–4  
 106. Donation to security agencies (e.g., police, army amongst others) 0–4  
 107. Employment generation 0–4  
    108. Donation to prison inmate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               0-4  
Total   108 SBD items  432 
     
 
 
SBD category  SBD item: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
   scores per theme 
     
(v) Community involvement 109. Donation of raw materials or cash to local communities affected by   0–4  
  rainstorm   
 110. Providing sponsorship for arts and culture. 0–4  
 111. Donation in support of families of victims of terrorist attacks 0–4  
 112. Donation and support to religious bodies during festive occasions  0–4  
  (e.g., Christmas, Easter, Ramadan ).   
 113. Cash donation to NGOs charities 0–4  
 114. Financial assistance to refugees and people from neighboring countries 0–4 84 
 115. Donation to ministries, department and district’s relief fund for fire   0–4  
  victims.   
 116. Financial assistance to chiefs in aid of special projects (e.g., celebration   0–4  
  of festivals, funerals, anniversaries).   
 117. Assessment of the negative impact of bank’s products and services 0–4  
 118. Involvement in community based campaigns  0–4  
 119. Engagement of National service personnel 0–4  
 120. Policy in support of Agriculture 0–4  




(vi) Employees     
 122. Implementation of policies regarding the issue of staff training 0–4  
  and development.   
 123. Adoption and implementation of employee welfare needs within the 0–4         
  bank.   
 124. Information about support for staff in areas such as day-care, maternity 0–4  
  and paternity leave.   
  125. Staff engagement programs 0–4 56 
 126. Number of employees 0–4  
 127. Career development programs 0–4  
 128. Employee benefits 0–4  
 129. Employee value added statements 0–4  
 130. Employee recruitment issues 0–4  
 131. Staff pension commitments and gratuity 0–4  
 132. Compensation plan for employees 0–4  
 133. Cost of employees safety measures 0–4  
 134. Employee classification by function 0–4  
 135. Facilities for employees children and/or dependents                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      0-4  
 Total  135 SBD items  540 
     
 
Scoring procedure      
0: No disclosure.   
1: General or rhetorical (including instances of ritualistic and repeated) statements: deemed to be purely symbolic with no evidence of actual actions/activities on the 
ground.   
2: Narrative explanation of what has actually been done or implemented: deemed to be a message of commitment (beyond symbolic).   
3: Information provided in (2) above supported by quantitative/monetary data: deemed to be substantive by providing evidence of the scale of activities or actions.   
4: Information provided in (3) above supported by explicit assessments of performance (relative to last period) or events (even if they are “bad” news), and which 
allows comparison between companies using external reporting models/benchmarks/assurance: deemed to be comprehensive.  
 




Appendix 2: Corporate governance (CG) disclosure index 
    
CG theme CG provision: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
  scores per theme 
    
(i). Director and board 1. In case the roles of chairperson and MD/ 0–1 37 
 CEO are split is disclosed.   
 2. Whether the chairperson of the board is an 0–1  
 independent, non-executive director.   
 3. If majority of non-executive directors 0–1  
 (NEDs) constitute the board of the bank.   
 4. Does the board meet at least four times 0–1  
 in a year.   
 5. Does the bank disclose records of individual 0–1  
    directors’ meetings   
 6. Whether the responsibilities of the board 0–1  
  of directors is disclosed.   
 7. Classification of board of directors into 0–1  
  executive, NED, and independent.   
 8. Disclosure of the performance of the  0–1  
 chairperson.   
 9. Disclosure of the effectiveness and  0–1  
 performance of the CEO/MD.   
 10. Disclosure of the board's performance and 0–1  
 effectiveness.   
 11. Disclosure of directors' biography,  0–1  
 experience and responsibilities.   
 12. Disclosure of a narrative with regards to  0–1  
 a policy on the issue of diversity of the    
 board.   
 13. Disclosure of the position of a company 0–1  
 secretary filled by a competent and suitable   
 person.   
 14. Disclosure of the performance of the 0–1  
 company’s secretary   
 15. As to whether directors have access to 0–1  
 free independent professional legal advice   
 16. Narrative relating to induction, training and 0–1  
 Personal development of directors.   
 17. Whether the size of the board in terms of   0–1  
 number is disclosed.   
 18. Disclosure of the performance of  0–1  
 individual board members.   
 19. Narrative on board charter, leadership  0–1  
 duties and roles.   
 20. Disclosure of policy on staggered  0–1  
 appointment and rotation of directors.   
 21. Disclosure of policy on multiple and  0–1  
 alternate directorship of board members.   
 22. Disclosure on board independence,  0–1  
 skills, experience and knowledge of the bank   
    
                                                                                                                                                       (continued on next page) 
    
CG theme CG provision: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
  scores per theme 
    
(i). Director and board 23. If the bank has established remuneration 0–1 43 
 committee.   
 24. If the remuneration committee is made up 0–1  
 of inly independent NEDs   
 25. If the chairperson of the remuneration  0–1  
 committee is an independent NED.   
 26. Disclosure of the remit of the remuneration 0–1  




 27. Disclosure of the performance of the  0–1  
    remuneration committee.   
 28. Disclosure of the membership of the  0–1  
  remuneration committee.   
 29. If the remuneration committee meets at 0–1  
  least four times in a year.   
 30. Disclosure of the establishment of   0–1  
 nomination committee.   
 31. If the nomination committee is made up of 0–1  
 majority of independent NEDs is disclosed.   
 32. As to whether the remit of the nomination 0–1  
   committee as well as the evaluation and      
 and assessment of the performance of 0–1  
 committee is disclosed.   
 33. As to whether the nomination committee  0–1  
 chairperson is an independent board member   
 is disclosed.   
 34. As to whether the membership of the  0–1  
 nomination committee of the board is   
 disclosed.   
 35. Disclosure meeting attendance records of  0–1  
  members of the nomination committee.    
 36. As to whether nomination committee 0–1  
 meets at least four times in a year is disclosed.   
 37. Disclosure relating to the issue of 0–1  
 technological failure and breakdown.   
 38. Whether share ownership by directors and  0–1  
 
officers is less than 50% of the total bank 
shareholdings.   
 39. Whether the performance of all board sub 0–1  
 
committees’ performance and effectiveness is 
evaluated is disclosed.   
 40. Whether there is a board statement on the  0–1  
 going-concern status of the bank is disclosed.   
 41. Whether directors who hold directorships  0–1  
 in other companies is disclosed.   
 42. Whether directors made statements  0–1  
 regarding internal controls is disclosed.   
 43. Whether a narrative s relating to  0–1  
 
directors review of internal controls 
privately with auditors   
    
                                                                                                                                                       (continued on next page) 
    
CG theme CG provision: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
  scores per theme 
    
(ii). Accounting, auditing 44. Disclosure of the performance and  0–1 22 
and transparency  evaluation of the audit committee   
 45. As to whether an audit committee has been 0–1  
 established.   
 46. As to if the audit committee is made up of  0–1  
 at least three independent NEDs   
 47. As to whether the chairperson of the audit 0–1  
 committee is an independent NED   
            48. Disclosure of the remit of the audit 0–1  
    committee    
 49. Disclosure of the membership of the 0–1  
  audit committee.   
 50. Disclosure of the audit committee 0–1  
  members meeting attendance record.   
 51. At least one member of the audit committee  0–1  
 has relevant financial training and experience   
 52. Disclosure of the performance of the 0–1  
 individual members of the audit committee   
 53. Disclosure of director’s remuneration,  0–1  
 interests, and share options.   




 procedure.   
 55. Disclosure of a policy on timely and   0–1  
 balanced information concerning the    
 bank.   
 56. Disclosure of evaluation the effectiveness 0–1  
 of the risk management and governance of   
 internal control and audit system.   
 57. Disclosure of a policy on risk management 0–1  
 and governance strategy.   
 58. As to whether the audit committee  0–1  
 meets at least four times in a year.   
 59. Disclosure of related party transactions 0–1  
 or offers such as subsidiaries.   
 60.Policy to inhibits insider share trade before 0–1  
  announcement of price sensitive information.   
 61. Existence of policies for appointing and 0–1  
 disengaging external auditors.   
 62. Disclosure of annual financial performance  0–1  
 of the bank.   
 63. Disclosure of policy on staggered  0–1  
 appointment and rotation of directors.   
 64. Disclosure relating to the review of  0–1  
 corporate operations.   
 
65. Whether a narration relating to audit committees 
‘ability to investigate any issue under its terms of 
reference, the resources,  0–1  
 and full access to information is disclosed.   
    
                                                                                                                                                      (continued on next page) 
    
CG theme CG provision: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
  scores per theme 
    
(iii). Risk management, 66. As to if a risk management committee 0–1 13 
Internal audit and control has been established.   
 67. Disclosure of the remit of the risk  0–1  
 committee.   
 68. As to whether there is a disclosure of risk 0–1  
 committee members’ meeting attendance.   
 69. Disclosure of the membership of the risk 0–1  
 committee.   
 70. As to whether risk management committee 0–1  
    meets at least four times a year.   
 71. Disclosure of future systematic and non- 0–1  
  systematic risk.   
 72. Disclosure of an existing internal systems 0–1  
  (e.g., internal audit).   
 73. Disclosure of how current and future    0–1  
       evaluated bank risk will be managed.   
 74. Disclosure on issues relating to IT 0–1  
    governance.   
 75. Disclosure on issues with regards to  0–1  
 Management, governance    
 76. Disclosure relating to risk management,   0–1  
  governance strategy and policy.   
 77. Disclosure on issues with regards to  0–1  
 management and governance, internal control    
 and audit systems.   
 78. If the risk management committee  0–1  
 membership is made up of executives,   
 non-executives and independent directors   
(iv) Compliance, 79. Disclosure of the existence of one-share- 0–1  
Shareholder rights and one vote.   
enforcement 80. Disclosure of on how the bank  0–1  
 encourages shareholder activism (proxy vote)   
 81.Positive statements with regards to   0–1  




 82. Disclosure on shareholder right to attend 0–1  
 and also vote at annual general meetings.   
 83. Disclosure of how the bank is contributing 0–1  
 to the development of financial journalism.   
 84. Disclosure of shareholders ‘right to have  0–1  
 their views on pay.    
 85. Disclosure of the issue of general  0–1  
 compliance.   
 86. Disclosure of the existence of right of   0–1  
 shareholders to call extraordinary meetings   
 87. Disclosure of right of shareholders to have  0–1  
 timely information regards to AGM   
    
                                                                                                                                                     (continued on next page) 
    
CG theme CG provision: Information on or reference to Range of Total score 
  scores per theme 
    
(iv). Compliance 88. Disclosure of shareholders right to receive  0–1 15 
 shareholder rights and annual report, other relevant communications.   
enforcement 89. shareholders ’right to receive dividends  0–1  
 and residual income out of liquidation.   
 90. Disclosure of a narrative with respect to  0–1  
 equal treatment of all shareholders.   
 91. Disclosure of the use of modern ways of 0–1  
   communication (e.g. Email, website, skype).   
 92. Disclosure of a narrative with regards to  0–1  
 
   shareholders’ right to transfer and registration of 
share ownership.   
 93. Disclosure of provisions of corporate 0–1  
 
 governance. 
94. Whether a narrative that indicates that the  
the board is accountable to shareholders is disclosed.                                                                                     0-1  
 
95. Whether governance committee is established is 
disclosed. 
96. Whether there is a narrative that states that    all 
shareholders have equal access information about the 
bank is disclosed. 
97. Whether   there is a narrative indicating that 
voting responsibility increases with size of  
shareholding is disclosed. 
98. Whether there is disclosure of policy to ensure no 
block persons have unfettered power        
99. Whether a narrative relating to effective 
communication among shareholders and other 
stakeholders is disclosed. 
100. Whether a narrative relating to a policy on how 
the bank should relate with internal and external 
stakeholders 
 
                                           
 
0-1 
 
0-1 
 
0-1 
 
 
 0-1 
 
 0-1 
 
0-1 
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